List of the Henchmen of the MPLA Regime of Angola Terror

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The Official List of the Henchmen of the MPLA Regime

L ooting the country’s riches by liquefying the natural assets of the nation through the creation of companies
under the name of family and members of the ruling elite of the MPLA Regime

"Angola Grow With Us"
70% of the Population lives under $2 US dollars a day
CORRUPTION – NEPOTISM – COMMUNIST IN ITS PUREST FORM

Information Last Updated: 18 February 2014

The personal fortune of Mr. Josй Eduardo dos Santos
is estimated to be
$20 Billion US Dollars or Ђ 14 Billion Euros
(Estimated in 2013)

From Rags to Riches

Josй Eduardo dos Santos was known to only have one suit and two white shirts
in the city of Brazzaville in (1963-1970), Josй Eduardo dos Santos is son of a stone mason and was born
in the Island of Sao Tome, and doesn’t speak any African Native Language, only fluent in Portuguese and Russian.

SUBMISSION OF CASES OF CORRUPTION

If you have any questions or wish to add information to any of these cases, you are welcome to send us any updated information in regards to the theft of public funds and illicit enrichment in Angola and occupied Cabinda, we are also keen on any information related to foreign multinationals, banks, financial institutions, government officials and governments relations with the MPLA Regime Nomenclature in cases of Public Corruption, Traffic of Influences, Criminal Activities between the MPLA Regime and Foreign Partners.

Rt Hon Mangovo Ngoyo
Keeper of Archives & Chief prosecutor

TOP 60 RICH PEOPLE IN ANGOLA LIST

With more than $20 Billion USD (2013 Estimate)

1 – Josй Eduardo dos Santos, President of the Republic

Isabel dos Santos (Daughter): First Born 1973 Isabel dos Santos assets worth $3 Billion US Dollars, the Richest woman in Africa

Josй Filomeno de Sousa dos Santos (Son): Born in 1977 from Jose Eduardo dos Santos second wife Luнsa Perdigгo Abrantes. He manages $5 Billion US Dollars in funds and assets

With more than $100 Million USD

2 – General Leopoldino Fragoso do Nascimento, (The US$750 Million Dollar Man), Member of the National Assembly

3 – Josй Leitгo, Chief of the Civil House of Luanda

4 – Elisio de Figueiredo, Ambassador

5 – Joгo de Matos, General

6 – Higino Carneiro, Minister of Public Works

7 – Helder Vieira Dias (Kopelipa), General

8 – Antуnio Mosquito, Businessman

9 – Valentim Amхes, Businessman

10 – Sebastiгo Lavrador, Banker

11 – Josй Severino, Businessman

12 – Joaquim Duarte da Costa David, Minister of Industry

13 – Manuel Vicente, Ex-Executive of the National Oil Company Sonangol, Vice President of Angola

14 – Abilio Sianga, Administrator of the National Oil Company Sonangol

15 – Mбrio Palhares, Executive of Bank BAI

16 – Aguinaldo Jaime, Deputy Minister to the Prime Minister

17 – Franзa Ndalu, General in Reserve

18 – Amaro Taty, Governor of Province of Biй

19 – Noй Baltazar, Director Delegate of ASCORP

20 – Desidйrio Costa, Minister of Petroleum

21 – Josй Filomeno de Sousa dos Santos, son of the Dictaror & Chairman Fundo Soberano de Angola

With more than $50 Million dollars but less than $100 Million Dollars

22 – Joгo Lourenзo, Secretary General of the MPLA Party

23 – Isaac dos Anjos, Ambassador

24 – Faustino Muteka, Minister of the Administration of the Territory

25 – Antуnio Vandъnem, Secretary of the Council of Ministers

26 – Dumilde Rangel, Governor of the Province of Benguela

27 – Salomгo Josй Luheto Xirimbimbi, Minister of Fisheries

28 – Jardim, Ex-Minister of Fisheries

29 – Dino Matross, 1°.Vice-Presidente da Assembleia Nacional

30 – Бlvaro Carneiro, Ex-Director Adjunto da Endiama

31 – Flбvio Fernandes, Ex-PCA da Multiperfil

32 – Fernando Miala, Ex-Director of the Services of Security of the State

33 – Armindo Cйsar, Businessman

34 – Ramos da Cruz, Governor of the Province of Huila

35 – Gomes Maiato, Governor of the Province of Lunda-Norte

36 – Joгo E. dos Santos, Governor of the Province of Moxico

37 – Gonзalves Muandumba, Governor of the Province of Lunda-Sul

38 – Anнbal Rocha, Ex-Governor of Cabinda

39 – Ludy Kissassunda, Governor of the Province of Zaire

40 – Luiz Paulino dos Santos, Ex-Governor of the Province of Biй

41 – Paulo Kassoma, Governor of the Province of Huambo

42 – Rui Santos, Businessman

43 – Mбrio Antуnio, Member of the Political Bureau of the MPLA Party and ADM. of GEFI

44 – Silva Neto, Ex-Administrator of the National Oil Company Sonangol Distribution

45 – Jъlio Bessa, Ex-Minister of Finances

46 – Paixгo Franco, President of FDES

47 – Mello Xavier, Member of the National Assembly and Businessman

48 – Kundi-Payhama, Ex-Minister of Defence

49 – Ismael Diogo, President of the Company FESA

50 – Maria Mambo Cafй (Diseased), Ex-Member of the Political Bureau of the MPLA Party

51 – Augusto Tomбs, Member of the National Assembly

52 – Generoso de Almeida, PCA DO BCI

53 – Luiz Faceira, General

54 – Cirilo de Sб, General

55 – Adolfo Razoilo, General

56 – Gilberto Lutukuta, ex-Minister of Agriculture

57 – Simгo Jъnior-Empresбrio (Grupo Chamavo e Gema)

58 – Carlos Feijу, Assessor of the President of the Republic

59 – Armando da Cruz Neto, Chief of the Armed Forces FAA

60 – Fernando Borges, Business man

MPLA Regime No.1

Josй Eduardo dos Santos, in power since 1979

SINCE 2007, 60 CUBAN BLACK SOLDIERS DIVIDED IN TWO PLATOONS PROTECT JOSE EDUARDO DOS SANTOS

They say that because they are black they will not be noticed and they where told to learn portuguese. The first platoon arrived in Angola between the 5 and 8 of October 2007, on the 24 of October 2007 arrived the second platoon. And in the old Cuban Communist fashion they where put to work at once, on the same day. They are administered by a Coronel.

The last time Cuban troops provided the private security of the Angolan President was under Agostinho Neto in the first years of Angola Independence.

On the 27 of May 1977, used the Cuban military men to suppress and kill the internal MPLA faction lead by Nito Alves.

The Cuban Forces took over the Rбdio Nacional de Angola, the barracks of the elite forces that formed the 9Є Brigade, and the Prison of S. Paulo, where the so called "nitistas" where in the morning of that day.

In the book livro Purga em Angola, it gives an account of that day the 27 of May, Dalila Cabrita and Бlvaro Mateus say that around 10:00 AM Agostinho Neto contacts Fidel Castro, reporting to him the events with alarm of the happenings in the City of Luanda, which in his words was taken by vandals and with the danger of an invasion from Zairian and South African Forces, which became known as «Operaзгo Cobra». (snake operation)”

The presence of Cuban Military men in Angola is contrary to the quadripartite treaties of13 December 1988, the “Acordos de New York ”, singed between Angola, Cuba, South Africa under the UN supervision, that made provisions for the withdrawal of Cuban and South Africa troops from the war theatre and the implementation of Resolution 435 that allowed the independence of Namibia.

Comrade Dictator – Josй Eduardo dos Santos

Dictator and self proclaimed Chief of State. Was a member of the group of Cuban troops who took Cabinda in the so-called north front. The MPLA awarded this bastard the distinction of General. And he is the Commander in Chief of the Armed Forces. He is the one who ultimately has absolute power over the regime.

Comrade Jose Eduardo dos Santos speaks no native language of Angola, which in it self its odd as if he was bourn and grew up in Luanda he would at least could speak Kimbundu, and it is well known that Jose Eduardo dos Santos was born in the Island country of Sгo Tomй and Prнncipe, from both parents from Sгo Tomй and Prнncipe, after the birth of their son they decided to immigrate and moved to Angola.

Biography of Jose Eduardo dos Santos

"I meet Jose Eduardo dos Santos in Exile and at that time he could not have had more than two pairs of Trousers and two pairs of shirts, so where does his massive fortune comes from?" – Declarations of the Political Activist Dr. Makuta Nkondo in a recorded interview on the 2 of April 2011 in Largo da Independecia, Luanda.

Jose Eduardo dos Santos was born in the Island and Country of Sao Tome in the village of Almeirim where he studied until the fourth class (that is primary School education).

His mother (Jacinta Josй Paulino) is of descent from people from Guinea and Cape Verde mixed with Sao Tomense after having immigrating to the island country of Sao Tome from Cape Verde due to the draught and hunger affecting that island.

Jose Eduardo dos Santos Father (Avelino Eduardo dos Santos) had originally as his family name Vandunen. The Vandunen are originally descendent from slaves, and they are from a Dutch polygamous father that had several offspring’s from different African women.

This name Vandunen comes from the Slaves and says nothing from the culture of Angola.

The Vandunen gathered a reputation for acting as mercenaries, assassins and thieves, this being the main reasons for the Father of Jose Eduardo dos Santos being ashamed of the name Vandunen and removed this name from his full name.

Jose Eduardo dos Santos is not and engineer of petroleum as we claims. He is lying to the people because he only studied until the 6th class in the High School of Salvador Correia in Luanda, after his parents immigrated to Angola.

He worked in a restaurant in Luanda and after an incident of removal and food theft, the Police agency PIDE was requested to apprehend him, thus is when he skipped as a fugitive to the neighbouring Congo.

Once in the Congo the MPLA Comrade Daniel Chipenda placed the thief Jose Eduardo dos Santos in a instruction course of telecommunications listening financed by the KGB, and it was due to this reason that Comrade Agostinho Neto placed him as the chief of the Communications DISA. This was his first work after 1975, and because of this Agostinho Neto placed him to commence fractionising the population and political manipulation of the society in order to establish a Communist State with the aid of the Russians and the Cubans.

He was swiftly placed as President of the MPLA after the mysterious death of Agostinho Neto in a suspicious medical treatment operation in Moscow. Comrade Agostinho Neto was having second thoughts in moving his allegiance to the United States and Europe and abandoning the Communist Block.

In the mean time the Soviets had this individual Comrade Jose Eduardo dos Santos who spoke fluent Russian and was married to a Russian women, was the perfect candidate to assure the Russians, Angola would not jump ship. The autopsy of Comrade Agostinho Neto was never preformed. Agostinho Neto died on the 10 of September of 1979 in Moscow.

As guerrilla war ends, corruption now bleeds Angola to death

By Tim Butcher, 30 Jul 2002

The scale of the MPLA Regime corruption problem only really registered when the senior army officer leant forward and whispered the magic word "diamonds".

"It is illegal to buy diamonds in Angola but if you know the right people they can fly you over the border to Kinshasa [capital of the Democratic Republic of Congo] and you can buy as many Angolan diamonds as you want," he said.

In Angola they use a Portuguese euphemism for "bribe". They say you pay a little extra so a person can have a gasosa or drink, but the sort of bribes being paid could buy more than just a little refreshment.

Whether it is army officers smuggling gems, government officials demanding multi-million-pound bribes for oil contracts or teachers wanting money for exam certificates, millions of pounds are being misappropriated every week.

And with more than one million of its 11 million population in need of food aid after the end of decades of civil war, corruption in Angola means yet more human suffering.

"Every person could be fed, every baby could be vaccinated, every bridge could be rebuilt and every mine could be lifted if the government of Angola properly used the millions it steals each year," a foreign aid worker said.

One provincial governor from the ruling Popular Movement for the Liberation of Angola, or MPLA, was recently exposed for selling schools to a friend who then charged pupils an attendance fee.

The wives of senior MPLA members go abroad for cosmetic surgery using a government fund meant to allow sick Angolans to travel for treatment.

So bad is corruption in Angola that it represents a grave challenge to the credibility of the new African Union which is supposedly committed to supporting good governance.

"The end of the war in Angola means that right now the main institution in the country is corruption," said Rafael Marques, a dissident journalist from Luanda who has been jailed by the Angolan government for his exposes.

"The system is rotten to the core and until you change the entire system nothing will change."

The systemic scale of corruption across the region compounds the task facing aid workers as they fight the consequences of the worst drought in the region in a decade.

At the top of the corruption charts is the Angolan oil industry, contributing more than 90 per cent of Angola’s Ј2 billion annual foreign earnings from enormous off-shore oil reserves.

Far from funnelling these earnings into much-needed social programmes, the government of President Jose Eduardo dos Santos has been accused of stealing up to a third of the annual income – hundreds of millions of pounds.

Global Witness, an international environmental watchdog, has also accused the MPLA of mortgaging the next few years of oil revenues in exchange for cheap loans.

The IMF has indicated that it will be reluctant to fund large-scale redevelopment in Angola unless some move is made towards accounting for the country’s oil money.

But Mr dos Santos has come out fighting, accusing the IMF of trying to interfere in the sovereignty of his country.

He has hired seven public relations consultancies in Washington to try to improve Angola’s standing among US congressmen, as well as making clear that oil companies will not be welcome in Angola if they reveal sharp business practices.

A footnote in BP’s 1999 annual figures stated that it had spent Ј75 million on a "signature fee" to win an offshore production contract. The payment never appeared in any government accounts.

BP has subsequently declined to publish details of signature fees paid for its three other big contracts in Angola.

All the Presidents Men a Global Witness Report on the MPLA Regime dated 1st March 2002

All the Presidents Men is the product of two years of investigations, and provides an update on the campaign for full transparency in the oil and banking sector. It continues an exposй, which started with December 1999’s A Crude Awakening, into the mechanisms of wholesale state robbery in Angola.

All the Presidents Men a Global Witness – Full Report in PDF

Oil Revenues in Angola: Much More Information But Not Enough Transparency 3rd December 2010

Significant gaps in the data published by the Angolan government about its earnings from the oil industry undermine its attempts to shed a reputation for corruption, says this new study by Global Witness and the Open Society Initiative for Southern Africa – Angola (OSISA-Angola).

A Crude Awakening 1st December 1999

Angola is sub-Saharan Africa’s second largest oil producer after Nigeria, with recent discoveries suggesting it could soon become the largest; this at a time when the 1999 UN Human Development Index (HDI) places Angola at 160 out of 174 countries, according to social indicators. Whilst Angola should be a country with a thriving economy, instead it is a country still at war, where a massive proportion of national wealth is unaccounted for, and where the well-being of the population appears no-longer to be a matter of priority for Government.

MPLA Regime: Above the Law: Police Accountability in Angola

This report documents cases of human rights violations by the police of the MPLA Regime in Angola between 2005 and 2007, which reveal a pattern of police abuse of power and the consistent failure to bring perpetrators of human rights violations to justice. It seeks to highlight the deficiencies in Angolan police accountability that contribute to, and exacerbate, these violations. The report concludes with recommendations for the improvement of police policies and practice, which, if fully implemented, would significantly contribute to a reduction in human rights violations by the police.


En Suisse, l’autre Angolagate des anciens d’Elf

а la chasse aux transactions financiиres pour reconstituer un vrai systиme de prison) et 45 millions de dollars rapatriйs en guise de « confiscation ». Le sort des deux jours-amende (soit le condamnй paie, soit il effectue sa peine de genevois aprиs une semaine au frais derriиre les barreaux. Jugement. une lйgиre peine de PDG d’Elf, le « factotum ».

Riccardo Mortara, expert financier et pilote d’avion, qui fut pendant des annйes le pour le compte du Congo-Brazzaville, le « chef d’orchestre des montages Rйpublique d’Angola ;

Jack Sigolet, ancien bras droit d’Andrй Tarallo, le Monsieur Afrique d’Elf et grand Baumettes, accrochй par un juge marseillais dans l’affaire du cercle Concorde. A sa sortie angolaise.

« entre 400 et 500 millions de dollars » par un fin connaisseur des circuits pйtroliers. Le Le banquier Franзois Rouge, propriйtaire de la Banque de patrimoine privйe (BPP), l’intermйdiaire franзais Pierre Falcone pose ses valises а Pйkin.

Les nouveaux circuits de la corruption

Elisio de Figueiredo, l’homme lige du prйsident Dos Santos, part s’installer en Asie, а

En 2003, alors que l’enquкte franзaise a portй un coup а la filiиre de trafic d’armes.

Le utilisй les services des anciens d’Elf-Aquitaine pour dйtourner des dizaines de millions de d’orgueil blessй de rodomontades de Charles Pasqua sur le trafic d’armes avec l’Angola et les cris dйtournements de fonds via d’anciens d’Elf.

Par David Servenay | Rue89 | 15/11/2009 | 13H54

la trace d’une sociйtй offshore titulaire d’un compte en banque au nom de China

Dynamic Development а Hong-Kong, qui a vu dйfiler 116 millions de dollars entre 2006 et 2008. De l’argent qui a servi а rйgler des achats de bijoux, pour six millions de francs suisses, via la sociйtй Sonnig de Mortara, offerts а des dignitaires de Luanda.

Riccardo Mortara, dйcrit comme le « garзon de course » de l’йquipe, a multipliй les ouvertures de comptes bancaires а Jersey, au Portugal, au Liban et а Hong-Kong. Comme le prйcise Le Temps, la clef de rйpartition des commissions est la suivante, selon la

Chambre d’accusation genevoise :

« 75% des fonds rйpartis semblaient concerner le prйsident angolais, 15% l’un de ses ministres et d’autres intermйdiaires. »
Les derniers 5% ont terminй dans les caisses de Crossoil, la sociйtй de Sigolet.
Le parquet de Genиve et les avocats d’accord pour йtouffer l’affaire
A lire aussi sur Rue89 et sur Eco89
Mais dйsormais, ils devraient avoir accиs au dossier pйnal. Ce qui les rendra peut-кtre de dossiers, soutiens du procureur gйnйral et les « nettoyeurs de cols blancs », ses йtait allй aux limites de ses prйrogatives. Un dйsaveu en bonne et due forme autre d’йtouffer cette belle affaire. Or, lundi 9 novembre, la Chambre d’accusation du L’accusation. Une collusion entre l’accusation et la dйfense pour obtenir le procureur gйnйral de Genиve, Daniel Zapelli, aux avocats des suspects franзais Claude Richard, lui aussi un ancien d’Elf, mettait en йvidence de supposйs liens. Alors que l’instruction est dйjа trиs avancйe, elle est devenue un scandale majeur, а cause

Isabel dos Santos daughter of the MPLA Dictator
Image showing companies partially owned by Isabel Santos

Isabel Josй dos Santos is considered by Forbes worth at least 50 million US Dollars and as the most powerful and richest woman in her country and among the richest in Africa.

6 December 2010 “Santoro Finance” last week bought almost 700,000 shares in the portuguese Bank BPI for around 986,000 euros, thus adding to the shares it already owned, the company said in a regulatory filing.

According to a statement filed with Portuguese stock market regulator CMVM, Santoro Finance said it had acquired a further 698,919 shares in the Bank BPI in purchases on the 26 November 2010 and 2 December 2010, and paid a total of 986,354 euros. With these acquisition, the company owned by the daughter of the MPLA Dictator, Isabel dos Santos, now has a 9.88% percent stake in the Bank BPI.

On 25 November 2010, Santoro Finance told the regulator it had acquired a further 997,00 BPI shares and at the time had a 9.8% percent stake in the BPI Portuguese Bank. Santoro Finance also owns 25% percent of BIC Portugal, an Angolan banking subsidiary. In Angola, BPI sold 49% percent of Banco de Fomento de Angola to Unitel, a telecommunications operators and one of the largest companies in Angola, which has Geni, a company also linked to Isabel dos Santos, as a shareholder with 25% percent.

INTERNATIONAL BANK CREDIT (BIC) – BANCO INTERNACIONAL DE CRЙDITO (BIC)

Isabel dos Santos, first born daughter of Comrade Dictator Eduardo dos Santos, and Portuguese businessman Americo Amorim (25%) are the main shareholders of the International Bank of Credit.

GENI
The starting point was the creation of UNITEL (mobile telephone) in partnership with Portugal Telecom. Founders: Isabel dos Santos
Activity: telecommunications and services.

PRODOIL
Associated to the Amec Paragon (Houston, USA). Between Angolan partners quoted Marta dos Santos, elder sister of the President.
Activity: Exploration and Production of Hydrocarbons, oil, natural gas, services, hotels.

SAGRIPEK
Capital divided between a group of partners Angolans in which includes Isabel dos Santos, which owns 51% and a Brazilian consortium.
Activity: agriculture, livestock, agro-industrial production.

Link between Angolan president’s son-in-law and state oil company
raises questions about transparency

15th March 2010

Sonangol. the state-owned oil company of Angola, nominated the son-in-law of Angola’s President dos Santos to the board of a holding company that owns a third of the listed Portuguese oil firm Galp Energia, Global Witness has learned.

Angola is an impoverished country that depends on its oil industry to pay for reconstruction after a long civil war. Angola has a reputation for severe corruption which Global Witness has been reporting on for the last decade.1 Angola’s people have one of the lowest life expectancies in the world: 46.5 years, according to the United Nations.2

Galp has major oil investments in Angola, a former colony of Portugal, and works closely with Sonangol, whose chairman Manuel Vicente sits on its board.3

A third of the shares in Galp are owned by a holding company called Amorim Energia BV. Forty-five per cent of the shares in Amorim Energia are owned by a company called Esperaza Holding BV, which is a subsidiary of Sonangol. The rest of Amorim Energia is ultimately controlled by Portugal’s Amorim family.4

The board members of Amorim Energia include Sindika Dokolo5, a businessman married to Isabel dos Santos, a daughter of the Angolan president. As this briefing will show, Global Witness has learned that Dokolo was nominated to this post in April 2006 by Esperaza Holding. The latter was wholly owned by Sonangol at the time, according to Dutch corporate records.6

"The son-in-law of the Angolan president, a private businessman, should not be working so closely with the state company which is responsible for managing Angola’s oil on behalf of its citizens," said Diarmid O’Sullivan of Global Witness. "This arrangement raises concerns about conflicts of interest to which Sonangol has not responded."

Sonangol’s minority partner in Esperaza Holding is Exem Holding AG. a secretive company based in the Swiss canton of Zug which does not publicly disclose the identities of its owners.7 A director of Exem Holding, a Paris-based financier called Konema Mwenenge, told Global Witness that he has a "professional" relationship with Dokolo. But Mwenenge declined to say whether Dokolo has a financial interest in Exem Holding.8 Dokolo himself, via his lawyer, declined to respond to questions from Global Witness.9 Sonangol’s chairman, Manuel Vicente, did not respond to written questions.10

The fact that the Angolan president’s son-in-law appears to have been representing Sonangol in its indirect investment in Galp does not amount to evidence of wrongdoing. But these findings raise further questions about the transparency of Sonangol, the state oil company which dominates the economy of Angola.

Sonangol collects billions of dollars a year in revenues on behalf of the Angolan government and controls other companies’ access to Angola’s oil and gas reserves, but does not publish its accounts and discloses little detailed information about its activities.

When President dos Santos called for "zero tolerance" of corruption in November 2009, a prominent member of the ruling MPLA party said Angolans should feel free to criticise the president over his family’s business dealings, Reuters news agency reported.11

Portuguese billionnaire Americo Ferreira de Amorim is the chairman of Amorim Energia. He told Global Witness, in a three-page response to questions about the issues raised in this briefing, that Dokolo had been appointed to the board of Amorim Energia "at the designation of Esperaza Holding".12

"The fact that Mr Dokolo is the husband of the daughter of President Jose Eduardo dos Santos does not seem in itself as relevant neither [sic] to qualify nor to disqualify him as a board member of Amorim Energia, and therefore was not a factor to have him appointed as a managing director of Amorim Energia," Amorim wrote in his letter to Global Witness. He added: "I can give you my personal views on the fact that the appointment of Mr Dokolo did not raise discussions concerning ethical issues."

Amorim said in his letter that the relationship between Amorim Energia and Galp was governed by a shareholder agreement that was in place before Dokolo came onto the former’s board. Global Witness does not assert, or seek to imply, that companies controlled by the Amorim family have engaged in any illegal or illegitimate activity.

At the end of 2006, Sonangol’s 100 per cent shareholding in Esperaza Holding had fallen to 60 per cent. The other 40 per cent was owned by a subsidiary of Exem Holding.13 Exem Holding, via its subsidiaries, has been granted access by Sonangol to potentially lucrative investments in Angolan oil and gas but appears to be otherwise unknown in the oil industry.

Sonangol has authorised subsidiaries of Exem Holding to:

* Acquire a 40 per cent stake in Esperaza Holding by the end of 2006, making it a partner in Sonangol’s indirect investment in Galp.
* Acquire a 10 per cent stake in an Angolan gas exploration venture announced in December 2007. This venture is controlled by Sonangol. Its other shareholders include Galp, Italy’s ENI and Spain’s Gas Natural.14 The venture has reportedly been awarded a ten-year gas exploration licence and exempted from taxes.15
* Pre-qualify, as of late 2007, to bid for oil licences in Angola.16

Global Witness asked the Exem Holding director, Konema Mwenenge, to describe the process by which Exem Holding had acquired these investments and investment opportunities. Mwenenge replied in an email that: "I can confirm as a Director of Exem Holding that its subsidiaries did respond to tenders in Angola. Information concerning the tenders is available on the web site of the national oil company of Angola."17

Sonangol’s website does report that a subsidiary of Exem Holding has been pre-qualified by Sonangol to bid for oil licences in Angola as a "non-operator" – that is, as a minority shareholder in a joint venture with other oil companies.18 However, there appears to be no information on this website about tenders in relation to Exem Holding’s other interests. Global Witness wrote back and asked Mwenenge where this information could be found, but he did not respond.

Although Sonangol has a reputation for being professionally run, its opacity and its close links to the ruling elite of Angola have long been a cause of public concern. The state oil company has long been used by the government to borrow huge sums in a highly opaque manner and with little public accountability for the use of the money.19

For more than a year, Global Witness has been investigating the relationships between Sonangol and certain private companies that invest in Angola’s oil sector, which are often complicated and hard to unravel because of a dearth of public information.

In August 2009, Global Witness reported on another little-known private company which was pre-qualified to bid for oil rights in Angola by Sonangol in late 2007. The shareholders of this company, Sociedade de Hidrocarbonetos de Angola, included a person called Manuel Domingos Vicente. The chairman of Sonangol, who has the same name, did not respond to a request for comment from Global Witness, nor did two other senior officials who also have the same names as shareholders in SHA.20

The International Monetary Fund agreed in late 2009 to lend $1.4 billion to Angola in return for policy pledges which include more transparency for Sonangol, but it remains to be seen whether these pledges will actually be implemented.21

"At a time when Angola’s government is promising more transparency to the IMF in return for a bailout, our findings show that Sonangol is still anything but transparent," said O’Sullivan.

Global Witness believes that Angola’s government cannot begin to reverse the country’s international reputation for severe corruption until:

* Sonangol explains its relationship with Dokolo and identifies the ultimate beneficial owners of Exem Holding, who are currently unknown to the public.
* Sonangol publishes its audited accounts and full details of oil revenue flows between foreign oil companies, Sonangol itself and the Angolan government.
* Sonangol relinquishes its control over the allocation of oil and mining rights in Angola to an independent agency that operates under full public oversight and awards these rights in a transparent manner.
* International oil companies in Angola commit themselves not to go into partnership with any smaller companies whose ultimate beneficial ownership is unknown to the public.
* The government ensures that civil society groups within Angola are able to freely discuss matters of public interest, including the oil sector, without fear of harrassment or censorship in any form.

For further information, please contact:
Diarmid O’Sullivan: +44 207 492 5863 or +44 7872 620 955
Amy Barry: +44 207 492 5858

Notes
1. Global Witness. A Crude Awakening. 1999; All the Presidents’ Men. March 2002. Time for Transparency. March 2004. Available at www.globalwitness.org
2. United Nations. Human Development Report 2009. Angola. The figures for life expectancy at birth are from 2007.
3. Galp Energia. Annual Report and Accounts 2008. Pages 6, 29 and 182
4. Amorim Energia BV. Annual accounts for 2008. Pages 3, 4 and 23.
5. Amorim Energia Annual report 2008. Page 3.
6. Amsterdam Chamber of Commerce. Handelsregisterhistorie. Esperaza Holding BV.
7. Handelsregister des Kantons Zug. Exem Holding AG.
8. Global Witness phone and email conversations with Mwenenge.
9. Correspondence between Global Witness and a lawyer acting for Dokolo.
10. Letter sent to Vicente by Global Witness on 15 September 2009.
11. Reuters. Angolan President calls on party to end corruption. 21 November 2009. Angolan President’s family taint corruption fight. 3 December 2009.
12. Letter from Americo Ferreira de Amorim to Global Witness. 18 January 2010.
13. Esperaza Holding B.V. annual accounts 2006. Page 3.
14. Eni. Eni acquires a participation stake in the Angola LNG Project. 10 December 2007. This press release refers to Exem Exploration & Production B.V. This company has since been renamed Exem Oil & Gas B.V. according to annual accounts filed by the latter for 2007, and is wholly owned by Exem Energy B.V, which is wholly owned by Exem Holding AG.
15. Reuters. Angola set to exempt gas explorers from tax. March 25 2009.
16. Angolan licensing round 2007/2008. Companies pre-qualified for Non-Operator. List published by Sonangol on its website. http://www.sonangol.co.ao/
17. Email to Global Witness from Mwenenge. 19 October 2009.
18. Angolan licensing round 2007/2008. Companies pre-qualified for Non-Operator. List published by Sonangol on its website. http://www.sonangol.co.ao/
19. See Global Witness. Undue Diligence. How banks do business with corrupt regimes. March 2009. Chapter Eight.
20. Global Witness. Angola. Private oil firm has shareholders with same names as top government officials. Media briefing. 4 August 2009.
21. International Monetary Fund. IMF lends Angola $1.4 billion to support reserves, reforms. Press release. 26 November 2009. See also Global Witness. IMF risks condoning corruption with new loan to Angola. Press release. 5 November 2009.

ZAP TV & INTERNET PROVIDERS

24 February 2012

ZAP, its an Angolan company that delivers TV and Internet content, with a participation 30% of its capital owned by ZON Multimйdia, commemorated this week end (February 2012) its second anniversary with the inauguration of its brand new installations in Luanda.

ZAP is owned in its majority 70% by the Angolan businesswomen Isabel dos Santos (daughter of El President Jose Eduardo dos Santos, the source of her wealth or her funds is unknown), the creation of the company ZAP constituted the first step in the process of internationalization of the company ZON Multimйdia in the Portuguese speaking countries.

The project of ZAP was born after Isabel dos Santos (daughter of El President Jose Eduardo dos Santos) became shareholder of the company ZON, with the purchase of 10% of the capital of that Portuguese company. ZAP was the first company to offer HD TV service in Angola.

In the opening ceremony of the inauguration of the coporate offices in Luanda situated in Talatona, the event was presided by the Minister of Social Communication Carolina Cerqueira, and by the Minister of Telecommunications & Technology of Information, Josй da Rocha, was also present at the event the President of the Executive Comission of ZON Multimйdia, Rodrigo Costa.

The Powerful Isabel dos Santos

Who is and how she lives the woman who is buying so much in Portugal? In the last 15 days (16 May 2012), she spent 82 Million Euros. The personal fortune of the first born daughter of Jose Eduardo dos Santos, known as the "Princess", has now surpassed the amount of investment in Portugal in the tune of 1.4 Billion Euros.

With jeans trousers and thorn T-Shirt, accompanied by a well-dressed lady and three children, a young woman arrives at Lisbon airport. A friend waits for some time, her flight from Luanda. Although she is famous and her name sparkles in all the headlines of newspapers of our country economic (Portugal), not to mention Forbes Magazine, where she figures as one of the largest fortunes in Africa, nobody, apart from him, recognizes her. Camouflaged in simple dress mode – although brand – lets the sparkle for her accompanier, in truth the "Au pair" of the children (4, 7 and 8 years). The girl of thorn jeans, yet, she is the one who is the boss. and the mother.

Maybe Isabel Josй dos Santos, 39 years old presumably completed last April, is only coming in a shopping trip. Simple things: a participation in the company GALP, a reinforcement in the position of ZON or another even bigger bite of the Bank BPI. The "Princes", as she is known is Angola, first born of the President Josй Eduardo dos Santos and of a Russian mother by the name of Tatiana, took a course in mechanical engineering electronics in King’s College, London, and displays a bewildering discretion, averse to parties and art openings, interviews or photographs of fuss and colourful African.

Completely westernised, anglophile, but speaking a perfect Portuguese, speaks French (that she uses with her Congolese husband Sindika Dokolo) and, presumably an impeccable Russian, she is a woman of the world.

One of these days, Portugal needed investment like her place of birth the dessert azeri (born in Baku, Azerbaijгo) needs drops of rain. Isabel dos Santos has been the angolan rain in service: through the company holding Santoro, she has 25% of the BANK BIC, now owner of the Bank BPN, and 19,4% of the Bank BPI. Through the company Esperanza Holding (like Holy Hope, a poem of Agostinho Neto), in partnership with Sonangol, 33,34% of the company Galp (45% of the company Amorim Energy).

And through the company holding Kento, 15% of the company ZON. Its around 1,4 Billion Euros in the value of shareholder in companies in the Portuguese stock market. Bank, Energy, Telecommunications – are her areas of interest, also of cement, and food produce distribution and art.

She is also the darling girl that owns the sophisticated restaurant in Luanda Oon.dah, where a meal costs in average around 100 Euros.

Os procuradores do Ministйrio Pъblico que estгo a conduzir a chamada “Operaзгo Furacгo” recolheram, em 2007, numa busca ao escritуrio do advogado Antуnio Frutuoso de Melo, documentaзгo relativa а constituiзгo de uma sociedade sediada numa offshore ligada а filha mais velha do Presidente de Angola, Josй Eduardo dos Santos. A referida sociedade, segundo fonte conhecedora do processo, foi utilizada por Isabel dos Santos para a compra de um apartamento em Lisboa.

In accordance with information obtained by the Portuguese newspaper Diario de Noticias, the offshore company, with headquarters in the USA, has finally been the subject of an investigation, because it was part of a list of clients of PIC (International Consultants), a fiduciary company that has already been search in connection to the "Operation Thunder". Such company was used to register an apartment bought in Lisbon by the husband of Isabel dos Santos.

Ora, uma vez que o advogado recorreu а PIC, empresa que fornecedora de serviзos no вmbito da constituiзгo de offshores, a sociedade de Isabel dos Santos e do marido (cujo nome nгo foi possнvel apurar) acabou por fazer parte da lista de clientes jб apreendida pelo Departamento Central de Investigaзгo e Acзгo Penal (DCIAP).

Licenciada em Engenharia Informбtica, em Londres, Isabel dos Santos tem diversificado os seus interesses econуmicos. Em Angola, atravйs da Unitel, a maior operador de telecomunicaзхes mуveis do paнs, mantйm uma parceria com a Portugal Telecom. Uma empresa que explora as redes de comunicaзхes por despacho do Governo angolano, que, por “razхes de manifesto interesse do Estado”, atribuiu а empresa a exploraзгo da rede mуvel.

In 2005, the First Born of Josй Eduardo dos Santos became shareholder of Banco Internacional de Crйdito (International Bank of Credit), with a participation identical to the Portuguese businessman Amйrico Amorim. And in partnership with this businessman gained entrance to the capital of the Portuguese company GALP by means of the consortium of Amorim/Sonangol, the National Oil Company of Angola, after that date and event there where no longer limits in her funding and investment with moneys of unknown origin.

THE DEALINGS OF ISABEL DOS SANTOS, DAUGHTER OF THE DICTATOR OF ANGOLA

UNITEL
Na reuniгo da Assembleia-Geral da UNITEL, a 4 Fevereiro 2006, Isabel dos Santos foi reconduzida ao cargo de administradora da principal operadora de telefonia celular.

A UNITEL й uma empresa privada de capitais mistos, com a participaзгo do Estado, que detкm 25% das quotas atravйs da Sonangol.

Atй а presente data, Isabel dos Santos mantйm-se como administradora da empresa. Dirigiu a reuniгo o presidente da Assembleia-Geral da UNITEL, General Leopoldino Fragoso do Nascimento, que na altura era o chefe de Comunicaзхes do Presidente da Repъblica, Josй Eduardo dos Santos.

O General mantйm-se como presidente da Assembleia-Geral da UNITEL, й consultor principal da Casa Militar do Presidente da Repъblica e, atй recentemente, tinha como Presidente do Conselho (PCA) de Administraзгo da UNITEL, o ex-PCA da Sonangol e actual ministro da Coordenaзгo Econуmica, Manuel Vicente.

Como foi Isabel dos Santos parar ao Conselho de Administraзгo da UNITEL e onde encontrou capital para ser accionista de uma das principais empresas privadas angolanas? A resposta a esta questгo certamente poderб ajudar a filha do Chefe do Estado a limpar o seu nome com brio.

BIC BANK
Since 2005, Isabel dos Santos is Administrator of the Bank BIC, where she owns 25% of the social capital, per the legal documents dated from the 7 June 2006.

Her name is present regularly in the portal of the Bank and on other documents of the company, in her quality or administrator of the Bank

DIAMONDS DEALINGS AND ISABEL DOS SANTOS
A associaзгo de Isabel dos Santos ao negуcio dos diamantes, em Angola, й bem conhecida. Em parceria com a sua mгe, Tatiana Cergueevna Regan, Isabel dos Santos constitui a 2 Abril 1997, em Gibraltar, a empresa Tais Limited, na qual detinha 75% das acзхes, cabendo o resto а sua mгe.

Por sua vez, a 11 Outubro 1999, o governo angolano, chefiado pelo seu pai, promulgou um acordo com a sua empresa, a Trans Africa Investment Services (Tais), o Group Goldeberg e Leviev Wellox, para a criaзгo de uma empresa mista de comercializaзгo de diamantes, a Angola Selling Corporation (Ascorp), (Conselho de Ministros (2003:1438-9); a 5 de Outubro de 2004, Isabel dos Santos transferiu a totalidade das suas acзхes para o nome da mгe e, por essa altura, a Tais jб havia mudado de denominaзгo para Iaxonh).

A aprovaзгo do consуrcio revelou conflito de interesses, nepotismo e indнcios de crime de suborno “passнvel de destituiзгo do cargo” (Art. 127є, 1, 2 da Constituiзгo). Para mais informaзхes sobre a participaзгo de Isabel dos Santos na Ascorp e as implicaзхes legais, consulte: Marques, Rafael, Diamantes de Sangue. Tinta-da-China: Lisboa, 2011:32-3.

OIL SECTOR AND ISABEL DOS SANTOS
O sector dos petrуleos em Angola tem sido o mais opaco e o mais controlado pelo Presidente da Repъblica, para serviзo dos seus desнgnios pessoais. A aprovaзгo final de qualquer contrato petrolнfero, por concurso pъblico ou nгo, cabe sempre ao Presidente da Repъblica.

O Decreto n.є 48/06, do Conselho de Ministros, sobre os Procedimentos de Concursos Pъblicos no Sector dos Petrуleos, estabelece que a aprovaзгo final dos concursos pъblicos cabe ao Governo, ou seja exclusivamente ao Presidente da Repъblica, como chefe do Executivo (Art. 14є, c).

Como exemplo, um ano antes de Isabel dos Santos ter apresentado queixa, o seu pai promulgou, a 27 Outubro 2006, a autorizaзгo conferida а Sonangol para associar-se, entre outras empresas, а Prodoil, para a realizaзгo de operaзхes petrolнferas no Bloco 1/06 (Decreto n.є 82/06).

A Prodoil й uma empresa criada a 9 Novembro 2001 pela Marsanto, e com participaзгo simbуlica da Prodiaman e Arlindo Fernando da Costa.

A Marsanto й uma empresa criada a 17 Dezembro 1996, pelos sobrinhos do Presidente Edson dos Santos Sousa e Esmeralda dos Santos Sousa, filhos da sua irmг Marta dos Santos, assim como o consorte desta Josй Pacavira Narciso.

Por sua vez, este cunhado de Josй Eduardo dos Santos й o PCA da Prodoil desde 2001.

Caixa Geral de Depуsitos vende participaзгo na Zon a Isabel dos Santos

A empresбria angolana pagou cerca de 85 milhхes de euros pela participaзгo de 10,88% que o banco do Estado detinha na empresa de telecomunicaзхes. Isabel dos Santo passa a ser a maior acionista privada da empresa, com 28,8 por cento do capital.

INVESTMENTS IN CAPE VERDE ISLAND

UNITEL a company which is Isabel dos Santos daughter of Jose Eduardo dos Santos owned by 25% ACQUIRED 70% OF THE CAPE VERDE ISLANDS PHONE COMPANY "T Mais" October 2012.

Isabel dos Santos, Africa’s Richest Woman

Daddy’s Girl: How An African ‘Princess’ Banked $3 Billion In A Country Living On $2 A Day

This story appears in the 2 September 2013 issue of Forbes
By Kerry A. Dolan and Rafael Marques de Morais

LAST DECEMBER (2012) Isabel dos Santos commemorated her tenth wedding anniversary to Congolese businessman Sindika Dokolo with a party. Subtlety wasn’t on the menu. She jetted in dozens of friends and relatives from as far as Germany and Brazil, who joined with hundreds of local guests in Angola for three days of lavishness, including a bash at the Fortress of Sao Miguel in the capital city of Luanda and a beachside Sunday brunch on the posh Mussulo peninsula.

The invitation, according to one attendee, came in a sleek white box, promising a celebration of “a decade of passion/ a decade of friendship/ a decade worth a hundred years. …” A decade worth $3 billion is more like it.

At 40 Dos Santos is Africa’s only female billionaire, and also the continent’s youngest. She has quickly and systematically garnered significant stakes in Angola’s strategic industries–banking, cement, diamonds and telecom–making her the most influential businessperson in her homeland. More than half of her assets are held in publicly traded Portuguese companies, adding international credibility. When FORBES outed her as a billionaire in January the government disseminated the news as a matter of national pride, living proof that this country of 19 million has arrived.

The real story, however, is how Dos Santos–the oldest daughter of Angolan President Josй Eduardo dos Santos–acquired her wealth. For the past year FORBES has been tracing Isabel dos Santos’ path to riches, reviewing a score of documents and speaking with dozens of people on the ground.

As best as we can trace, every major Angolan investment held by Dos Santos stems either from taking a chunk of a company that wants to do business in the country or from a stroke of the president’s pen that cut her into the action. Her story is a rare window into the same, tragic kleptocratic narrative that grips resource-rich countries around the world.

For President Dos Santos it’s a foolproof way to extract money from his country, while keeping a putative arm’s-length distance away. If the 71-year-old president gets overthrown, he can reclaim the assets from his daughter. If he dies in power, she keeps the loot in the family. Isabel may decide, if she is generous, to share some of it with her seven known half-siblings. Or not. The siblings are known around Angola for despising one another.

“It is not possible to justify this wealth, which is shamelessly displayed,” former Angolan prime minister Marcolino Moco tells FORBES. “There is no doubt that it was the father who generated such a fortune.” Isabel dos Santos declined to speak with FORBES for this article. Her representatives failed to respond to detailed questions sent months ago but last week issued this statement: “Mrs. Isabel dos Santos is an independent business woman, and a private investor representing solely her own interests.

Her investments in Angolan and/or in Portuguese companies are transparent and have been conducted through arms-length transactions involving external entities such as reputed banks and law firms.”

In turn, the spokesman accuses this article’s coauthor, an Angolan investigative journalist, of being an activist with a political agenda. The Angolan government jailed Marques de Morais in 1999 over a series of articles critical of the regime and has brought new criminal defamation charges against him over his 2011 book, Blood Diamonds: Corruption and Torture in Angola.

Finally, a representative of Mrs. Dos Santos said that any allegations of illegal wealth transfers between her and the government are “groundless and completely absurd.” That could well be. When your father runs the show, and can dictate which national assets are sold and at what price, what’s theft of public resources in one country can be rendered legal with a swipe of the pen.

President Josй Eduardo dos Santos could not be reached for comment. That is unfortunate, because the Dos Santoses, as Moco notes, have “some explaining to do.” FOR THREE CENTURIES the Portuguese extracted wealth from this mineral-rich country on Africa’s southwestern coast.

Almost immediately after Angola won independence in 1975, various internal factions began battling one another for the right to do the exact same thing. From this chaos, which lasted 27 years, Dos Santos, who had studied oil engineering in Soviet Azerbaijan and served as foreign minister upon independence, eventually emerged as president in 1979. He’s held on to power ever since, making him the planet’s third-longest-serving nonroyal head of state.

The president met his first wife (he’s been married at least twice), Tatiana Kukanova, while a student in Azerbaijan, and his first child–Isabel–was born there. By age 6 Isabel dos Santos was in Angola’s presidential palace, and while the family’s lifestyle wasn’t over-the-top by profligate African dictator standards (save the president’s dalliances–at least five of his children are from various mistresses), the family had Christmas trees flown in from New York and $500,000 worth of bubbly imported from a Lisbon restaurateur.

There was decadence enough for Isabel to earn the nickname “the Princess.” During Isabel’s upbringing the Angola economy sputtered, crippled by two factors: ongoing civil war and Dos Santos’ socialist policies. “In the 1980s you’d go to the supermarket and there would only be noodles on the shelves.

There wasn’t much there,” says University of Southern California associate professor emeritus Gerald Bender, who’s been studying Angola since 1968. For cloistered Isabel that reality was likely invisible; she eventually attended King’s College in London, where her mother, now a British citizen, lives, and earned an undergraduate degree in engineering.

However, as civil war resumed by the end of 1992, Isabel left for Angola’s capital city, Luanda, in a rush, allegedly after receiving death threats in London. By the late 1990s, when the civil war was winding down –a ceasefire was formally declared in 2002–President Dos Santos, like the Soviets he had studied under in the 1960s, was embracing a grab-what-you-can form of capitalism.

Over the past decade Angola has been one of the world’s fastest-growing economies. GDP grew at an 11.6% annual clip from 2002 to 2011, driven by a more than doubling of oil production to 1.8 million barrels a day. The government budget sits at $69 billion, up from $6.3 billion a decade ago. But predictably, precious little of the windfall has made it to the people. Some 70% of Angolans live on less than $2 a day. And by the government’s own count, 10% of the country’s population is scrambling for food due to drought and bureaucratic neglect. So where’s the money going? Start with a paranoid president-for-life.

The state security apparatus sucks more funds from the budget than health care, education and agriculture combined. A lot is clearly stolen: Between 2007 and 2010 at least $32 billion of oil revenue went missing from the federal ledger, according to the International Monetary Fund, which later tracked most of the money to “quasi-fiscal operations.” Angola comes in at 157 out of 176 nations ranked by Transparency International’s Corruption Perceptions Index.

It trails shining stalwarts of participatory democracy such as Yemen and Kyrgyzstan. And it’s within this environment that Isabel dos Santos has surfaced with an estimated net worth of $3 billion.

ISABEL DOS SANTOS’ formative business experience came at Miami Beach. Not the Florida city, but rather a rustic chic beachside bar and restaurant in Luanda that tries to emulate its namesake, down to the mediocre food and indifferent service. In 1997 the owner, Rui Barata, was having issues with health inspectors and taxmen. His solution: bringing in Isabel dos Santos, then 24, as his partner, with the idea, contemporaries say, that her name would keep pesky government regulators at bay.

Her initial investment was negligible, according to a source with knowledge of the deal, and the restaurant thrived: Sixteen years later it’s still a weekend hot spot. The lesson–the equity stake available to those with a gilded name–couldn’t have been lost on Isabel dos Santos, who was entering adulthood at the exact same time Angola’s riches were being unlocked.

Here’s what followed: First, Grab the Diamonds. Angola is the world’s fourth-largest diamond producer, selling an estimated $1 billion in gems every year from mines situated in the country’s northeast. The mines’ exclusive concession-holder is the state-owned company, Endiama. In 1999 President Dos Santos pushed Endiama to form a diamond-selling partnership. Three Israeli diamond merchants, including Lev Leviev, who FORBES now estimates is worth $1.5 billion, promised contacts and expertise.

The power behind the venture, according to British court records, was Russian arms dealer Arkady Gaydamak–a former confidant of President Dos Santos during the civil war of 1992-2002. The new company would be called Ascorp. Leviev and his partners, including Gaydamak, would wind up with 24.5% of Ascorp.

The government would retain 51%. The most surprising major shareholder? Isabel dos Santos, who emerged with a 24.5% stake through a Gibraltar investment company, Trans Africa Investment Services, that she had set up with her mother, according to TAIS’ annual report. (Leviev did not respond to a request for comment, and Gaydamak could not be reached at press time.) Angola’s 2010 constitution bars the president from stealing public money and acts of corruption, which would seem to prohibit the use of his position for the private enrichment of his family.

No matter: Angola’s Council of Ministers, controlled by her father, approved the Ascorp deal anyway. “In a country with separation of powers and real democracy, these presidential actions to enrich his family would have caused legal procedures for his impeachment,” says lawyer Salvador Freire, president of the human rights group Maos Livres. “In Angola he is the law.”

Ascorp was a cash cow, yielding millions of dollars in dividends per month, according to British court documents, but as the “blood diamond” business attracted international scrutiny in the middle of the 2000s, Dos Santos transferred to her mother total control of TAIS, now renamed Iaxonh Limited, according to Gibraltar’s Registry of Companies records accessed by FORBES.

It’s quite a parking spot, safely under the control of a British citizen, with Isabel dos Santos conveniently sitting in Angola as her mother’s sole heir. The mother could not be reached for comment. Telecom: Father Knows Best. In 1997 President Dos Santos issued a decree concerning the increasingly valuable telecommunications spectrum it controlled: The government must undertake a public bidding process for new telecom licenses. Two years later he defied his own decree–by issuing a new one.

The government could grant such a license without a public tender, as long as the grantee was a joint venture with the state. Eleven months after that the president, backed by his rubber stamp Council of Ministers, granted Unitel the right to be the first private mobile telephony operator in the country–with the condition that he had sole power to approve the project and to decide on the shareholding structure of the company, since it involved state funds. The state-owned oil company got a 25% stake, and Isabel emerged with her own 25% stake. A spokesman for Isabel dos Santos said she contributed capital for her Unitel stake but declined to specify how much. A year later Portugal Telecom paid $12.6 million for another 25% stake.

It was one hell of an investment. Mobile phones have revolutionized Africa, and as one of just two mobile phone networks in Angola, Unitel had amassed 9 million subscribers. Revenue last year was $2 billion, making it Angola’s largest private company. Her share is worth at least $1 billion, based on discussions with several analysts who follow Portugal Telecom. Banking: A Friend in Europe. As Isabel dos Santos diversified her Angolan business interests, in 2005 she diversified her network of powerful patrons. Enter Americo Amorim, a Portuguese billionaire worth $4.3 billion who has spent his life expanding his family’s business empire from cork to real estate, tourism and, especially, oil.

The billionaire, who did not comment for this story, was early to seek deals in Angola after hostilities ended. When the Dos Santos clan made a move into banking in 2005, they did so in partnership with Amorim and Fernando Teles, a Portuguese national who had been CEO of another Angolan bank. They formally opened Banco Internacional de Credito, known as BIC, according to the company’s annual reports. The hand of Isabel’s father again played a role: President Dos Santos, as head of the Council of Ministers, formally authorized the foreign investment in the capital of the bank. Specifically how it was financed is murky, as there is no public record showing who put money into the bank. BIC’s latest annual report shows that Amorim owns 25% of the bank.

Various documents reveal that another 25% is held through an investment vehicle controlled by Isabel dos Santos. Her spokesman says she was a founding member of the bank and had independent means to pay her share from her early business ventures. Regardless, BIC was a hit, in large part because of a deal to lend money to … the Angolan government. BIC made loans to the state worth $450 million, in addition to more than $350 million made to private ventures. BIC had assets of $6.9 billion in 2012. Isabel dos Santos’ stake is worth at least $160 million, FORBES estimates, based on the bank’s book value listed in its latest annual report. BIC officials could not be reached for comment. Oil: A Strange Partnership. Oil is Angola’s greatest natural asset.

The country produces 650 million barrels per year, most of it exported. The state-owned oil firm, Sonangol, is so profitable that it was only a matter of time before the Dos Santos family would start looking for ways to hitch a ride on its success. Isabel’s banking partner, billionaire Americo Amorim, would play the key role. In 2005 Amorim set up a subsidiary, Amorim Energia. He would control it with a 55% stake. The remaining 45%, at least originally, went to Sonangol via a Netherlands holding company called Esperaza Holding B.V. At the end of that year Amorim Energia went shopping, acquiring 33.3% of Galp Energia, Portugal’s former state-owned oil company, for roughly $1 billion, according to press reports.

At the end of 2006, according to investigative not-for-profit Global Witness, 40% of Sonangol’s stake in Esperaza ended up with a Swiss company called Exem Holding. No documents could be found that definitively tie Exem Holding to Isabel dos Santos, but her fingerprints are everywhere. Her husband, Sindika Dokolo, was put on the Amorim Energia board at the request of Esperaza, according to Global Witness. And the chairman of Isabel dos Santos’ holding company is also on the boards of Fidequity, a subsidiary of Exem Holding, and entities called Exem Energy and Exem Oil & Gas, according to public filings. Last year Amorim Energia paid $726 million for an additional 5% of GALP. Isabel’s estimated 6.9% stake in Galp is worth a recent $924 million.

Cement: Safeguarding the “Public Interest.” For most of President Dos Santos’ reign there’s only been one cement factory in Angola, owned by a firm called Nova Cimangola. By mid-2004 the government owned 39.8% of it, state-owned oil company Sonangol’s captive bank, BAI, owned 9.5%, and the remaining 49% was owned by Swiss firm Scanang, which was in the process of being taken over by Portuguese cement company Cimpor. The government began demanding a bigger stake, arguing that the factory was a strategic asset for national reconstruction in the aftermath of the war.

On Oct. 29, 2006 the president’s Council of Ministers’ Resolution 78/06 approved a $74 million payment to buy out Cimpor, declaring that the expenditure was necessary to safeguard “public interest, to restore the legality and to maintain the shareholding control of Nova Cimangola by national entities, incorporated in Angola.” The $74 million payment, according to an Angolan newspaper, came from BIC, the bank half-owned by Amorim and Isabel dos Santos.

The government would now own 89%, while BAI and Angolan individuals would control the remaining 11%. What followed, however, showed that the larger goal wasn’t to give Angola a larger stake but rather certain Angolans. Prior to the council’s approval a company called Ciminvest was incorporated in Angola. Ciminvest was initially fronted by the president’s former legal counsel, according to the articles of incorporation he signed. At one point Portuguese billionaire Americo Amorim owned an estimated 30% of Ciminvest, but his representative confirms that he transferred his stake in 2009. He would not comment on who took over the stake or what was paid for it.

The real owners are now widely understood to be Isabel dos Santos and her husband, though documents detailing ownership are not publicly available. However, Isabel admits on her resume that she chairs the board of Nova Cimangola, which she controls through Ciminvest. Without much ado, at no apparent cost, the company that was presidentially mandated to be controlled by “national entities” had become controlled by Isabel dos Santos. ISABEL DOS SANTOS’ holdings are more than just squirreled away assets to be unearthed in case of a rainy day.

They throw off hefty dividends that allow her to buy yet more assets in businesses seemingly unrelated to the exploitation of Angolan properties, such as her $500 million stake in Portuguese media firm ZON. Meanwhile, her father has taken steps to legally protect himself from all the plundering. Under Angolan law President Dos Santos’ decision to grant a license to Unitel for the personal benefit of his daughter could be considered an abuse of power.

To cover his legal bases, in 1992 the president fiddled with the law to reduce it to two grounds: taking bribes or betraying the country. Technically, he can argue, neither was violated in the case of Unitel. The larger strategy, though, is to portray Isabel as a hero.

In January, after FORBES declared her a billionaire, the Angolan regime’s mouthpiece (and the country’s only daily newspaper), Jornal de Angola. claimed that “while we give our best for Angola without poverty, we are elated with the fact that businesswoman Isabel dos Santos has become a reference in the world of finances. This is good for Angola and it fills Angolans with pride.” Angolans should be mortified, not proud.

The Son of Comrade Dictator Jose Eduardo dos Santos

José Filomeno dos Santos, aka "Zenu"

As chairman of the new Fundo Soberano de Angola (FSDEA), Josй Filomeno de Sousa dos Santos is mandated to get the US$ 5 Billion sovereign fund off the ground. Dos Santos represents a new round of leaders managing sub-Saharan Africa’s sovereign wealth. Dos Santos was a former board member of Banco Kwanza Invest, an Angolan investment bank.

Millionaire overnight, where the money come from?

Josй Filomeno dos Santos is CEO of the China Petrotechnical Corporation register in Hong Kong partner of SINOPEC Corp (China Petroleum & Chemical Corporation) The Father is the Dictator of the MPLA, Government, Armed Forces, etc… the uncle is Manuel Vicente, President of the Counsel and Administration (PCA) of the Angola Petrol Company Sonangol, family business is the best (wow is Angola a family run business? yeap it seems so). Jose Filomeno dos Santos, aka Zenu spent time in tour of China petroleum infrastructures in 2005.

José Filomeno dos Santos son of the Dictator Jose Eduardo dos Santos is being investigated by the German Authorities for Money Laundry

Josй Filomeno dos Santos, son of Jose Eduardo dos Santos the MPLA Regime Dictator, seen by some observers as a potential successor to become Head of State, is in the eyes of the German and Swiss media because of alleged illicit business activities.

Zenu, is the nick name for Josй Filomeno dos Santos, is a man that has already worked in several companies of the MPLA Regime: he was part of the Directors of Sonangol and was director adjunct of its subsidiary company AAA, before venturing in the world of International Businesses: he passed by Sweden, he studied in England and participated in several projects, such as “Afrikanische Innovations Stiftung”, Foundation for the Innovation of Africa, with head quarters in Switzerland.

The Swiss journalist specialized in economic matters, Lukas Haessig, recently published and article about the suspicious activities of Zenu dos Santos in Switzerland, in which he explains the function of the Son of the Dictator of Angola Comrade Jose Eduardo dos Santos, allegedly to finance building works for Charity in Africa. “Zenu dos Santos with this front pretends to create for himself a positive image”, sais Haessig.

The Director of the Foundation is a Swiss lawyer by the name of Thomas Ladner, who at the same time, also directs the company of financial services with the name of Quantum in Switzerland. Zenu dos Santos is also one of the promoters of the Bank Quantum Angola: “This for me is a web of companies – an Angolan network – always with the same individuals who work in together”, states the journalist.

The unclear role of a German Banker

Behind the businesses of Zenu dos Santos is Jean-Claude de Morais Bastos, a Swiss citizen original from Cabinda. It was through him that Zenu created his Bank “Quantum Bank” and recruited to this Bank Ernst Welteke, ex-president of the Central Bank of Germany, Mr. Ernst Welteke today occupies the functions of President of the Council of Administration of the Bank of the Son of Jose Eduardo dos Santos.

Haessig considers being “very peculiar” a ex-president of the Bundesbank (German Central Bank) exercising such functions in a Bank of the Son of the Dictator Jose Eduardo dos Santos, e, and at the same time, in a Bank in Switzerland with the same name, but that alegedly nothing has to do one with the other. "But looking for the Administration we can see that its Administrative personnel are exactly the same. Mr. Ernst Weltecke belongs to both Administration Councils and also the Angolan-Swiss citizen Basto de Morais is in both banks".

Accusations of Money Laundry

Angolan observers residents in Germany have already made serious public accusations against this network, which they qualify as a Laundry machine of money laundry from public funds in Angola. The laundry would be made with the participation and help of some German personalities, such as Ernst Welteke, writes an Angolan journalist resident in Germany, in an article published in the German magazine "afrika Sьd". Title of the article: “Dirty money seeks washing-up”.

The Swiss Journalist, Lukas Haessig, says that despite of no proof, for the time being. Deutsche Welle tried in vain to contact Mr. Ernst Welteke, member of the Social-Democrat German party, which in 2004 was forced to quit from the German Central Bank for suspicion of corruption.

Author: Antуnio Cascais/Cristina Krippahl
Revision: Helena Ferro de Gouveia
Translation into English: Mangovo Ngoyo

The Talented Mr. Bastos de Morais

Mr. Jean-Claude Bastos de Morais, the closest business associate of President Dos Santos’ son, Josй Filomeno “Zenъ”. He was convicted by a criminal court in the Swiss canton of Zug for “repeated qualified criminal mismanagement.” The judgment dates back to July 13, 2011.

Bastos de Morais first appealed the judgment. On December 11, he was scheduled to meet the deadline for another appeal at the High Court of Zug. The businessman withdrew from appealing, and the conviction has now entered into force. According to a press release issued by Bastos de Morais’ communications agency, Spicy Communications, the reason for the withdrawal is that he was “acquitted in all major charges.” And that what remained was “only a conditional fine and another one for two formally incorrect wage payments.”

He also denied to the “Handelszeitung” that his business activities in Angola are due to his good relationship with the Angolan princeling. “That’s not the case,” he said.

According to Bastos de Morais, the idea of setting up a state fund for venture capital is his brainchild. He mentioned to have close relationships with several ministers, including the minister of Economy, Abrahгo Gourgel, who “was willing to listen.” Through the attentive hears of the minister, and through a web of connections, Banco Kwanza secured hundreds of millions of dollars from the Angolan Central Bank to invest abroad. At the time, minister Abrahгo Gourgel, was the head of the central bank. “The Minister was able to place the idea, I was the producer.”

“I am a machine of ideas,” boasted Bastos de Morais.

Longtime business partner of Bastos, Marcel Krьse, who is currently the CEO of Banco Kwanza, was also convicted in the Zug court on the same case.

Bastos received a suspended fine of 160,000 Swiss Francs, and has to pay 4,500 Swiss francs. The court handed Marcel Krьse a suspended fine of 170,000 Swiss francs, and has to pay 5,000. A suspended fine means they don’t have to pay the fine unless they commit another crime within the next two years. Nevertheless, both get a criminal record.

Bank Kwanza Invest
www.bancokwanzainvest.com
Josй Filomeno dos Santos, on of the sons of the President Jose Eduardo dos Santos in one of the proprietors of the Bank Kwanza Invest.

Rбdio Kwanza
Rбdio Kwanza is the now Radio Station of Josй Filomeno, dos Santos son of the President Jose Eduardo dos Santos, it will start to broadcast in 2012.

The Eldest Daughter of Comrade Jose Eduardo dos Santos, gave a Diamond Mine to his oldest daughter.

The exploration of her Diamond mine in the mining zone of Camatué, in Lunda Norte.

Ngutuika Josefa Matias (dos Santos)

Daughter of Elisabeth Kaenje Konambanfe and of Dictator Jose Eduardo dos Santos, but of course this daughter, born outside of his "official " marriage does not qualify for a Diamond Mine. UPDATE: January 2012 apparently rumours in Luanda, say that the Communist Leader Jose Eduardo dos Santos, finally has recognized this person has his daughter while in Zaire.

Welwitschia Josй dos Santos “Tchizй” another Daughter of Comrade Jose Eduardo dos Santos

Presidential Promiscuity Has Corrupted Society

By Rafael Marques De Morais
4 December 2009

In August, I sent a letter to the president of the Angolan republic, in which I drew attention to the fact that the attorney general of the republic was breaking the law by serving as the managing director of various private firms, something that is incompatible with the office that he holds. [1]

Several people have asked me about the lack of a response from the head of state and government regarding these complaints. My response has been that one cannot and should not expect any positive reaction from the president of the republic concerning corruption and respect for the law. I argued that Josй Eduardo dos Santos embodied the same promiscuity that he himself had condemned as the worst evil of his government. [2] I also stated that disrespect for the law was common practice for His Excellency.

In response to these questions, I present a brief investigation into the practices of the Eduardo dos Santos Foundation (FESA) as a case study of the president’s behaviour in relation to the institutions of state, current law and corruption. While serving as president of the republic, Josй Eduardo dos Santos also serves as chairman of his foundation, a private entity whose structures include members of the government, members of parliament, multinational corporations and private businesses. Research reveals several articles of legislation which have been ignored by FESA since it was founded in 1996, and which outlaw the use of public powers to personal ends, conflict of interests, influence-peddling and other corrupt practices.

Why has society seemed powerless in the face of the innumerable abuses of power by the president of the republic? This article tries to locate Dos Santos’s actions in the context of the collective mentality that is paralysing society: generalised corruption. The article questions the president’s political and moral legitimacy in continuing to rule the country after 30 years in power, while disrespecting the laws approved by his own government and allowing corruption to become institutionalised.

THE REIGN OF DOS SANTOS

According to Article 65 of the Angolan constitution, ‘the President of the Republic is not responsible for acts carried out in the exercise of his duties, except for cases of bribery or treason to the Fatherland’. (Some lawyers argue that Angolan legislation does not define the crime of bribery and that the provision on treason does not apply to the president. Nevertheless, as a signatory to the SADC (Southern African Development Community) Protocol against Corruption,[3] Angola makes up for this omission since the state has incorporated the protocol into its domestic law. [4] ) Thus, with a constitutionally enshrined freedom from responsibility, the president can do as wishes. His slightest whim is law. Lawyers from the ruling MPLA (Movimento Popular de Libertaзao de Angola – Partido do Trabalho) party go to extremes to interpret the president’s violations of the law as acts of sovereignty and as demonstrations of the political wisdom of their leader.

The 30-year reign of Josй Eduardo dos Santos has been successful in two respects. First, in the accumulation of wealth beyond measure, in shadowy ways and with impunity, by the presidential family, the closed inner circle of government, generals of the Angolan armed forces, high officers of the Angolan National Police, the MPLA elite and foreigners partners. Second, in the absolute control of political, economic and social power through a web of corruption that is complemented by strategies of repression.

In a recent talk on Radio Ecclesia I drew attention to a number of concrete cases of corruption in the highest echelons of the state. I referred to the ongoing violation of the law by members of the government and by those who control public resources. I quoted in particular the flouting of the Law on Crimes Committed by Public Office Bearers [5] and the Disciplinary Regulations for Public Management[6], which both clearly prohibit officials from using their positions or engaging in state business for personal benefit, beyond the proper remuneration for their work.

Several citizens have spoken to me about this subject. Yet it seems that society in general is still not yet prepared to deal with the truth. People feel offended, and can even become hostile, when someone exposes the truth to public view. This is one of the effects of generalised corruption, not of fear of repression. Even though the looting of public wealth has been laid bare, a large part of society prefers to survive by hiding behind the illusion that everyday corruption is an act of benevolence by those in power.

‘They [the power holders] plunder, but also allow others to plunder their share.’ This seems to be the justification among the more enlightened sections of society.

The fear that is so often evoked as an explanation for the impotence of society is simply the fear of losing the property or benefits that are to be gained through dealings based on institutional, party-political or family connections. This is the condition of citizens who are aware of reality and capable of effecting change. This is a middle class riding on the back of opportunism.

THE PRESIDENT’S LAW

The president of the republic, Josй Eduardo dos Santos, is the chairman of FESA, a private organisation which the Council of Ministers, chaired by President dos Santos, ratified as a public utility institution. [7] From an ethical and legal point of view, this act in itself reveals a conflict of interest and influence-peddling, in that the president, acting through a collegiate institution of government, approved his private foundation as a public utility.

According to the Regulations for Associations and Other Public Utility Institutions, [8] public utility status is bestowed upon ‘philanthropic or humanitarian associations, or aid and educational institutions founded by private individuals, of which the beneficiaries are the inhabitants of a particular place, and which are not administered by the State’. [9]

According to FESA itself, the foundation was created in 1996, ‘with His Excellency President Josй Eduardo dos Santos as its founder’.[10] Bestowing upon FESA the status of public utility thus violates the regulation referred to above, which was approved by the president of the republic as head of the Council of Ministers, and which is supposed to apply only to institutions created by private individuals. The president of the republic is not a private entity.

As the chairman of FESA, the organisation’s highest authority, the president of the republic plays an active role, with the power to chair meetings of the trustees’ committee, to appoint the members of the same committee, to convene meetings, to appoint and dismiss the president and vice-presidents of the foundation and to ‘determine the disposal of the foundation’s assets’, among other tasks. [11]

From an ethical and legal point of view, the incumbent president of the republic may not exercise any private function. Although constitutional law is not specific on the matter, this conclusion can be reached through extensive interpretation, according to the constitutional expert Mihaela Webba. If parliamentarians and judges may not fulfil private functions other than teaching, then the president of the republic as the bearer of the highest state office certainly may not.

Moreover, in Angola the president is an executive entity, since he is head of government and as such should, at the very least, respect the judicial regime applied to members of the government, namely the Law on Crimes Committed by Public Office Bearers. Even if this law does not apply to the president of the republic, by association and by interpretation Josй Eduardo dos Santos ought to comply with this law as a member of the government. [12] This law prohibits the use of public office for personal gain, and combining private and public roles. Good sense should have persuaded Josй Eduardo dos Santos not to establish the foundation while in office as president of the republic.

The very nature of the foundation conflicts with the statesmanlike behaviour that is expected of the president, and damages the supposed separation of public power from private interests. FESA, in point 1.2 of article 3 of its constitution, provides for delivering special consultancy services ‘with a view to technical assistance to public and private institutions (. )’. In point 1.3 of the same article, FESA intrudes into the realm of national politics by declaring itself ready to ‘contribute to the formulation of national policy conducive to the sustainable development of the country’. [13]

Article 4 of FESA’s statutes states that the foundation must ‘promote the creation of private business enterprises in which the foundation becomes a shareholder.’ [14] This is something which has happened with great success. FESA’s participation in commercial business, with no line drawn between the state and the private sphere, makes the president of the republic the representative of the commercial interests of a private association in which local meets international capital.

As proof of his absolute power, Josй Eduardo dos Santos has brought part of the government and other bodies of state, such as the National Assembly, into the management of FESA, in disregard of the law. The sustenance of such a decision corrupts the workings of the public administration. This is demonstrated by looking at the management structures of FESA and of its sporting offshoot, the Santos Football Club.

Santos Football Club [16]

Manuel Vicente, the chairman of the board of the Angolan state oil company, Sonangol, is breaking the Disciplinary Code for Public Management by serving as vice-chairman of FESA, a private function, even though he was mandated to do so by the president of the republic. On the other hand, Sonangol, a state company, is a member of the FESA general assembly, one of the main donors to the foundation and a partner in FESA’s investment arm, Suninvest, in the Empreendimentos Miramar project in Luanda. [17]

This is a modern high-rise complex currently under construction next to the Alto das Cruzes cemetery, and which includes a five-star Hotel Intercontinental [18], the biggest casino in the country and three apartment towers, with the most expensive flats currently on the market. Sonangol holds 43% of the shares and Suninvest 40%, while the foreign business that is building the project, the Nankwing Rainbow Company, holds the remaining 17%. [19] This raises the question of who is paying the millions of dollars needed for the construction of the project? Where is Suninvest getting its funds from? Or is Sonangol covering all the costs and offering shares to Suninvest? This information is not in the public domain.

Although the National Assembly has removed the explicit definition of acts of corruption from the Law on Economic Crimes, and its succeeding laws, Angola remains a signatory to the SADC Protocol Against Corruption, [20] the United Nations Convention Against Corruption, [21] and the African Union Convention on Preventing and Combating Corruption. [22] The legal mechanisms and definitions set out in these documents apply to Angola.

More seriously, there is a simple explanation for the total support that the president’s actions enjoy among members of the government, MPLA parliamentarians, and the leaders of the armed forces and the police: they do as the president wishes so that they too may act with impunity.

Let us take the example of the head of Sonangol, Manuel Vicente, whose personal businesses, such as Sadissa, engage in multi-million dollar deals with the state, but who has never been punished for such illegal acts. [23]

The same can be said of Manuel Rabelais. The minister of information is the managing director of various companies, some of which provide services to the state media outlets. Apart from giving away Channel 2 of TPA (Angolan Public Television) to the president’s children, Manuel Rabelais insists on breaking the law by keeping Tchizй dos Santos, the president’s daughter, as one of the interim directors of TPA. [24] Tchizй dos Santos is the managing director of Semba Comunicaзao, which is responsible for producing the content of TPA’s Channel 2. The law known as the Statute of the Public Manager prohibits the simultaneous holding of public and private office in the way that Tchizй dos Santos does. She has the double role of public servant and the main private supplier to TPA. What possibility does this leave for an oversight role by the state?

As members of FESA structures, ministers Manuel Rabelais, Francisca Espa­rito Santo and Mankenda Ambroise, vice-ministers Pinda Simao and Victoria de Barros Neto, as well as the ambassador to UNESCO, Sita Josй, and the Africa and Middle East Director in the Foreign Ministry Nelson Cosme, are committing the crime of abuse of power, according to the Law on Crimes Committed by Public Office Bearers (Lei dos Crimes Cometidos por Titulares de Cargos de Responsabilidade).

The Members of Parliament Domingos Peterson and Teresa Cohen are violating Line H of Article 16 of the Deputies’ Statute (Estatuto dos Deputados), by serving on FESA’s Curators’ Committee. [25] Two of the longest-standing members of the MPLA’s political bureau – the parliamentarians Afonso Domingos Pedro Van-Danem ‘Mbinda’ and Magalhaes Paiva ‘Nvunda’ – are also involved in the Santos Football Club.

The president in turn abuses the human resources that are put at his disposal for the fulfilment of his state duties and for his personal security by deploying them in the management of the Santos Football Club. This is the case with Manuel Paulo da Cunha and Generals Leopoldino Nascimento and Josй Joao Mawa.

Moreover, according to the Santos Football Club website, the club’s main objectives include commercial success through ‘finding the best and easiest route to acquire resources through the international known model of the "business-club"’. [26] Since Josй Eduardo dos Santos continues his role in FESA, and the Santos Football Clube is a FESA project, it is fair to say that the president is directly involved in private business.

Furthermore, FESA represents the most blatant example of influence-peddling ever seen in the country. The FESA general assembly includes representatives of the oil multinationals British Petroleum (BP), ExxonMobil, Total and of the Block 2 associates (Braspetro, Sonangol Chevron, and the Angolan private companies Somoil, Poliedro and Kotoil), as well as the diamond giant De Beers. The construction firms that have benefited the most from state contracts – the Brazilian Odebrecht and the Portuguese Soares da Costa, Teixeira Duarte and Mota Engil – enjoy presidential favour as members of the FESA general assembly and its main donors.

The firm that is almost exclusively responsible for the overseeing of the main state construction projects, Dar, offered FESA office space while the foundation was being set up. Dar is a member of the FESA general assembly, while its proprietor, the Lebanese Ramzi Klimk, is also the chairman of the foundation’s fiscal committee.

Klimk is also a shareholder in FESA’s investment arm, Suninvest, and of the German multinational Siemens, in Siemens Angola. [27] The main state-owned companies, Sonangol, TAAG (Angola Airlines), the diamond company Endiama and Angola Telecom also have seats in the FESA general assembly.

According to Article 21, point 1, line B of the FESA statutes, one of the requirements for a seat in the general assembly is the donation of at least a minimum sum ‘determined by the Council of Curators’. However, there is no public information as to what this minimum sum is. [28]

In terms of current legislation, [29] the monetary and material contributions by these companies to FESA can be defined as acts of corruption since they involve direct or indirect gifts to the highest state official, the president, who as head of the Council of Ministers has the power to decide on the awarding of all relevant state contracts. Until recently, FESA’s President Ismael Diogo, who works with members of the general assembly on a daily basis, was also a public office holder with the position of Angolan consul general in Rio de Janeiro.

Over 30 years in power, Josй Eduardo dos Santos has never earned a democratic mandate as president. Appointed president of the republic by the MPLA in 1979, he did not win an outright majority in Angola’s first and only presidential election in 1992, and the required second round of that election never took place. His current behaviour deprives him of any political or moral legitimacy to continue in office. As Manuel Jorge points out, ‘there is no legitimate power without respect for the law’. [30]

Since bribery is defined as an act of corruption, citizens ought to organise themselves to explore all the legal, civic and political means to insist on an independent audit of FESA’s activities, since there are plenty of indications that criminal action could be taken against the president of the republic, Josй Eduardo dos Santos.

Society urgently needs a debate on how to restore the legitimacy, honour and authority of the office of the president of the republic. The ongoing disrespect for the law is, in itself, a form of tyranny and the corruption of political power and of state institutions.

To take a stand against the political irresponsibility, impunity and corruption that are robbing Angolans of the prospect of a better collective future is an act that is in keeping with the constitution and with aspirations for a more moral society. Angola needs a leader who can restore morality to society and to government for the benefit of future generations.

[1] See the author’s letter about the attorney general’s business activities, addressed to the president of the republic on 13 August 2009. A copy is available at http://makaangola.com/wp-content/uploads/Letter-to-the-President-of-Angola.pdf
[2] Dos Santos, Josй Eduardo (2008) ‘Devemos corrigir todas as praticas negativas que afectam a imagem do Governo’, address at the opening of the 11th Extraordinary Meeting of the MPLA Central Committee.
[3] Assembleia Nacional, Resoluзao.° 38/05 de 8 de Agosto, Protocolo contra a Corrupзao da SADC.
[4] According to the SADC Protocol Against Corruption, ‘Corruption. includes bribery or any other behaviour in relation to persons entrusted with responsibilities in the public and private sectors which violates their duties as public officials, private employees, independent agents or other relationships of that kind and aimed at obtaining undue advantage of any kind for themselves or others.’
[5] Assembleia do Povo (1990) Lei n.° 21/90 de 22 de Dezembro.
[6] Comissao Permanente da Assembleia do Povo (1989) Lei n.° 10/89 de 30 de Dezembro. www.makaangola.com
[7] Conselho de Ministros, Resoluзao n°14/96 de 20 de Dezembro.
[8] Conselho de Ministros (2001) Decreto n.° 5/01 de 23 de Fevereiro.
[9] Ibid. Artigo 2°, n.° 3.
[10] See http://www.fesa.og.ao/fundacao/estatuto.htm
[11] See section II of the FESA Statures on the foundation’s organs, particularly article 8, which defines the role of chairman, and article 9 which sets out the competencies of the chairman in six lines.
[12] The Supreme Court controversially ruled on 21 December 1999 that ‘the President of the Republic is in a certain manner a member of the government since he presides over the formation of the government, having the power of decision in the Council of the Republic.’ The Angolan lawyer Antonio Paulo disagrees with this interpretation by the Supreme Court, and argues that from a constitutional point of view, the leadership of the government falls on the prime minister. Nevertheless, the president shelters behind this ruling as a way of legitimising his absolute control over the government’s decisions. He must therefore be held to account as a member of the government.
[13] See Fundaзao Eduardo dos Santos (2009) Alteraзao do Pacto Social da FESA, Diairio da Republica, III Sйrie, n.° 77, de 27 de Abril, p 3607.
[14] Ibid.
[15] Table based on information available on the FESA website. http://www.fesa.og.ao/fundacao/orgaos.htm
[16] Ibid. http://www.fesa.og.ao/projectos/sfc.htm
[17] See Miramar Empreendimentos, Limitada (2007) Constituiзao da sociedade Miramar Empreendimentos, Limitada, Diairio da Republica, III Sйrie, n.° 70, de 11 de Junho, pp.2169-71.
[18] See InterContinental Luanda at http://www.ichotelsgroup.com/intercontinental/en/gb/new-hotels/luanda
[19] Ibid. p.2170
[20] Assembleia Nacional, Resoluзao.n° 38/05 de 8 de Agosto, Protocolo contra a Corrupзao da SADC.
[21] Assembleia Nacional, Resoluзao n.° 20/06 de 23 de Junho, Convenзao das Naзaes Unidas contra a Corrupзao.
[22] Assembleia Nacional, Resoluзao n.° 27/06 de 14 de Agosto, Convenзao da Uniao Africana sobre a Prevenзao e o Combate а Corrupзao.
[23] Marques de Morais, Rafael (2009) Legal Doubts over Thales’ Angola Deal, text available at http://makaangola.com/?p=44〈=en-us
[24] Gabinete do Ministro da Comunicaзao Social (2009) Despacho n.° 38/09, 28 May.
[25] According to this point of law, one may not ‘use the position of member of parliament to benefit private interests, whether one’s own or of a third party, in any way’.
[26] See FESA (2009) Programas e Projectos, Santos Futebol Clube de Angola: Objectivos do Clube. http://www.fesa.og.ao/projectos/sfc.htm
[27] Vide Siemens, S.A, DiaЎrio da Republica, III Sйrie, n.° 94, de 4 de Agosto de 2006, pp. 2629-33.
[28] A public disclosure by a former member of FESA’s general assembly, the then Norwegian oil company Norsk Hydro (currently StatoilHydro) revealed that it contributed with an annual sum of US$100,000 to the president’s foundation. See http://www.hydro.com/upload/33521/Final%20Libya%20Investigation%20Report%202008-10-06.pdf
[29] As an illustration, the African Union Convention on Preventing and Combating Corruption defines corruption, in Article 4, point 1, line B as ‘the offering or granting, directly or indirectly, to a public official or any other person, of any goods of monetary value, or other benefit, such as a gift, favour, promise or advantage for himself or herself or for another person or entity, in exchange for any act or omission in the performance of his or her public functions’.
[30] Jorge, Manuel (2001) Poder e Autoridade: A Legitimidade em Questao, text sent to the Farum sobre as Mutiplas Consequкncias da Guerra, 14-15 March, Luanda.

The Private Present Diamond Mind of Welwitschia Josй dos Santos “Tchizй”

On the 5 of November 2010, Josй Eduardo dos Santos, authorized the Ministry of Geology, Mines and Industry to issue a concession in the region of Lunda-Norte of the Muanga Project to his daughter Welwitschia Josй dos Santos “Tchizй”.

On the 2 of December 2010 this concession came into law with the Presidential Decree No. 296/10

The Muanga Project was originally given issued on the 14 of July 2005 by Josй Eduardo dos Santos as an association between Endiama (51%), and the Society of Mining Development (Sociedade de Desenvolvimento Mineiro – SDM) (20%), Odebrecht (19%) and Di Oro (10%).

SDM is a consortium between Endiama and the Brazilian multinational Odebrecht.

Semba Comunicaзгo (Semba Comunications)
This communications company as has partners two sons of the President of Angola which are Welwitshea known as "Tchizй", and Josй Paulino dos Santos. The company is spending 17 million USD between 2011 and 2012 on adverts promoting the Republic of Angola and what a great place it is do do business the international news channel CNN, the money off course is paid from public funds, and the company gets its commission, all nice and clear. The name of the advert campaign is "Angola Grow With Us".
The web page of the company was www.semba-c.com and www.semba.ao

Semba Comunicaзгo, a private Angolan company, has been receiving millions of dollars directly from the presidency of the Republic of Angola’s budget to produce commercials to improve the image of Angola abroad. However, this company, incorporated on 11 October 2006, is owned by President Josй Eduardo dos Santos’ children, namely Welwitchea Josй dos Santos ‘Tchizй’ and Josй Paulino dos Santos ґCorйon Du.’ They are promoting the image of their father’s regime through campaigns broadcasted on CNN International. President Dos Santos has been in power for 32 years without ever being elected by the people.

The 2012 presidential budget alone allocates almost US $17 million for Semba Comunicaзгo to engage in a contractual agreement with CNN International for a new advertisement campaign.

Josй Eduardo Paulino dos Santos “Coreon Dъ”

The Company, Di Oro – Sociedade de Negуcios e Alta Costura Limitada, established in 2003, is owned by Tchizй dos Santos (73.34%), and her husband Hugo Andrй Nobre Pкgo (16.66%), and the President singer son Josй Eduardo Paulino dos Santos “Coreon Dъ” (10%).

At the time of the signing of the Muanga Mining Project, the company Di Oro –Sociedade de Negуcios e Alta Costura Lda (Society of Businesses and High Fashion Limited), had a different area and scope of business, has stated in article No. 2 of the company incorporation papers, which was “high class fashion designs, administration of industrial ventures, decoration, commercialization of cosmetics, clothing for weddings, cocktails, anniversaries and receptions”.

Josй Eduardo Paulino dos Santos “Coreon Dъ” left, Jose Eduardo dos Santos, centre with his latest wife on the right

On the 30 of September 2005, two months after the diamond mining concession was granted to both sons and the son in law of Josй Eduardo dos Santos they changed the name of the company to “Di Oro – Sociedade de Negуcios Limitada” (Society of Businesses Limited), and the Article No. 2 of incorporation was changed to “geological studies, diamond prospection and mining, association in the participation of mining businesses, hospitality industry and confections, general commerce, import and export”.

The Brazilian Multinational Odebrecht his heavily involved in accounts of corruption directly involving the President of Angola, by giving 10% of the Social Capital of the Muanda Mining Project to the sons of the President Dictator Jose Eduardo dos Santos, whom personally signed the contracts with the Director of the Brazilian Multinational Odebrecht Mr. Antуnio Mamieri.

The Contract of the Muanga Mining Project in Article No.25 states that Odebrecht and SDM both assume the compromise to make all investments. The only justification for the Di-Oro to receive 10% of the business is the privilege that has in gaining the signature of the President Jose Eduardo dos Santos.

The Dictator Josй Eduardo dos Santos is in the habit of giving mining concessions to his own sons and family, on the 30 November 2005 he gave a concession for Prospect, Research and Recognition of the deposits of primary diamonds in the Cabuia Mining Project, in the region north-east of Saurimo in Lunda Sul by Decree No. 106/05 of 9 December 2005 of the Council of Ministers.

The consortium formed by the company of Tchizй dos Santos, N’Jula Investments, Miningest and Sambukila, was given 5% of the social capital in the mining project, without necessity of any financial contributions to it, either material or technical.

In the mining Project Cabuia, the company Equatorial Diamonds owned by the businessman Hйlder Bataglia, assumed the entirety of the finance of the project in his own account and risk, and stayed with 44% of the total of shares.

The company Endiama, in its quality of representing the state, received 51% of the shares. The contract was celebrated for a period of 5 years by Executive Decree No. 7/06 of 30 of January 2006, of the Ministry of Geology and Mines, such contract received some changed to its original configuration, in relation to the Mining Project of Cabuia.

The consortium of Tchizй dos Santos gained a new amount of 30% for the diamonds exploration period. The company Endiama (35.5%) and the company Equatorial Diamonds (34.5%).


Media Nova
www.medianova.co.ao
Media Nova (New Media) is the biggest editorial media in Angola they are controlled and owned by two sons of Mr. El President Jose Eduardo dos Santos, yep the same old giza, you should get the hang of the way things are run in "Angola" by now.
Media Nova owns Radio More ( Rбdio Mais) and the TV Channel Zimbo (TV Zimbo).

www.radiomais.co.ao
Rбdio Ecclesia was the radio channel more widely listened in Angola but as from 2012 it can only broadcast in certain areas, on the contrary Radio More ( Rбdio Mais) can broadcast everywhere at leisure, Radio More ( Rбdio Mais) you guess it, it is owned by the Company Media Nova which is owned by two sons of Mr. El President Jose Eduardo Dos Santos, owned by Welwitshea Josй dos Santos “Tchizй” and of Josй Paulino dos Santos “Corйon Du ".

Maria Luнsa Perdigгo Abrantes “Milucha"

Maria Luнsa Perdigгo Abrantes “Milucha" is the mother of Welwitshea Josй dos Santos “Tchizй” and of Josй Paulino dos Santos “Corйon Du”.

Maria Luнsa Perdigгo Abrantes “Milucha" is also the president of the National Agency for Private Investment in Angola ANIP (Agкncia Nacional para o Investimento Privado).

ANA PAULA CRISTУVГO LEMOS DOS SANTOS

Born 17 Outubro 1963, tendo feito os seus estudos primбrios em escolas da capital. Cedo se sentiu atraнda pela abertura ao mundo proporcionada pela navegaзгo aйrea, tendo sido assistente de bordo das Linhas Aйreas de Angola durante dez anos.

Contraiu matrimуnio com Josй Eduardo dos Santos, no dia 17 de Maio de 1991. Do enlace matrimonial nasceram trкs filhos: Eduane Danilo (nascido a 29/09/1991), Joseana (nascida a 5/4/1995) e Eduardo Breno (nascido a 2/10/1998), incluindo o nъcleo familiar mais cinco filhos do lado paterno, anteriores ao casamento.

Eduane Danilo Lemos Dos Santos
Eldest son of Ana Paula Cristovao Lemos dos Santos
with Jose Eduardo dos Santos

Front view of the Solar de Alvalade Building in Luanda

Rear view of the Solar de Alvalade Building in Luanda

Main Entrance Front view of the Solar de Alvalade Building in Luanda

Eduane Danilo Lemos Dos Santos son of Jose Eduardo dos Santos and Ana Paula dos Santos
new purchased Penthouse Apartment on the 17 top Floor of the Solar de Alvalade Building in Lunda
valued at US$ 4,000,000 (Four Million US Dollars)

Eduane Danilo Lemos Dos Santos, um dos filhos mais novo do Presidente da Repъblica, foi recentemente brindado com um apartamento avaliado em quatro milhхes de dуlares norte-americanos, no edifнcio "Solar do Alvalade", localizado na rua Comandante Gika, adjacente a sede da OMA Nacional. O presenteado й filho mais velho do casamento com Ana Paula dos Santos.

Trata-se do apartamento mais caro do edifнcio por estar localizado no ъltimo andar (17 piso) com uma vista dos dois lados da cidade. Muito recentemente, e por orientaзгo do “ofertante” que se desconhece, foi partida uma parte do imуvel para dar lugar a uma nova estrutura decorativa revestida de mбrmore branco.

No 7 July 2012, foi alugado uma grua para carregar as novas mobнlias e material da cozinha para o apartamento. O facto foi encarado pelos vizinhos como uma demonstraзгo "de poder", visto que todos os moradores do prйdio usam elevadores e escadas para carregar os seus bens (mas nunca uma grua).

Eduane, de 21 anos de idade, se encontra neste preciso momento a estudar arquitetura na Inglaterra, serб o morador mais novo daquele edifнcio e com o apartamento mais caro.

Vivem igualmente no referido edifнcio, o ministro da Administraзгo e Territуrio, Bornito de Sousa (que aparece de quando em vez), o chefe adjunto do SINSE, Fernando Eduardo Octavio, o ex-administrador da RNA, Eduardo Magalhгes e o secretario de Estado junto a PR, Manuel Magalhгes.

Em tempos, Manuel Rabelais foi-lhe recusado um pedido para colocar vidros na varada do seu apartamento no oitavo andar. A administraзгo do edifнcio convocou-lhe para uma reuniгo onde lhe foi transmitido que nгo permitiam alteraзхes porque iria tirar a estйtica do imуvel.

Atй aqui nгo se sabe se o mesmo irб recorrer da decisгo uma vez que o apartamento de “Danilo” dos Santos sofreu alteraзхes, sem merecer qualquer objecзгo da direcзгo administrativa do referido edifнcio.

LAWYERS WHO HAVE REPRESENTED THE MPLA REGIME

Jean-Yves Le Borgne, french lawyer on the pay roll of the MPLA Regime

Reinhart Marville Torre’s lawyers
(Lawyers to Corrupt and Criminal Regimes)
"To retain our competitive edge, and mindful of our clients, lawyers and support staff, we constantly monitor and seek to control our cost base".

Jean Reinhart, lawyer to the MPLA Corrupt Regime

MPLA Regime No.2

General Antonio dos Santos Franзa, aka “Ndalu”

No decision is taken without his presence. In al decisions even on those more sensitive such as High Command decisions in the Regime, the last word is his. He is revered as the strategist. He is a Regime figure such as Comrade Carlos Feijу, all call him “The Chief”. Comrade General Franзa “Ndalu” is the father of the hawks. After the Dictator Jose Eduardo dos Santos, General Ndalu is the only person in the Regime that can order to “shut the mouth” of Comrade Vice President “Nandу” and the mouth of Comrade General “Kopelipa”.

In the inner circle of the MPLA Regime it is mentioned that the Armed Forces of Angola belong to Comrade President Jose Eduardo dos Santos, but the Generals belong to Comrade General “Ndalu”. He is the mentor of Comrade General “Kopelipa”, of Comrade General Joгo de Matos and others. He is the leader of the hawks in the MPLA Regime. All Generals have to obey him. In 2005 De Beers Angola Prospecting appointed General Antonio Dos Santos Franca ‘Ndalu’ to the board of the company as non-executive chairman.

Monopoly security of oil fields. Its founders were the generals Joao de Matos, France Ndalu, Armando da Cruz Neto, and Antonio Luis Faceira and Hendrick.

General Antonio dos Santos Franзa aka “Ndalu” also has Investments in Air Gemini, the Lumanhe Company (diamonds) with Escom, linked to the Group Espirito Santo.

MPLA Regime No.3

General Manuel Hйlder Vieira Dias, “Kopelipa”

The security of the Dictator Comrade President Jose Eduardo dos Santos is in his hands. He is the closest Henchmen of the Dictator and the one who has access to his home. (also only Comrade Vaz da Conceiзгo and Comrade General Leopoldino have access).

He is Minister of State and Chief of the Military House. In Government he follows all military issues, defence, police and intelligence. All promotions in this areas have to pass through his hands first for appraisal. The Dictator Comrade President Jose Eduardo dos Santos appreciates his discrete side not getting involved with any group. He was the individual who the Dictator sent to convince the dissident Comrade Carlos Feijу to return to the presidential circle. Comrade Kopelipa is in the list of the 5 largest fortunes created by corruption of the MPLA Regime. He avoids political fights with the others in the Regime. He was the responsible of ending the carrier of the Regime Dissident General Fernando Miala.

NO PROOF OF ORIGIN: This insignificant piece of shit speaks no native language of Angola it is known he was born in Cape Verde and Island lost in the middle of the Atlantic somewhere between the African continent and South America.

BUSINESS IS GOOD IF YOU ARE A MPLA REGIME HENCHMEN

List of a few of the many companies owned by Comrade General Kopelipa

MACON
Revolutionize public transport in Luanda (buses and taxis). Hйlder Vieira Dias, head of the Military House of the presidency and director of the Office of National Reconstruction is a member-founder.

AutoStar
Owns 40% of this company that distributes Car Parts and sales new cars like the Mercedes brand. Comrade Manuel Josй Van-Dъnem
another MPLA Regime Henchmen has 10% on this same company.

Activity: transport, trade.

World Wide Capital (WWC). As of April 2011 Comrade Kopelipa now owns 8,37% of the Bank BIG.

Hypermarket Kero
January 2012

Based on the Information of the Director General of the Hypermarket Kero the Brazilian Citizen Joгo Santos, the investment interests in the Kero Hypermarket is made up from a joint of capitals from a group of Angolan Investors and the Private Bank Atlвntico: “The US$35 millions are a joint of own capital and the resources made available by the partnership with the Private Bank Atlвntico”.

On the 10 th of December 2011 the Minister of Commerce Idalina Valente, inaugurated the third Hypermarket of Kero in Luanda in the new location of Kilamba. This housing project is the biggest of Angola and was under the responsibility of the Cabinet of National Reconstruction which is under the Command of General Manuel Hйlder Vieira Dias Jъnior “Kopelipa”.

Presently (January 2012) the project is managed by the State Oil Company Sonangol and it is directed by Comrade Manuel Domingos Vicente.

The company proprietor of the project is Zahara, which is one of the Angolan companies that belong to the Group Aquattro International S.A. Who controls 99,96% of its capital.

This group of companies has in the last three years became the most dynamic and the leader of private development and investment in the angolan economy, it is exclusive property of three individuals: the President of the Board of Administration of Sonangol the State Oil Company Comrade Manuel Vicente;

the Minister of State and Chief of the Military House of the President of the Republic General Manuel Hйlder Vieira Dias “Kopelipa”; and its principal advisor General Leopoldino Fragoso do Nascimento.

These three partners hold an equal share in the Grupo Aquattro International S.A. each one has 33,3% of the social capital in the Group.

Coronel Joгo Manuel Inglкs, Logistics Officer in the Military House, and his Brother Domingos Manuel Inglкs, private assistant of the businesses of General Manuel Hйlder Vieira Dias Jъnior “Kopelipa”, have a symbolic representation 0,5% of shares in the Group.

This company was created by three partners, Ismкnio Coelho Macedo, portuguese citizen, and an administrator of the Private Bank Atlвntico, the one who financed in part the Hypermarket Kero.

Sonangol State Oil Company has a quantitative participation in the Private Bank Atlвntico, of 7,5%, and it is represented in the Bank by a non executive administrator appointed by Sonangol Comrade Baptista Sumbe, who is a close associate and employed by Senior Comrade Manuel Vicente.

The Hypermarket Kero, in the housing estate of Cajъ, Talatona, shows Comrade Manuel Domingos Vicente a member of another multimillionaire project which was financed by the State Oil Company Sonangol, the housing project was created for the accommodation of its workers, for the extended family of the President, and for the nomenclature elite of the MPLA Regime.

General Manuel Hйlder Vieira Dias Jъnior “Kopelipa” and Comrade Manuel Domingos Vicente in the development of a housing project in the location of Kilamba, they both are the responsible for the taking of decisions in the project.

The Trio made up by Comrade Manuel Domingos Vicente, Generals Manuel Hйlder Vieira Dias Jъnior “Kopelipa” and Dino is also propriety of the Private Company Delta Imobiliбria, by which the Angolan State has contracted to manage and oversee the sale of the houses at millionaire prices.

For the moment Comrade Manuel Domingos Vicente henchman of the MPLA Regime and the Generals of the Regime are granted total impunity in front of the law has they are the “de-facto” right hand men of Josй Eduardo dos Santos.

Pumangol with participation of “Kopelipa”

Pumangol, it is a new company (2011) in the Angolan market of comercialization and distribution of oil products, “downstream”, Angola,
it is a company constituted between the multinational company Puma Energy International, and the Trafigura Group and a group of Angolan investors. Among these the main partners are the Chief of the Military House Gen M H Vieira Dias “Kopelipa” and Leopoldino do Nascimento “Dino”. both very near to several titles and both having several businesses in common.

Before of the constitution of Pumangol (the bureaucratic set up process was done in an unusual speedy and timely manner unusual in Angola, supposedly by direct influence of Angolan personalities interested), Sonangol, through its holding, announced the intention of purchasing 20% of the participation in the Trafigura Group in the Company Puma Energy International, which mean that by the path it also has indirect interests in the new company.

Since its set up Pumangol has already opened up 15 distribution posts of gasoline in Luanda (end of 2011 early months of 2012), some of these gas stations are of big proportions.

Pumangol thus does not need to deal with the usual paper word and red tape and becomes more competitive in the “midstream”.

Pumangol does not depend of the Sonangol Refinery; it imports directly, in accordance with the plans that traces and which execution controls.

Angola officials held hidden oil stakes

Financial Times
By Tom Burgis and Cynthia O’Murchu, FT.com

(Financial Times) Three of the most powerful officials in Angola have held concealed interests in an oil venture with Cobalt International Energy, the Goldman Sachs-backed explorer whose operations in one of the world’s most promising energy frontiers are under investigation by US authorities, the Financial Times has learned.

The recently departed head of the national oil company and an influential general confirmed to the FT last week that they and another general have held shares in Nazaki Oil and Gбz, the local partner in a Cobalt-led deepwater venture launched in early 2010.

Warning its shareholders that it might face liabilities under US anti-corruption laws, Houston-based Cobalt said in February that the Securities and Exchange Commission and the Department of Justice were investigating its Angolan operations.

The three men’s previously opaque shareholdings in Cobalt’s local partner could raise questions about compliance with US anti-corruption law, which makes it a crime to pay or offer anything of value to foreign officials to win business.

Manuel Vicente, who was the head of state-owned Sonangol until his appointment in January as minister of state for economic co-ordination, and General Manuel Hйlder Vieira Dias Jъnior, known as Kopelipa, the head of the presidency’s military bureau, confirmed their holdings in Nazaki in near-identical letters.

As head of Sonangol, Mr Vicente oversaw Africa’s second-biggest oil industry. Asked whether they had exerted any influence over the award of Cobalt’s oil rights, Mr Vicente and Gen Kopelipa denied wrongdoing. They said they had held their Nazaki interests "always respecting all Angolan legislation applicable to such activities, not having committed any crime of abuse of power and/or trafficking of influence to obtain illicit shareholder advantages".

They said their interests and those of General Leopoldino Fragoso do Nascimento were held through Grupo Aquattro Internacional. Aquattro is named as a Nazaki shareholder in two company documents from 2007 and 2010 obtained by the FT. They said Aquattro had been "recently dissolved" but did not say whether they had disposed of their interests in Nazaki.

Gen Fragoso do Nascimento, a former head of communications in the presidency, did not respond to requests for comment.

Mr Vicente and Gen Kopelipa added: "Should the continued operation of Cobalt in the Angolan petroleum sector be unviable as a result of any failure to comply with any American law, there will certainly be [Angolan] and/or foreign entities interested in substituting for it in the assets it owns in Angola." Gen Kopelipa added that "that hopefully will not happen".

Responding to FT inquiries about the three officials, Cobalt stressed that its extensive and ongoing due diligence "has not found any credible support for [the] central allegation that Angolan government officials, and specifically the officials identified. have any ownership in Nazaki". It would be happy to review any proof.

"Cobalt has at all times complied fully with both US and Angolan laws," it said. Nazaki, which did not respond to a request for comment, denied the allegation, Cobalt said.

Goldman, one of Cobalt’s founding investors and its biggest shareholder, declined to comment, as did the SEC and DoJ. Sonangol did not respond to requests for comment.

Kopelipa Pitta Gros Vieira Dias

The son of General Manuel Hйlder Vieira Dias Jъnior “Kopelipa”

4 November 2012 – The of son General Kopelipa bought the Portuguese Company Viauto from the Company Santogal, a Company from the Portuguese Group Espirito Santo.

Viauto represents in Portugal and Spain the Car Brands of Ferrari and Maserati in both nations markets, but the deal made with the Son of General Kopelipa only corresponds to the Company Interests and Operations in Portugal.

Kopelipa Pitta Gros Vieira Dias, has and owns several businesses in Portugal, both in the bar, club and restaurants sector and in the Real Estate sectors, with this purchase he enters the selling of luxury cars in the Portuguese market.

It is not know the origin and source of his funds nor in which way and manner the funds will arrive in this European Community Country, Portugal. The Bank of Angola in an attempt to combat the exit of capitals from Angola, forbid that any Angolan citizen transfer to the exterior no more than $ 60,000 USD per year.

MPLA Regime No.4

Manuel Domingos Vicente

Comrade Manuel Domingos Vicente (son-in-law of the Dictator Jose Eduardo dos Santos) receives $6 Million USD per year from the Oil Company Exxon for Rent of a Apartment in Barrio Corimba in Luanda, Angola, the Oil Company Exxon deposits the annual rent directly into the personal account of Comrade Manuel Domingos Vicente in a Swiss Bank.

Chinese unelected Vice Premier Li Keqiang (R) meets with Manuel Domingos Vicente (L), chairman and chief executive officer of Sonangol, Angola’s state-owned oil company, in Beijing, May 9, 2010.

Manuel Domingos Vicente
(son-in-law of the Dictator Jose Eduardo dos Santos)

Comrade Manuel Vicente is the 39є most important man of the Portuguese Economy.
So how much money does he has in Portugal? Just ask the Immensely Incompetent and Corrupt Portuguese Authorities.

In the start of 2010 he was in the path to become Minister of State for Economic Coordination, he also seen the name of one of his protйgйes Comrade Baptista Sumbo being denied to substitute him has President of the Administration Council of Sonangol the MPLA run and control State Oil Company.

The importance that the Dictator Jose Eduardo dos Santos has given him denotes that he has now passed into the list of natural candidates to the presidential succession. He has received much power whereby he has now be given the control of Transport, Economy and Public Works. In the last years it is to him that Comrade Dictator Jose Eduardo dos Santos started to ask for the names of who should and should not be promoted. Some in the unelected Regime say that he is in training for the passage of the political testament. He is placing individuals of the MPLA Run State Oil Company Sonangol into Governmental Posts.

BCP (Banco Comercial Portuguкs) this Bank is the largest investment of the MPLA Regime in the portuguese economy. Sonangol, the State Oil Company of Angola controls 11,57% of shares in this bank, which confers to the MPLA Regime the largest share holder in the bank. Recently (early 2012) dictated the rules and structure of the institution. And selected the model of administration and appointed the names to the Council of Administration. We must understand that the MPLA Regime is advised in such matters by the Cuban advisors in the same way the Cuban Regime advises and controls the Regimes in Venezuela, Nicaragua, Argentina, Ecuador and Bolivia.

Manuel Domingos Vicente has accumulated one of the largest fortunes in Angola. He is also referred in the Regime structures as the financial facilitator of the New Rich inside of the MPLA Regime.

Opening ceremony of the Hypermarket Kero in Luanda

Hypermarket Kero : Partner in the Hypermarket Kero (Please read the details in MPLA Regime No.3)

Link between the MPLA Regime Dictator son-in-law and
state oil company raises questions about transparency

15th March 2010

Sonangol, the state-owned oil company of Angola, nominated the son-in-law of Angola’s President dos Santos to the board of a holding company that owns a third of the listed Portuguese oil firm Galp Energia, Global Witness has learned.

Angola is an impoverished country that depends on its oil industry to pay for reconstruction after a long civil war. Angola has a reputation for severe corruption which Global Witness has been reporting on for the last decade. 1 Angola’s people have one of the lowest life expectancies in the world: 46.5 years, according to the United Nations. 2

Galp has major oil investments in Angola, a former colony of Portugal, and works closely with Sonangol, whose chairman Manuel Vicente sits on its board. 3

A third of the shares in Galp are owned by a holding company called Amorim Energia BV. Forty-five per cent of the shares in Amorim Energia are owned by a company called Esperaza Holding BV, which is a subsidiary of Sonangol. The rest of Amorim Energia is ultimately controlled by Portugal’s Amorim family. 4

The board members of Amorim Energia include Sindika Dokolo 5. a businessman married to Isabel dos Santos, a daughter of the Angolan president. As this briefing will show, Global Witness has learned that Dokolo was nominated to this post in April 2006 by Esperaza Holding. The latter was wholly owned by Sonangol at the time, according to Dutch corporate records. 6

"The son-in-law of the Angolan president, a private businessman, should not be working so closely with the state company which is responsible for managing Angola’s oil on behalf of its citizens," said Diarmid O’Sullivan of Global Witness. "This arrangement raises concerns about conflicts of interest to which Sonangol has not responded."

Sonangol’s minority partner in Esperaza Holding is Exem Holding AG. a secretive company based in the Swiss canton of Zug which does not publicly disclose the identities of its owners. 7 A director of Exem Holding, a Paris-based financier called Konema Mwenenge, told Global Witness that he has a "professional" relationship with Dokolo. But Mwenenge declined to say whether Dokolo has a financial interest in Exem Holding. 8 Dokolo himself, via his lawyer, declined to respond to questions from Global Witness. 9 Sonangol’s chairman, Manuel Vicente, did not respond to written questions. 10

The fact that the Angolan president’s son-in-law appears to have been representing Sonangol in its indirect investment in Galp does not amount to evidence of wrongdoing. But these findings raise further questions about the transparency of Sonangol, the state oil company which dominates the economy of Angola.

Sonangol collects billions of dollars a year in revenues on behalf of the Angolan government and controls other companies’ access to Angola’s oil and gas reserves, but does not publish its accounts and discloses little detailed information about its activities.

When President dos Santos called for "zero tolerance" of corruption in November 2009, a prominent member of the ruling MPLA party said Angolans should feel free to criticise the president over his family’s business dealings, Reuters news agency reported. 11

Portuguese billionnaire Americo Ferreira de Amorim is the chairman of Amorim Energia. He told Global Witness, in a three-page response to questions about the issues raised in this briefing, that Dokolo had been appointed to the board of Amorim Energia "at the designation of Esperaza Holding". 12

"The fact that Mr Dokolo is the husband of the daughter of President Jose Eduardo dos Santos does not seem in itself as relevant neither [sic] to qualify nor to disqualify him as a board member of Amorim Energia, and therefore was not a factor to have him appointed as a managing director of Amorim Energia," Amorim wrote in his letter to Global Witness. He added: "I can give you my personal views on the fact that the appointment of Mr Dokolo did not raise discussions concerning ethical issues."

Amorim said in his letter that the relationship between Amorim Energia and Galp was governed by a shareholder agreement that was in place before Dokolo came onto the former’s board. Global Witness does not assert, or seek to imply, that companies controlled by the Amorim family have engaged in any illegal or illegitimate activity.

At the end of 2006, Sonangol’s 100 per cent shareholding in Esperaza Holding had fallen to 60 per cent. The other 40 per cent was owned by a subsidiary of Exem Holding. 13 Exem Holding, via its subsidiaries, has been granted access by Sonangol to potentially lucrative investments in Angolan oil and gas but appears to be otherwise unknown in the oil industry.

Sonangol has authorised subsidiaries of Exem Holding to:

  • Acquire a 40 per cent stake in Esperaza Holding by the end of 2006, making it a partner in Sonangol’s indirect investment in Galp.
  • Acquire a 10 per cent stake in an Angolan gas exploration venture announced in December 2007. This venture is controlled by Sonangol. Its other shareholders include Galp, Italy’s ENI and Spain’s Gas Natural. 14 The venture has reportedly been awarded a ten-year gas exploration licence and exempted from taxes. 15
  • Pre-qualify, as of late 2007, to bid for oil licences in Angola. 16

Global Witness asked the Exem Holding director, Konema Mwenenge, to describe the process by which Exem Holding had acquired these investments and investment opportunities. Mwenenge replied in an email that: "I can confirm as a Director of Exem Holding that its subsidiaries did respond to tenders in Angola. Information concerning the tenders is available on the web site of the national oil company of Angola." 17

Sonangol’s website does report that a subsidiary of Exem Holding has been pre-qualified by Sonangol to bid for oil licences in Angola as a "non-operator" – that is, as a minority shareholder in a joint venture with other oil companies. 18 However, there appears to be no information on this website about tenders in relation to Exem Holding’s other interests. Global Witness wrote back and asked Mwenenge where this information could be found, but he did not respond.

Although Sonangol has a reputation for being professionally run, its opacity and its close links to the ruling elite of Angola have long been a cause of public concern. The state oil company has long been used by the government to borrow huge sums in a highly opaque manner and with little public accountability for the use of the money. 19

For more than a year, Global Witness has been investigating the relationships between Sonangol and certain private companies that invest in Angola’s oil sector, which are often complicated and hard to unravel because of a dearth of public information.

In August 2009, Global Witness reported on another little-known private company which was pre-qualified to bid for oil rights in Angola by Sonangol in late 2007. The shareholders of this company, Sociedade de Hidrocarbonetos de Angola, included a person called Manuel Domingos Vicente. The chairman of Sonangol, who has the same name, did not respond to a request for comment from Global Witness, nor did two other senior officials who also have the same names as shareholders in SHA. 20

The International Monetary Fund agreed in late 2009 to lend $1.4 billion to Angola in return for policy pledges which include more transparency for Sonangol, but it remains to be seen whether these pledges will actually be implemented. 21

"At a time when Angola’s government is promising more transparency to the IMF in return for a bailout, our findings show that Sonangol is still anything but transparent," said O’Sullivan.

Global Witness believes that Angola’s government cannot begin to reverse the country’s international reputation for severe corruption until:

  • Sonangol explains its relationship with Dokolo and identifies the ultimate beneficial owners of Exem Holding, who are currently unknown to the public.
  • Sonangol publishes its audited accounts and full details of oil revenue flows between foreign oil companies, Sonangol itself and the Angolan government.
  • Sonangol relinquishes its control over the allocation of oil and mining rights in Angola to an independent agency that operates under full public oversight and awards these rights in a transparent manner.
  • International oil companies in Angola commit themselves not to go into partnership with any smaller companies whose ultimate beneficial ownership is unknown to the public.
  • The government ensures that civil society groups within Angola are able to freely discuss matters of public interest, including the oil sector, without fear of harrassment or censorship in any form.

For further information, please contact:
Diarmid O’Sullivan: +44 207 492 5863 or +44 7872 620 955 and Amy Barry: +44 207 492 5858

1. Global Witness. A Crude Awakening. 1999; All the Presidents’ Men. March 2002. Time for Transparency. March 2004. Available at www.globalwitness.org
2. United Nations. Human Development Report 2009. Angola. The figures for life expectancy at birth are from 2007.
3. Galp Energia. Annual Report and Accounts 2008. Pages 6, 29 and 182
4. Amorim Energia BV. Annual accounts for 2008. Pages 3, 4 and 23.
5. Amorim Energia Annual report 2008. Page 3.
6. Amsterdam Chamber of Commerce. Handelsregisterhistorie. Esperaza Holding BV.
7. Handelsregister des Kantons Zug. Exem Holding AG.
8. Global Witness phone and email conversations with Mwenenge.
9. Correspondence between Global Witness and a lawyer acting for Dokolo.
10. Letter sent to Vicente by Global Witness on 15 September 2009.
11. Reuters. Angolan President calls on party to end corruption. 21 November 2009. Angolan President’s family taint corruption fight. 3 December 2009.
12. Letter from Americo Ferreira de Amorim to Global Witness. 18 January 2010.
13. Esperaza Holding B.V. annual accounts 2006. Page 3.
14. Eni. Eni acquires a participation stake in the Angola LNG Project. 10 December 2007. This press release refers to Exem Exploration & Production B.V. This company has since been renamed Exem Oil & Gas B.V. according to annual accounts filed by the latter for 2007, and is wholly owned by Exem Energy B.V, which is wholly owned by Exem Holding AG.
15. Reuters. Angola set to exempt gas explorers from tax. March 25 2009.
16. Angolan licensing round 2007/2008. Companies pre-qualified for Non-Operator. List published by Sonangol on its website. http://www.sonangol.co.ao/
17. Email to Global Witness from Mwenenge. 19 October 2009.
18. Angolan licensing round 2007/2008. Companies pre-qualified for Non-Operator. List published by Sonangol on its website. http://www.sonangol.co.ao/
19. See Global Witness. Undue Diligence. How banks do business with corrupt regimes. March 2009. Chapter Eight.
20. Global Witness. Angola. Private oil firm has shareholders with same names as top government officials. Media briefing. 4 August 2009.
21. International Monetary Fund. IMF lends Angola $1.4 billion to support reserves, reforms. Press release. 26 November 2009. See also Global Witness. IMF risks condoning corruption with new loan to Angola. Press release. 5 November 2009.

MPLA Regime No.5

Comrade Fernando da Piedade Dias dos Santos aka Nando

Prime Minister of Angola between 2002 to 2008, then President of the National Assembly, then February 2010 was appointed vice-president of Angola, by private choice of Dictator Josй Eduardo dos Santos

In the familiar circle of Comrade Jose Eduardo dos Santos he is seen as the better person who would protect them in adverse times. He is one of the rarest figures of the Regime that in the absence of Comrade Dictator Jose Eduardo dos Santos, would guarantee inner stability, in 1992 during the war with UNITA he was the guarantee of stability in person. He is respected because he had the merit to overthrow the Dissident General Fernando Miala who he was his mortal enemy.

In the inner hard side of the nucleus of the Regime the are scared of him, and rumours about that with him, “he it will be worse than the Comrade Dictator Jose Eduardo dos Santos”. People in his inner circle do not think that Jose Eduardo dos Santos is grooming him to replace him.

He hopes that one day he will be the “Constitutional Substitute” to the Presidency. He has become lately a switched of political figure, fact that disturbs him to bits. He no longer seems to be received by the Dictator. He has made know via third parties to the Dictator Jose Eduardo dos Santos that he doesn’t enjoys his new political situation. His office is where it functioned the old Prime Minister Paulo Kassoma. The Regime wanted to transfer him to a new office near to the Presidency, in an office next to the Ceremonial Office but he refused.

He is one of the principal shareholders of the African Bank of Investments "Banco Africano de Investimentos" (BAI).

Mr Nando has also other businesses he owns a Ranch and he owns a Water Company which is managed by his sons, he also moves in the areas of real estate and construction.

MPLA Regime No.6

Comrade Carlos Feijу

He is part of the doves faction in the Regime. He is in practice the figure who has in fact taken in the role of running the executive administration. He is not a member of the Political Bureau of the MPLA Party but participates in the meetings in the quality of “invited” of the Comrade Dictator Jose Eduardo dos Santos has the Dictator makes a point in introducing him in such capacity.

The Provincial Governor and the Ministers of the Social Departments and of Economy report directly to him, this makes of Comrade Carlos Feijу a figure in a superior position than that of the Vice-President of the MPLA Communist Regime. He has become the main individual in the investment policies in Guinea-Bissau a major hub in Africa for the Narco Trafficking.

Company created by Simon Junior, its current president is Jose Leitao, former head of the Civil House of the Presidency. Account among its shareholders with the lawyer Carlos Feijу. Activity: supermarkets, cinemas, private clinic, shareholder of Coca-Cola Angola, partnerships with South African companies and Chinese.

Comrade Paulo Kassoma is the one on the left with the glasses.

Comrade Paulo Kassoma

He is constitutionally the third person in the State. He is referred as the person that more consensus gathers inside of the inner thought centre of the Regime He has no inner enemies at present. Comrade Dictator Jose Eduardo dos Santos nurtures strong admiration for him and recognizes in him a sense of humility.

In the eve of the Fraudulent Elections of 2008 where the Regime gained 80% of the votes after 37 Years in Power, and the economy, the country totally destroy by corruption and terrible management and total neglect by the unelected Communist Regime. Comrade Dictator Jose Eduardo dos Santos visited the region of Huambo having become “amazed” by what he had seen. At night on his return to Luanda he called him on the phone to inform him of his desire of making him his next Prime Minister of Angola. One of his best friends is the Vice-President “Nandу”. They studied together in the school of Sгo Domingo when they where kids.

In European circles of intelligence Comrade Paulo Kassoma his seen as one of the possible substitutes for the Dictator Jose Eduardo dos Santos to the Post of President of the Republic, but he has yet to give signs of his desire for such a post in the Regime

MPLA Regime No.8

General Antуnio Josй Maria

He is the Chief of the Military Intelligence Service (SIM). He has the power of influence next to Comrade Dictator Jose Eduardo dos Santos in relation to military matters. The Generals have no sympathy for him. He is the Senior Officer of the Armed Forces that has mostly shown obedience to the wimps of the Regime, and is therefore the source of his power (a perfect ass licker “general”).

In 1992 e became an enemy of Fernando “Nandу” in regards to the assassination by the MPLA Regime of Adolosi Paulo Mango Alicerces the Secretary General of UNITA, Adolosi was his colleague when studying in the Huambo Higher Seminary, and during the war took refuge in his house. He was the mentor for the promotion of the Regime Dissident General Fernando Miala. In 2006 he had serious differences with Comrade Kundy Paihama.

He has already threatened Sebastiгo Martins the Chief of the MPLA Regime Secret Service SINFO.

He has influenced the dismissal of the ex Chief of the Armed Forces Comrade General Francisco Furtado and also responsible for the dismissal of the ex Commander of the Second Military region Comrade General Jack Raul and his both assistants of the Military Intelligence Service SIM Comrade General Zй Grande and Comrade General Joгo Massano.

He has also made animosity with Comrade General “Kopelipa”. In short he is a member of the Regime that imposes order in the Generals.

MPLA Regime No.9

He retains much influence in the south part of Angola where the population assume that he is their man that represents them in side of power. He is the individual in which Comrade Dictator Jose Eduardo dos Santos seeks no fights with. When the MPLA Regime was forces by the international community to end the one party only policy he was one of the Regime personalities who people fought he would leave the MPLA party to start his own party.

Since then Comrade Dictator Jose Eduardo dos Santos started to pay more attention to him and to his Native Ovimbundos.

Kundy Paihama visiting reclusive Regime of North Korea

Comrade Kundy Paihama is an equal partner in the Investment Group Angola Casinos (Casinos de Angola) the Complex is calculated in US $3,5 millions Dollars. One of the equal partner of the Investment Groups is a foreigner which is hiding from prosecution and police in Europe, his where about are unknown. Comrade Kundy Paihama promised (January 2012) that he will sort things out in order to became the majority share older partner.

Comrade Kundy Paihama has a taste for expensive and luxurious watches he bought a $50,000 USD watch and made it public. Now he says in his own words "that the trick is to keep the mouth shut, he can not say and he cannot buy what he likes".

MPLA Regime No.10

Comrade Roberto Antуnio Victor Francisco De Almeida

Chairman of the National Assembly

Date of Birth: 05/02/1941, Place of Birth: Kaxicane, Icolo e Bengo Ethnicity: Mbundu

Career: Director General, Foreign Affairs Ministry, 1975; Minister of External Trade, 1976; Coordinator, MPLA Urban Committee, Luanda, 1978-79; Deputy President of National Assembly, 1980; Secretary, MPLA ideology sub-committee, 1982; MPLA representative for Biй Province, National Assembly, 1992; President, National Assembly, 1996 to date.

Commentary: A member of the MPLA old guard, Roberto De Almeida has built up a formidable business and political network. With good contacts in Europe, especially in Moscow, he has also developed ties with some French-speaking former activists of Holden Roberto’s Frente Nacional de Libertaзгo de Angola (FNLA).

He his the Vice-President of the Communist MPLA Regime party.


MPLA Regime No.11

Comrade – Juliгo Mateus Paulo aka Dino Matross

Secretary General of the MPLA Party. He has importance for having been Minister of Security, for which reason even by not being active he can be called to give advise on sensitive matters. His political power of influences remains next to the Administration of State.

MPLA Regime No.12

Comrade Joгo de Almeida Martins aka “Jъ”

His power is in the MPLA party. He is presently the ideological architect of the MPLA policy, and he operates like a specie of Vice-president in the shadows. From this apreciation is why they call him the little “Lucio Lara”. In party matters his vision is always taken into consideration by Comrade Dictator Jose Eduardo dos Santos. No decision is taken without his knowledge first.

The inner circle of the MPLA Regime acknowledge him with political wisdom. Party leaders state in informal circles that in the lack of Comrade Dictator Jose Eduardo dos Santos, Comrade Jъ can maintain the Regime together. His adversaries for the post of President are “Manuel Vicente” and “Nandу”. While both of this individuals fight the succession struggle Jъ Martins is laying down the foundations for the succession.

Comrade General – Higino Carneiro

After the Dictator Jose Eduardo dos Santos Comrade General Higino Carneiro is the Richest Henchman of the Regime of the MPLA.
In 2009 he had a small fight with “Kopelipa” concerning labour matters. He was one of the ministers that was more involved with state matters. He accompanies Comrade Dictator Jose Eduardo dos Santos to all his foreign trips.

In October 2010 Comrade Dictator Jose Eduardo dos Santos invited him to the post of Governor of Luanda, but he refused saying that he only accepts that post if he can have his own powers for the job and without any interference from central power. He has acquired illegitimately like the rest of the Members of the MPLA Regime an amazing personal fortune, and he is the political figure that more supports the MPLA Party. He is responsible for moving $200USD million dollars from INEA to the MPLA campaign in 2008.

CABUTA ORGANISATIONS
"Holding set up by General Higino Carneiro, Minister of Public Works and governor of Kwanza Sul and family. Activity: agriculture, agro-industry, hotels, tourism, banking, insurance.

From the endless list of Businesses he has 12 hotels dispersed in the territory of Angola, has big haciendas (Cabuta Hacienda is one of them), he owns Banks (Bank Keve and Bank Sol), he owns an aviation company with a fleet of 14 light aircrafts called Air Services, which recently was in talks to start flights between Sao Paulo, Brazil and Luanda, etc.

Puma Air
He was a Partner with the Brazilian citizen Gambogi de Souza, the company was based in Brazil a Puma Air.

MPLA Regime No.14

Comrade Aldemiro Justino de Aguiar Vaz da Conceiзгo

He is the political figure of the MPLA that exercises political coercion over the Media in Angola. His puppet is Luis de Matos the National Director of Information. He has the job of assessing Comrade Dictator Jose Eduardo dos Santos in making him read all political happenings in Angola.

One of his known assess is his capacity to manipulate public opinion. He is presently in the Military House managing the Office of Psychological Action and Information. He his in charge of overseeing all of the Regime Propaganda.

MPLA Regime No.15

Cвndido Pereira dos Santos Van-Dъnem, Minister of Defence

MPLA Regime No.16

Miguel Maria Nzau Puna
a.k.a. o "Porco" e "Traidor"

Miguel Nzao Puna is also known by is nick name "Porco" (The Pig) and "Traidor" (The Traitor), it was this Pig who was at one time the Secretary General of UNITA, and Miguel Maria Nzau Puna was instrumental in the betrayal of Dr. Jonas Malheiro Savimbi location and personal security, which lead to the massacre and assassination of Dr. Jonas Malheiro Savimbi. A native born of Cabinda, thus the Noble and Glorious Cabinda Patriots wipe their arses with this communist, treacherous pig.

The Pig alias the Traitor Miguel Maria N`Zau Puna among other things served as the ambassador of the MPLA Regime to Canada from September 28, 2000 to 2008.

MPLA Regime No.17

Eduardo Leopoldo Severim de Morais

Minister of Finance

Finance Minister Eduardo Leopoldo Severim de Morais, who succeeded Josй de Morais in 2008.

MPLA Regime No.18

Antуnio Domingos Pitra Costa Neto

Minister of Public Administration, Employment and Social security

Antуnio Domingos Pitra Costa Neto is partner in GEMA a company created by Simon Junior, its current president is Jose Leitao, former Head of the Civil House of the Presidency. Account among its shareholders with the Lawyer Carlos Feijу and Antуnio Domingos Pitra Costa Neto, vice-president of MPLA and Minister for Employment and Social and Security.

Activity: supermarkets, cinemas, private clinic, shareholder of Coca-Cola Angola, partnerships with South African companies and Chinese.

Antуnio Domingos Pitra Costa Neto is also partner with Brazilian businessman Valdomiro Minoru Dondo in the company 2000 Empreendimentos.

MPLA Regime No.19

General Bento Kangamba

The name of General Bento Kangamba apears next and connected to the individuals from whom where ceased Millions of Euros by the French Authorities. General Bento Kangamba is member of the Presidential Family, he is married to Avelina Escуrcio dos Santos, who is the daughter of Avelino dos Santos, the eldest brother of Josй Eduardo dos Santos.

He is the President of the Kabuscorp Football Club in Luanda, among other things he is the Secretary of the Provincial Committee of Luanda of the MPLA Party for the organization and mobilization in the rural and periphery areas of the capital city of Luanda.

MPLA Regime No.20

General Leopoldino Fragoso do Nascimento

"The US $ 750 Million Dollar Man"

How a Swiss commodities giant used shell companies to make an
Angolan General three-quarters of a Billion Dollars richer

By Michael Weiss @ foreignpolicy.com
13 February 2014

Revolutionary communist regimes have a strange habit of transforming themselves into corrupt crony capitalist ones and Angola — with its massive oil reserves and budding crop of billionaires — has proved no exception. In 2010, Trafigura, the world’s third-largest private oil and metals trader based in Switzerland, sold an 18.75-percent stake in one of its major energy subsidiaries to a high-ranking and influential Angolan general, Foreign Policy has discovered.

The sale, which amounted to $213 million, appears on the 2012 audit of the annual financial statements of a Singapore-registered company, which is wholly owned by General Leopoldino Fragoso do Nascimento. Details of the sale and purchaser are also buried within a prospectus document of the sold company which was uploaded to the Luxembourg Stock Exchange within the last week. "General Dino," as he’s more commonly called in Angola, purchased the 18.75 percent stake not in any minor bauble, but in a $5 billion multinational oil company called Puma Energy International. By 2011, his shares were diluted to 15 percent; but that’s still quite a hefty prize: his stake in the company is today valued at around $750 million.

The sale illuminates not only a growing and little-scrutinized relationship between Trafigura, which earned nearly $1 billion in profits in 2012, and the autocratic regime of 71-year-old Angolan President Jose Eduardo dos Santos, who has been in power since 1979 — but also the role that Western enterprise continues to play in the Third World.

Despite a boom in its oil revenue over the last few decades, and dos Santos’s own declared zero-tolerance campaign against corruption, Angola has yet to implement any meaningful development programs for a citizenry of 14 million, many of whom still live in poverty. "Angola is incredibly compelling from a human rights point of view partly because of the corruption and the fact that this is a government that has the resources to respond to the needs of its people and to fulfill the huge economic and social and cultural rights and yet is not doing so," said Leslie Lefkow, the deputy director for Human Rights Watch’s Africa Division. Meanwhile, Trafigura has spent the last several years cultivating lucrative commercial interests in Angola and buying up shares in at least seven different companies, ranging from real estate to cargo shipping.

Unsurprisingly, it has assiduously pursued investment in Angola’s oil sector, according to Marc Gueniat, the senior researcher at the Berne Declaration, a Swiss NGO that monitors corporate transparency. (The group is named for the 1968 accord signed by scholars and intellectuals calling for more equitable business practices in an increasingly globalized economy.) "I am not aware of any other country where one company has such a dominance on the oil imports as Trafigura has in Angola," Gueniat said. "It effectively has a monopoly to supply petroleum products in the country. What sense does this make from an Angolan perspective?" Gueniat has extensively documented the curious arrangement between Trafigura and the dos Santos regime, including deals that directly involve General Dino, whose actual legal ownership of former Trafigura assets was previously unsubstantiated although suspected.

In a February 2013 Berne Declaration report titled "Trafigura’s Business in Angola," Gueniat found that the commodities trader, which is the third-largest company in Switzerland in terms of money brought in "seems to have committed itself to agreements in which the risk is high that the distinction between public and private interests becomes confused." Most of Trafigura’s investments in Angola have been managed through a Singapore-registered company called DTS Holdings, also known as the DT Group.

The two directors of this entity are General Dino and Claude Dauphin, a French billionaire who helped found Trafigura and is today its chief executive officer. As the Berne Declaration noted: "While DTS Holdings is involved infrastructure, logistics and real estate, it is oil where the majority of its revenues are generated. The group is party to a swap contract, which may be one of the largest in the world.

They export unknown quantities of Angolan crude and in return, since 2009, have been supplying Angola with all of the oil-derivative products required to meet domestic demand." DTS Holdings’s monopoly on oil-derivative products has proved remarkably lucrative. In 2011, DTS Refining — the subsidiary responsible for controlling the company’s contract with the Angolan state — was valued at $3.3 billion. Trafigura’s investments tend to involve or enlist the so-called "triumvirate" of regime officials who oversee large swaths of the Angolan economy.

Angolan Vice President Manuel Vicente, said to be dos Santos’s anointed successor, as well as the former CEO of Sonangol, Angola’s state oil company, is one member of this triumvirate. Another is Gen. Manuel Helder Vieira Dias Junior, also known as "General Kopelipa," who is now the chief of the Security Intelligence Bureau of the Presidency, a national security agency. Kopelipa is widely considered to be the most powerful man in the country, and the only real rival to President dos Santos’s influence. That makes his deputy, the third man in the trio, extremely well placed: General Dino, formerly the head of communications for the Angolan presidency and then General Kopelipa’s special advisor. He was appointed to this role in September 2010 by in a presidential decree which was heralded in Diario da Republica, the state newspaper of Angola. Whether he’s still formally in this role is somewhat unclear.

Trafigura, in a statement, noted that "Leopoldino Fragoso do Nascimento is a leading Angolan business man and a long standing partner of Trafigura and holds no current position in the Angolan Government." But the Angolan journalist and watchdog Rafael Marques de Morais counters, "When ranking officials are dismissed or resign, the president must publish his decision in the daily gazette. Also, as a general he should have been retired from the army to be able to take a private job." Regardless of his position now, the Berne Declaration makes clear that he was indeed General Dino at the time Trafigura "befriended" him, which may account for how he managed to buy a nice chunk of one of its most valuable assets.

Here’s how it happened. In 2010, a Singapore-registered company known as Cochan Pte Ltd. invested approximately $213 million in cash and in kind to purchase an 18.75 percent stake in Puma Energy International, a company acquired by Trafigura in 2000. Headquartered in Singapore and claiming to "bring secure, safe and affordable fuels, lubricants and other oil products to millions of business and retail customers every day," Puma Energy International is in the business of supplying, storing, refining, and selling petroleum-based products. It employs 6,000 people in over 30 countries, operates 1,500 gas stations, and has regional offices from Puerto Rico to Australia.

The investment in that 18.75 percent stake was made via Cochan Pte’s Marshall Island-registered holding company, Cochan Holdings LLC. Cochan Pte’s sole shareholder is an entity known as Cochan Ltd .– this one registered in the Bahamas, an offshore tax haven much sought for its corporate secrecy laws. In 2011, owing to an enlargement of shares in Puma Energy International, Cochan Pte’s 18.75 percent stake was diluted to 15 percent. It was not at the time disclosed, however, who the ultimate legal beneficiary was of the Bahaman parent company.

That mystery has now been solved thanks to Cochan Pte’s financial statements for 2012, which were audited by global accounting firm Ernst & Young, copies of which have been obtained by Foreign Policy, and by a newly published prospectus document which corroborates the audit. The owner of the Bahaman Cochan is none other than General Dino, making him the owner of Cochan Pte (in Singapore) and now the sole owner of 15 percent interest in Puma Energy International. "Where did a general get $213 million dollars to invest?" asks Arvind Ganesan, the director of the Business and Human Rights Program at Human Rights Watch. Another question asked by anti-graft monitors contacted by Foreign Policy is how General Dino managed to enrich himself so extravagantly in such a short period of time, and through a transaction with one of the world’s largest commodities trader.

Yet General Dino wasn’t the only one to gobble up shares in in the oil company. In 2011, Trafigura also decided to sell another 20 percent stake of Puma Energy International to Sonangol Holdings LDA, a holding company of Sonangol, the Angolan state oil company. This transaction apparently satisfied both buyer and seller because, as the Financial Times reported last November, Trafigura sold an additional 10 percent interest in Puma Energy International to the Angolan state oil company for $500 million. That means, that as of this writing, 45 percent of a $5 billion multinational is owned by either the dos Santos regime or General Dino. But that’s not all.

The Ernst & Young audit of Cochan Pte further discloses that General Dino owns 50 percent of DTS Holdings. If this company’s subsidiary, DTS Refining, was valued at $3.3 billion in 2011, then General Dino’s half interest in DTS Holdings is likely worth a small fortune today. Combined with his stake in Puma Energy International, he is almost certainly an on-paper billionaire, again raising the question of how he obtained the initial capital to make such remunerative investments. Foreign Policy contacted Trafigura for comment. A spokesperson for the company, Victoria Dix, emailed back confirmation of the sale as well as General Dino’s ownership of Cochan.

Dix quotes from a prospectus document for the bond issued by Puma Energy International in January 2014, which does indeed name General Dino as the ultimate owner of the Bahaman entity. However, that prospectus is only available on the Luxembourg Stock Exchange website and was only uploaded on Feb. 3, 2014. There was no mention of General Dino’s direct ownership of Cochan in any public press statement linking him to this much-scrutinized transaction four years ago.

The prospectus also confirms that General Dino was appointed a special advisor to Kopelipa in September 2010 but adds that he "no longer serves in such capacity." It does not say when he stepped down from his position or whether or not he currently holds any other active role in the dos Santos government. (As recently as April 2012, the Financial Times referred to General Dino as one of three of the "most powerful officials in Angola.") Nevertheless, the prospectus confirms that General Dino was an active public official in Angola when he bought his stake in Puma Energy International.

Dix declined to respond to Foreign Policy’s question about whether or not Trafigura was concerned that selling a sizable stake in a multinational oil company to an Angolan official, while simultaneously investing in Angola’s publicly owned energy economy, constituted a conflict of interest. Puma Energy’s bond prospectus, though, does seem to address these concerns by stating: "Certain of our direct shareholders, Sonangol, Cochan and Trafigura, and certain of their beneficial shareholders, as well as local partners have in the past or are currently, and may in the future, be the subject of criticism or allegations by the press relating to fraud, corruption, bribery and non-compliance with sanctions, and have in the past or are currently, and may in the future, be subject to investigation by certain regulatory authorities and other governmental and non-governmental entities relating to such matters.

These allegations and criticism can be found in the public domain. Such allegations and criticisms do not relate to their shareholding in or relationship with us." While Trafigura has not done anything illegal in selling its assets to either the government or an Angolan individual, General Dino may have violated his own country’s Law on Public Probity. Passed in June 2010, or about two months after he was named an advisor to General Kopelipa, this law criminalizes the act of a state official "acquiring for [himself] or for another, in the exercise of [his] duties, responsibilities, employment or public function, goods of any nature whose value is disproportionate to the capital gains or income of the public servant." The law also requires those officials to disclose their assets and revenue, and the sources of both, once every two years, although, according to Freedom House, the "dominant interpretation of the law is that the president, vice president, and president of the National Assembly are exempt from this requirement."

General Dino is no stranger to corruption allegations within and without Angola. He currently features in a still-pending U.S. federal investigation into the activities of an American oil company.

Along with General Kopelipa and Vice President Vincente, General Dino is a shareholder in Nazaki Oil & Gas, an Angolan enterprise that partnered with the Texas-based Cobalt International Energy, a U.S. concern whose main shareholders are Goldman Sachs and a joint energy fund controlled by the Carlyle Group and Riverstone Holdings, an American private equity firm. In 2009, Cobalt received licenses to operate two deepwater blocks in the Angola seabed thought to contain large reservoirs of recoverable oil.

Cobalt’s original investment was $500 million in 2005, but, as the Angolan journalist Rafael Marques de Morais points out in a comprehensive study titled, "The Angolan Presidency: The Epicentre of Corruption," this was roughly the same amount that Sonangol itself had previously invested in the Carlyle Group and Riverstone Holding’s joint energy fund. In other words, he claims, the money that private U.S. enterprise was investing in Angola actually already belonged to the Angolan people.

Interestingly, in 2011, Cobalt further admitted that it’d been made aware of a "connection between senior Angolan government officials and Nazaki." But the Texan oil company chose to go ahead with the deal anyway. In November 2012, the U.S. Securities Exchange Commission and the Justice Department launched an investigation into Cobalt International under the Foreign Corrupt Practices Act, which outlaws U.S. citizens or companies paying bribes to foreign officials. The U.S. government’s suspicions were triggered by Nazaki’s links to the triumvirate of General Dino, General Kopelipa, and Vice President Vincente. The investigation remains ongoing. Cobalt, meanwhile, maintains that it did nothing wrong.

It told the Financial Times in April 2012 that it had "not found any credible support" to corroborate ties between Nazaki and these three Angolan officials. Vincente and Kopelipa also denied that their interests in the company consisted an "abuse of power." Still, the Financial Times disclosures about Cobalt’s ties to General Dino and these other Angolan political figures cost the company close to $1 billion in market capitalization. * * * For its part, Trafigura’s history outside of Angola has similarly merited unflattering attention — quite a lot, in fact, for such a short corporate lifespan.

The commodities trading giant was founded in 1993 following the departure of a number of senior commodities traders — including Eric de Turckheim and current CEO Claude Dauphin — from Marc Rich & Co. run by the eponymous American billionaire who fled to Switzerland in 1983 to evade U.S. federal prosecutors. Rich at that time had been charged with 64 crimes including racketeering and "trading with the enemy," namely Iran. He died last June but not before being infamously pardoned by President Clinton in 2001.

Other Marc Rich & Co. traders left to found Glencore, today Switzerland’s largest commodities trader, which last year merged with XStrata, a Swiss mining giant. According to a 2005 BusinessWeek article, Rich’s own money may have helped to found Trafigura "to expand his empire," although he is thought to have divested at some point. A 2012 bond prospectus put out by Trafigura’s finance subsidiary states that the company, which now has 81 offices operating in 54 countries, and a total of 9,000 employees, is "exclusively owned by over 750 senior employees," although their identities are not stated.

The French-born, 63-year-old CEO Claude Dauphin is widely regarded as Trafigura’s single largest shareholder. A separate 2010 bond prospectus discloses that he owns "less than 20%" of the company. Trafigura was accused of violating sanctions against Iraq in 2001 when it took part in removing 500,000 barrels of oil from the country, according to the 2005 Volcker Report on the abuses and misuses of the United Nations’ "oil-for-food" program. The report found that Trafigura had bought Saddam Hussein’s crude from a Bermuda company known as Ibex Energy — itself owned by a former Marc Rich & Co. trader named Jean-Paul Cayrй.

Trafigura denied having any links to Ibex Energy but, in the end, its Swiss arm, Trafigura AG, was fined $20 million by the U.S. government after pleading guilty to falsifying information about the origins of the oil, which subsequently was sold on to American refineries. In October 2009, the details of confidential scientific report Trafigura had commissioned three years earlier were published by the Guardian showing that the company bore responsibility for dumping tons of toxic waste in Abidjan, the capital of the Ivory Coast and created a public health crisis for tens of thousands of people. Effects ranged from severe burns to the skin and to the lungs; permanent ulceration; corneal damage; vomiting, diarrhea, loss of consciousness and death.

Trafigura, the Minton Report found, had used an amateur chemical reduction process to lower the sulfur quotient in a consignment of cheaply-bought contaminated gasoline; the result led to the creation of a corrosive and poisonous black sludge that was then discarded recklessly by a ship called the Probo Koala. Following this, Amnesty International and Greenpeace launched a three-year investigation into Probo Koala incident, concluding in a lengthy report published in 2012 that Trafigura hadn’t adequately safeguarded against a repeat of toxic waste dumping and calling for the company to be brought up on criminal charges in Britain.

The company’s operations "are essentially run from London," as the Guardian’s David Leigh wrote. Trafigura countered by alleging "significant inaccuracies and misrepresentations" in the Amnesty/Greenpeace study, although it declined to specify what these were. Trafigura had initially tried to keep its pollution of the Ivory Coast hidden from public view, despite a raft of damning internal company emails that were leaked to the press.

Leigh accused the company of engaging in a "massive cover-up" and documented the legal avenues it had pursued which included "launch[ing] a libel case against BBC Newsnight, forc[ing] an alleged correction from the Times, demand[ing] the Guardian delete articles, and. [trying] to gag journalists in the Netherlands and Norway with legal threats." To even publish an article on the Minton Report, the Guardian had to fight a "five-week legal battle." Then, in December 2012, Trafigura again found itself mired in African controversy when Wynter Kabimba, the Zambian justice minister, was hauled before his own country’s Anti-Corruption Commission to account for allegations that the Swiss trader paid Midland Energy Zambia, a company he owned, to facilitate an oil and diesel deal. Trafigura denied that it had ever made any payments to Midland Energy Zambia.

As far as African countries go, Angola is at once a bad place for conducting clean and transparent business transactions and a good place for garnering sweetheart deals with state officials inclined to ignore their own laws and look the other way. Much of Angola’s $114 billion GDP has either gone missing or straight into the pockets of the ruling elite. Transparency International’s Corruption Perceptions Index ranked Angola 153 out of 177 countries in 2013, and the U.S. State Department noted in 2012 that the Angolan "business environment remains one of the most difficult in the world.

Investors must factor in pervasive corruption, an underdeveloped financial system, poor infrastructure and extremely high on-the-ground costs." Last year, Isabel dos Santos, the president’s 40-year-old daughter, was declared Africa’s only female billionaire, and the continent’s youngest, with a net worth of $3 billion, according to an article in Forbes.

Perhaps most famously, between 2007 and 2010, the International Monetary Fund found that $31.4 billion had disappeared somewhere along the way from Sonangol to the government’s bank accounts. Even though the dos Santos regime later claimed to have accounted for 85 percent of the money in "losses," Sonangol is still seen as the "personal ATM of the government," according to Human Rights Watch’s Arvind Ganesan, who has spent 15 years studying corruption in Angola. "The fundamental problem in Angola with oil money is that, as the second largest oil producer in sub-Saharan Africa, there should be enough revenue to make Angola a model of development around the continent and really around the world," says Ganesan. "But that doesn’t happen.

The reason is that the dos Santos government is opaque in how it uses the funds." Instead, the richer the dos Santos regime becomes on oil revenue, the more it cracks down on dissent and oppositional activity. Rafael Marques de Morais, the muckraking journalist who has anatomized the triumvirate’s dodgy commercial involvements, now faces possible jail time — for what, exactly, he’s never been informed. "I’ve been indicted now to go to court, but after 8 months of investigations and questioning, I was never allowed to see a word on the charges against me," he told Foreign Policy. Even minor challenges to the authoritarian status quo are met punishingly.

In October 2013, for instance, 17-year-old Manual Chivonde Bapista Nito Alves, who’d been arrested a month earlier for ordering T-shirts that read, "Out Disgusting Dictator," was tossed into solitary confinement and kept for weeks without access to lawyers, family, or doctors. (Under Angolan law, juveniles may not be kept in pretrial detention, much less solitary confinement.) Nito Alves is now the first citizen to be charged under a 2010 state security law which prohibits "insulting" the Republic of Angola.

The lesser insult, apparently, is making dos Santos’ cronies exorbitantly rich at the expense of the people whose lives they are meant to better. In a speech delivered before the PMLA in 2009, President Dos Santos condemned "[i]rresponsible people, people of bad faith, [who] have taken advantage. to squander resources and to carry out illicit and even damaging and fraudulent acts of management." General Dino, it seems, has yet to be included in this category.

ANGOLA: A Family run business

The Private Government of Mr. Josй Eduardo dos Santos and his Family

Josй Eduardo dos Santos Dictator of Angola since 10 September 1979 – present

Josй Filomeno de Sousa dos Santos aka Zenu son of the Dictator Josй Eduardo dos Santos, was nominated a member of the Council of Administration of the Petroleum Fund (Fundo Petrolнfero) of the State Oil Company SONANGOL by presidential order Nє 19 /2012. He is also the executive vice president of the Administration of the Bank Kwanza Investment (Banco Kwanza Investimento). He is being groomed by his father the Dictator to be a presidential candidate in the election period after 2017. As chairman of the new Fundo Soberano de Angola (FSDEA), Josй Filomeno de Sousa dos Santos is mandated to get the US$ 5 billion sovereign fund off the ground. Dos Santos represents a new round of leaders managing sub-Saharan Africa’s sovereign wealth. Dos Santos was a former board member of Banco Kwanza Invest, an Angolan investment bank. Son of the Dictator of Angola he was born in 1977 from Jose Eduardo dos Santos second wife Luнsa Perdigгo Abrantes.

Eduardo Santos nephew of the Dictator Jose Eduardo dos Santos was nominated a member of the Council of Administration of the Petroleum Fund (Fundo Petrolнfero) of the State Oil Company SONANGOL by presidential order Nє 19 /2012.

Afonso Van-Dъnem M’Binda. Minister of External Relations 1985-1988 is the Husband of Luzia Inglкs Van-Dъnem who was the leader the MPLA Ruling Party Woman’s Organization until 2011 and which is now the President of the National Electoral Commission of Angola

Cвndido Pereira dos Santos Van-Dъnem. Minister of Defence is a cousin of the Dictator Josй Eduardo dos Santos, and Kopelipa Minister of State and Chief of the Military House, and Josй Vieira Dias Van-Dunem Minister of health.

Carlos Alberto Lopes

Carlos Alberto Lopes Finance Minister, brother-in-law of the Dictator Josй Eduardo dos Santos.

Fernando da Piedade Dias dos Santos ‘Nandу’ Vice-President of Angola, from 2010 – present; Speaker of the National Assembly 2008-2010; Prime Minister 2002-2008, he is cousin of the Dictator Josй Eduardo dos Santos

Fernando Josй de Franзa Dias Van-Dъnem Prime Minister 1991-1992; 1996-1999, cousin of General Manuel Hйlder Vieira Dias ‘Kopelipa’

Isabel dos Santos. daughter of the Dictator Josй Eduardo dos Santos; investor; owner of key mobile phone operator and bank, the richest woman in Angola

Josй Vieira Dias Van-Dъnem

Josй Vieira Dias Van-Dъnem. cousin of General Manuel Hйlder Vieira Dias ‘Kopelipa’ Minister of State and Chief of the Military Bureau of the Presiden t

Josй dos Santos da Silva Ferreira

Josй dos Santos da Silva Ferreira . is the head of the super ministry which oversees Chinese contracts and projects

Luzia Inglкs Van-Dъnem

Luzia Inglкs Van-Dъnem ex-Secretary General of OMA, the women’s mass movement of the ruling party MPLA, and now President of the Angola National Commission, she is the wife of Afonso Van-Dъnem M’Binda who was the Minister of External Relations 1985-1988

Lionidio Ceita
President of the Administration Council of the State Water Company EPAL, Mr. Lionido Ceita is the Brother of Ana Paula dos Santos Wife of the Dictator Josй Eduardo dos Santos

– Manuel Domingos Vicente chairman and chief executive officer of Sonangol, Angola’s state-owned oil company, he is son-in-law of the Dictator Josй Eduardo dos Santos

General Manuel Hйlder Vieira Dias ‘Kopelipa’ Minister of State and Chief of the Military Bureau of the President, cousin of Dictator Josй Eduardo dos Santos.

Pedro de Castro Van Dъnem. 1942-1997 Minister of External Relations of Angola 1989-1992; Minister of Public Works and Urban Affairs 1992-1997

– Antonio dos Santos Franзa aka “Ndalu”

casamento da filha do general Antonio Franзa “Ndalu”, ocorrido sexta 9 March 2012 in portugal. O correio da manha, num artigo assinado por Sofia Rкgo realзa que Ana Paula dos Santos, mulher do presidente de Angola, Josй Eduardo dos Santos, deslocou-se a Portugal para assistir ao casamento de Irina Franзa, prima da famнlia. Na festa, que se realizou no hotel Penha Longa, em Sintra, e juntou parte da elite angolana, nгo faltaram luxos.

Convidados ficaram hospedados em luxuoso palбcio

A noiva, cantora e filha do general Antфnio dos Santos Franзa “Ndalu” e da ex-embaixatriz de Angola nos EUA Maria Joгo Jardim, deu o nу com Sйrgio Pugliese (um dos directores da petrolнfera BP em Angola), numa cerimуnia que contou com cerca de 600 convidados. Irina chegou com uma hora de atraso, аs 17h30, numa charrete, vestida de branco pйrola e a acenar aos convidados, entre eles, a ministra da Agricultura de Portugal, Assunзгo Cristas (que nasceu em Angola), Sнlvia Rizzo e Romana.

Segundo a media portuguesa o general “Ndalu” e a esposa Maria Joгo Jardim sгo realmente grandes e poderosos anfitrхes em Portugal, tudo para poder receber com carinho e muito luxo a comitiva de convidados vips de vбrias nacionalidades, inclusive do Brasil, de onde veio grande nъmero de amigos para prestigiar o casamento de Irina Jardim Franзa e Sйrgio Pugliese.

A primeira-dama de Angola, Ana Paula dos Santos, veio a Portugal para assistir ao enlaceFranзa “Ndalu” acomodou os hospedes do casamento da num fantбstico palбcio que virou hotel, o Seteais, da poderosa cadeia Tivoli, que possui os mais luxuosos hotйis pelo mundo.

O Seteais merece comentбrio. afinal, ele й mais que um hotel de cinco estrelas, й um luxuoso e romвntico palбcio que nos transporta para o requinte da arquitectura do sйculo XVIII. Ele estб localizado na encosta de uma serra, vila Patrimуnio com vista para o castelo dos Mouros e o Palбcio da Pena.

Para alйm da primeira dama angolana, Ana Paula dos Santos e o general Joгo de Matos que foi o padrinho do noivo estiveram tambйm como convidados figuras destacadas como o General Pedro Neto, a deputada Вngela Braganзa e o seu esposo, o ministro dos assuntos parlamentares, Norberto Santos “Kwata Kanawa”, o ex- embaixador em Portugal, Rui Mingas, o ex- Ministro do Interior, General Roberto Leal “Ngongo”, o ex- SG do MPLA, Joгo Lourenзo e a sua esposa Ana Dias Lourenзo. Na vertente cultural, esteve Mъsico Coreon Du, o rapper PM e sua noiva Telma Escorcio e o produtor Gil Inglкs radicado nos Estados Unidos da America.

– General Bento Kangamba

The name of General Bento Kangamba apears next and connected to the individuals from whom where ceased Millions of Euros by the French Authorities. General Bento Kangamba is member of the Presidential Family, he is married to Avelina Escуrcio dos Santos, who is the daughter of Avelino dos Santos, the eldest brother of Josй Eduardo dos Santos.

He is the President of the Kabuscorp Football Club in Luanda, among other things he is the Secretary of the Provincial Committee of Luanda of the MPLA Party for the organization and mobilization in the rural and periphery areas of the capital city of Luanda.

List of the Richest Men of the MPLA "Nomenklatura"

The New rich MPLA Regime bets in Business

I miss Angola and from Angonotнcias and other sites to learn of the generals that enabled me to move quite at ease throughout the territory during the war, arrived only in areas where the mercenaries, soldiers. and, worse, where people were attacked by the military and where assassinated without having no one to turn to. It continues to find unforgivable that the international community, because of the wealth that prey on the MPLA Angola, did not press the organisation of free elections in the country.

‘Invest in Angola is now the currency of our rich’ says the ‘Weekly Angolense. The newspaper, which caused scandal in 2004 with the publication of the richest men listed the "nomenklatura" Angolan, again loading two weeks ago with a "portrait" of private groups that proliferate in MPLA Angola, to lift the ‘boom’ economic and confesses intention of the government to stimulate domestic private groups and to enter into strategic sectors such as banking, oil or diamonds.

The Director of the ‘Weekly Angolense ", Graca Campos, admits that the list is not exhaustive and does not support a thorough investigation. They are the ‘business’ giving that talk and that illustrate the importance of political lobbying activities and’ desire ‘for foreign investors to form partnerships with political figures of the regime or their relatives. With the proper salute to the ‘Weekly Angolense ", that is, in short, from A to Z, the portrait of private groups more’ exciting ‘of today in Luanda.

ARMINDO CЙSAR & SONS
In the beginning was the Maboque, company specializes in catering, hotel and "Catering. It is said that counts among its shareholders with family members of Comrade Dictator Jose Eduardo dos Santos and a pleiades of generals. But in the last five years the group grew and multiplied itself. Activity: the earlier, more fishing (catch and marketing), hotel and tourism, real estate, trade (hypermarket Interpark), training and services.

INTERNATIONAL BANK CREDIT (BIC)
Isabel dos Santos, first born daughter of Comrade Dictator Jose Eduardo dos Santos, and Portuguese businessman Americo Amorim (25%) are the main shareholders. Created in June, has already opened 13 branches (8 in Luanda) and raised more than 165 million dollars in deposits.

COMMERCIAL BANK OF ANGOLA (BCA) BANCO COMERCIAL DE ANGOLA (BCA)
It includes among its shareholders three former MPLA Regime prime ministers: Lopo do Nascimento, France Van-Dъnem and Marcolino Moco. Solomon Xirimbimbi (Minister of Fisheries), Augusto Thomas (former Governor of Benguela, former Minister of Finance) and businessman Jaime Freitas (COSAL, Interauto, Tecnomat) are the other members. In 2005 sold 50% of the shares to Absa Bank of South Africa, which in turn was bought by Barclays Bank, the United Kingdom.

CABUTA ORGANISATIONS
"Holding set up by General Higino Carneiro, Minister of Public Works and governor of Kwanza South and family. Activity: agriculture, agro-industry, hotels, tourism, banking, insurance.

FINANGEST
Among the shareholders are listed Josй Pedro de Morais, Ex-Minister of Finance (December 2002 to October 2008), General Pedro Neto, chief of General Staff of the Air Force, and Kundi Paihama, Minister of Defence. Activities: games and lotteries, publishing record, transport, services, construction, "import-export ‘insurance, security.

GEMA
Created by Simon Junior, its current president is Jose Leitao, former head of the Civil House of the Presidency. Account among its shareholders with the lawyer Carlos Feijу and Antуnio Domingos Pitra Costa Neto, vice-president of MPLA and Minister for Employment and Social and Security. Activity: supermarkets, cinemas, private clinic, shareholder of Coca-Cola Angola, partnerships with South African companies and Chinese.

GENI
Companies in the sectors of banking, oil, diamonds and construction thrive as’ boom in MPLA Angola. The starting point was the creation of UNITEL (mobile telephone) in partnership with aPortugal Telecom. Founders: Isabel dos Santos, Brig Leopoldino Fragosodo Birth (Head of Communications of the Presidency), Anthony Van-Dъnem (former secretary of the Council of Ministers) and Manuel Augusto da Fonseca, the bureau’s legal Sonangol. Joined them to the Franco-Brazilian businessman Pierre Falcone. Activity: telecommunications and services.

GENIUS
Created by General Joao de Matos (ex-chief of General Staff General of the FAA) and Mбrio Pizarro (former Governor of the BNA). The crown jewel of the group is GEVAL-Angola Joint-venture with the Brazilian Vale do Rio Doce, No. 1 worldwide for mining.
Activity: mining (diamonds, manganese, others). Projects: electricity, telecommunications. Participations: Torres of Caramel (Luanda), Fine Shopping Centre

IMPORБFRICA-IMPORCAR
Faustino Muteka former Minister of Administration of Territory and current secretary of the MPLA Party for the mobilisation is the figure-of-bow of the group, which are associated with capital from Portugal to India. Activity: construction, agriculture, trade, sale of cars, real estate.

In the photo the Angolan actres Lesliana Pereira, the Brazilian Xuxa, and the Valdomiro Minoru Dondo

MACON
Revolutionized the public transport in Luanda (buses and taxis). Hйlder Vieira Dias, head of the Military House of the presidency and director of the Office of National Reconstruction, Brig Leopoldino Fragoso and Julio Bessa, former Minister of Finance, in partnership with the Brazilian native with Angolan citizenship Valdomiro Minoru Dondo are members-founders.
Activity: transport, trade (the Shopping Centre Kinaxixi is "stuck" for two years).

Note on the dark activities of Mr. Valdomiro Minoru Dondo
In 2010 the Brazilian Federal Police discovered his name in a dark operation with an Official of the International Airport of Rio de Janeiro which has now been dismissed.

XAVIER MELLO
There is much that Mr George Mello Xavier by MPLA in 1992 ceased to be ‘the entrepreneur of the regime "but remains active, influential and irreverent.
Activity: construction, tourism, hospitality, beverage, agro-industry,

PECUS
Created by Portuguese group Tecnocarro, Jose Rйcio, was sold to brothers Anthony and Luis Faceira.
Activity: production and marketing of meat, which leads sector.

PRODOIL
Associated to the Amec Paragon (Houston, USA). Between Angolan partners quoted Marta dos Santos, elder sister of the Comrade Dictator Jose Eduardo dos Santos.
Activity: Exploration and Production of Hydrocarbons, oil, natural gas, services, hotels.

SAGRIPEK
Capital divided between a group of partners Angolans (BAI, GCP, Banco Keve, Higino Carneiro, Mello Xavier, Faceira brothers, Isabel dos Santos), which owns 51% and a Brazilian consortium.
Activity: agriculture, livestock, agro-industrial production.

SOMOIL
First private company to enter the Angolan oil exploration. Founded by Desidйrio Costa, Minister of Petroleum, and Alberto de Sousa. Activity: oil and derivatives (lubricants)

SUNINVEST
Directed by Ismael Diogo, Consul of Angola in Rio de Janeiro and President of the FESA (Eduardo dos Santos Foundation).
Activity: pharmaceutical industry (partnership with the Laboratory Teuto of Brazil), urban transport, waste removal (Luanda), trade.

VALENTIM AMХES
He came to Luanda from the Central Plateau, which has a large property and controls much of the trade. He joined the Central Committee of MPLA in 2004 and among its members include the General Fernando Miala, the information services outside of the presidency.
Activity: road and air transport, hotel and tourism, ‘rent-a-car’ trade.

SECURITY
The security companies deserve to be treated separately, as it was by way that many MPLA generals first entered in business and acquired the capital that allowed them highest flights. They are now the hundreds, more or less sophisticated, and provide all kinds of services, from the safety of the premises personal escorts, transport of funds and installation of monitoring systems. The ‘Weekly Angolense "highlighted the following:

ANGO SEGU
Company pioneer in industrial safety. Its founding the generals Fernando Miala and Josй Maria and Santana Andrй Pitra (Petroff) former Minister of Interior and Commander-General of Police.

ALFA 5
Created by General Joao de Matos and other generals and officers. It controls 50% of the safety of large areas of exploitation of diamonds.

TELESERVICE
Monopoly security of oil fields. Its founders were the generals Joao de Matos, France Ndalu, Armando da Cruz Neto, and Antonio Luis Faceira and Hendrick. Investments in Air Gemini, the Lumanhe Company (diamonds) with Escom, linked to the Group Espirito Santo.

COPEBE
Created by Pedro Hendrick Vaal Neto (former minister of social communication), Roberto Leal Monteiro "Ngongo" and Nelson Cosme, ambassador of Angola in the Organization of Central African States.

Valdomiro Minoru Dondo
Became rich with Businesses in Angola

Valdomiro Minoru Dondo, is a Brazilian Business man who became rich with the Socialism of the Angolan market, he did not made the miracle alone. He is the owner of a conglomerate of more than 20 companies, which the solitary client is the MPLA Regime itself, he is the partner of at least 5 local authorities, including regime leaders without portfolio, who made millionaire contracts with him.

But the relation with power goes further. In Brazil Minoru has negotiated at least 3 buildings for Angolan leaders and their families members.

His wife, Agla Dondo, is personal friend of Ana Paula dos Santos, wife of Josй Eduardo dos Santos, the dictator who has has hold the grip on power for the last four decades which Minoru has businesses.

Considered a myth in Angola Minoru gets annually an officially $4.5 Million USD in profits from public contracts, in Brazil he is known for the extravagant birthday parties of his wife, in one of these parties he send to make a giant cake in the shape of a Louis Vuitton hand bag.

In the businesses of Minoru, there are no limits between public and private.

Has a physical person he is partner of Pedro Sebastiгo Teta, vice Minister of Science and Technology of Angola, in the company Jъpiter; he is partner of brigadier Leopoldino Fragoso, Dino, in the company Supermar; he is partner of the sister of the first lady of Angola, Artemнsia Cristina Cristуvгo de Lemos, in the company Bob’s; he is partner again of Leopoldino Fragoso, in the company Tilбpia Psicultura; he is partner of Pitra Neto, Minister of Work and Social Security of Angola, in the company 2000 Empreendimentos; he is partner of the Chief of the Military House of the Presidency of Angola and Director of National Reconstruction of Angola, General Manuel Hйlder Vieira Dias, o Kopelipa, in the company Medicamentos e Cosmйticos (Medicine & Cosmetics) he is partner of Prenda; and also, has juridical person (by Midras), of the ex-Minister of Finances Josй Pedro de Morais (December 2002 to October 2008), in the Company Gesa Health.

Minoru is also the 3rd largest shareholder of the BNI Bank, this Bank has in its social composition again the ex Minister of Finances Josй Pedro de Morais (December 2002 to October 2008), and the Ex-Chief of Armed Forces and General of the Army Joгo de Matos and the President of the National Assembly, Paulo Kassoma, represented by his daughter, Kanda.

Hб oito anos, Josй Pedro de Morais e o ex-governador do Banco Nacional (o Banco Central daquele paнs) Amadeu de Jesus Castelhano Maurнcio (demitido em 2009) foram favorecidos com 21 remessas do Trade Link Bank (uma offshore nas Ilhas Cayman), procedentes do Brasil, no valor total de US$ 2,7 milhхes.

Pelos extratos bancбrios obtidos com a quebra do sigilo bancбrio da Trade Link nos Estados Unidos, durante as investigaзхes sobre o valerioduto, a offshore fez 20 remessas no valor aproximado de US$ 2,6 milhхes para contas de Morais entre 2003 e 2005. As remessas variaram de US$ 76 mil a US$ 360 mil. Os documentos oficiais registram que, sу em 2003, a Trade fez 12 transferкncias para o ex-ministro, no valor de US$ 1,4 milhгo. Os recursos saнram de uma conta do Trade Link, no Banco Standard, em Nova York, e seguiram atй uma conta em nome de Morais no Banco Internacional de Crйdito (BIC), em Lisboa, Portugal.

Nos extratos da offshore, consta tambйm uma remessa de US$ 176 mil para Amadeu Castelhano, entгo a mais alta autoridade monetбria de Angola, no dia 12 de marзo de 2002. O dinheiro saiu da conta da Trade no Standard, passou pelo Banco Africano de Investimentos e, depois do giro, voltou a uma conta em nome de Amadeu, no Citibank, em Nova York.

Minoru й prуximo de ambos. De Morais, й sуcio em dois negуcios. Jб os cartуrios de registro de imуveis do Rio revelam que, em 30 de janeiro de 2004, o empresбrio comprou de Antфnio Jacinto Castelhano (parente de Amadeu) as sobrelojas 207 e 208 do edifнcio situado na Avenida Presidente Vargas 590, no Centro.

Nos anos 1990, revela ainda a pesquisa nos cartуrios cariocas, Minoru fez dois negуcios com Sebastiгo Basto Lavrador, outro ex-governador do Banco Nacional: em novembro de 1997, o empresбrio foi procurador de Maria Fernanda Noguera Alcвntara Monteiro Lavrador (mulher de Lavrador) na compra do apartamento 301 da Praзa Ataualpa 86; dois anos depois, em 9 de julho de 1999, o empresбrio vendeu para o prуprio Lavrador a sala 201 do bloco 10 da Avenida das Amйricas 500, na Barra, com direito a quatro vagas de garagem.

Em Angola, Minoru jб foi acusado de fazer negуcios com o Ministйrio da Saъde, a Casa Militar, o Ministйrio das Finanзas e vбrios governos provinciais, supostamente transferindo os recursos para empresas suas situadas em paraнsos fiscais, como Ilha da Madeira, Ilhas Cayman, Suнзa e Miami. Mas as investigaзхes ordenadas pelas autoridades locais nada constataram atй hoje.

O escвndalo mais recente, divulgado pelos meios de comunicaзгo independentes, atingiu a Midras, unidade do grupo VMD (a holding de Minoru) para a бrea de medicamentos. Para disfarзar a grande concentraзгo de recursos e de contratos nas mгos de uma ъnica empresa (a Midras), Minoru teria criado mais de uma dezena de filiais para receber os recursos federais, sustentou a denъncia.

Como ocorre com as empresas de Minoru no Brasil, que recebem recursos do BNDES para atender аs encomendas do governo angolano, a Midras teria captado emprйstimos em bancos de vбrias partes do mundo, especialmente da Europa, em nome do Ministйrio da Saъde, para fornecimento de medicamentos para a rede pъblica hospitalar.

De acordo com a denъncia, o emprйstimo й originalmente concedido а Neofarma, do grupo VMD, comeзando assim um efeito cascata destinado a disfarзar o desvio de parte do emprйstimo. Na etapa seguinte, a Neofarma encomenda a compra a outra empresa de Minoru, a Nova Бfrica, que ficaria com parte do lucro. Mais empresas completam essa cadeia, atй garantir que uma fatia do emprйstimo se perca no caminho.

A pioneira das mais de 20 empresas de Minoru em Angola й a Macon, criada para explorar os transportes coletivos no paнs, atй entгo limitados a tбxis (lotada) e caminhonetes. Em reportagem sobre os investimentos do governo central em grandes "elefantes brancos", cuja utilidade й duvidosa, a "The Economist" citou que foram comprados trкs mil фnibus, mas o paнs sу tinha na ocasiгo 1.500 motoristas.

A ъltima manobra de Minoru teria sido a aquisiзгo da empresa DGM, que cuida do desenvolvimento de sistemas de pagamento de benefнcios para o Instituto Nacional da Seguranзa Social. A DGM teria sido comprada pela Angola Prev em junho. Suspeita-se que o governo esteja preparando a compra da DGM por US$ 500 milhхes, muitas vezes mais do que o seu real valor: a avaliaзгo feita por uma empresa brasileira foi desqualificada por uma instituiзгo financeira internacional.

From Mr. Valdomiro Minoru Dondo website

International businessman Valdomiro Dondo applies his entrepreneurial acumen in both his professional and charitable endeavors. Under the auspices of his executive work with Brazilian firm Midras Group, L.L.C. Dondo has spent two decades fostering a powerful connection between Latin America’s largest country and the East African province of Angola. In addition to bolstering general economic and cultural transfusion between the two regions, Dondo’s firm has been instrumental in encouraging a significant Brazilian audience presence at the Miss Angola contest. His work with Midras Group also supports a strong Angolan market for Brazilian daytime television.

Valdomiro Dondo began investing in Angola when its economy opened in 1992, while the country struggled under a decades-long civil war. Rather than focusing solely on the region’s explicit business interests in the form of diamonds and oil, Dondo set out to establish critical inroads for Angolan infrastructure, including the region’s first urban transportation program. In addition to major installations in the healthcare, technology, and retail sectors of the country, Dondo helped found Angola’s stock exchange. He also instituted language programs to help Angolan businessmen communicate with their largest investors, the Chinese.

Education on several vital issues has proved an essential ingredient in Valdomiro Dondo’s ongoing mission to improve Angola’s healthcare and human services. Entrenched superstitions surrounding such issues as hygiene, medicine, and gender roles have made it difficult for human aid services to establish the type of systems needed to help equalize rights and provide care for Angolan natives. Consequently, the charitable organizations working in the region emphasize instruction and information, in addition to the provision of relevant resources. Dondo’s beneficiaries in this sector include projects supporting dental health, advanced prenatal care, and vaccinations against malaria and other infectious diseases endemic to the area.

Estoril Sol Residence

Luxury Complex in the sea front of the city of Estoril in Portugal

The Minister of Administraзгo Pъblica, Emprego e Seguranзa Social, Antуnio Domingos Pitra Costa Neto, й dono de cinco apartamentos na Torre Baнa, no 3.є, 5.є, 7.є, 9.є e 14.є andares, estando os primeiros quatro em nome da sua filha Katila Pitra da Costa, estudante.

Pitra Neto deverб ser o prуximo presidente da Assembleia Nacional, depois das eleiзхes de 31 de Agosto 2012, conforme cogitaзхes emanadas da presidкncia de Josй Eduardo dos Santos.

Tanto no 9.є como no 14.є andar, o ministro Pitra Neto tem como vizinhos o casal "Kopelipa". Fбtima Geovetty, a esposa do ministro de Estado e chefe da Casa Militar, general Manuel Hйlder Vieira Dias – Kopelipa, adquiriu dois apartamentos.

O fiel escudeiro do general Kopelipa nos seus negуcios privados, Domingos Manuel Inglкs, fica a meio, no 12.є andar.

Na torre ao lado, Cascais, o principal gestor de negуcios um tanto obscuros do general, o portuguкs Ismкnio Coelho Macedo, desfruta da grande vista para o mar, com um apartamento no 4.є andar. Outro comprador extraordinбrio й o ex-ministro das Finanзas, Josй Pedro de Morais, com quatro apartamentos, tambйm na Torre Baнa, no 1.є, 2.є, 4.є e 5.є pisos.

Por sua vez, o brasileiro Valdomiro Minoru Dondo, tambйm portador de nacionalidade angolana, tem um apartamento no 11.є andar da Torre Estoril. Valdomiro Minoru Dondo tem cruzado negуcios com o general "Kopelipa", Josй Pedro de Morais, Pitra Neto, a famнlia presidencial e outros influentes membros do Regime. A sua formidбvel capacidade para o trбfico de influкncias conferiu-lhe o interessante tнtulo de estrangeiro mais rico de Angola. Por sua vez, outro brasileiro, associado a Minoru Dondo e a dirigentes angolanos, Gerson Antуnio de Sousa Nascimento й dono de um duplex, na Torre Estoril, no 6.є e 7.є andares.

O sуcio e representante legal de alguns negуcios de Welwitchia – Tchizй? dos Santos, Walter Virgнnio Rodrigues, demonstrou que os negуcios lhe tкm corrido de feiзгo e comprou um apartmento no 8.є andar da Torre Estoril.

Como celebraзгo do contrato multimilionбrio realizado entre o Ministйrio da Comunicaзгo Social e a empresa Westside Investments para a gestгo privada do Canal 2 da Televisгo Pъblica de Angola (TPA), a sуcia maioritбria, -Tchizй? dos Santos, agraciou-o com um bуnus de US $500 mil, enquanto a filha do presidente atribuiu-se, a si prуpria, com fundos do erбrio pъblico, um prйmio de um milhгo e meio de dуlares. Outro angolano que faz parte do selecto grupo de proprietбrios do Estoril Sol Residence й o antigo director da Endiama, Noй Baltazar.

Apesar dos preзos, os angolanos, regra geral, compram vбrios apartamentos, de forma ostensiva. Algumas das aquisiзхes levantaram suspeitas junto das autoridades judiciais portuguesas que, para o efeito, abriram inquйritos. Um dos inquiridos, por suspeita de branqueamento de capitais, foi o presidente do Banco Espнrito Santo Angola (BESA), Бlvaro Sobrinho.

A 2 de Setembro de 2010, Бlvaro Sobrinho adquiriu seis apartamentos no referido complexo, tendo, inicialmente, pago o valor de 9,5 milhхes de Euros, segundo investigaзхes do Diбrio de Notнcias.

His brothers Sнlvio and Emanuel Madaleno are also the owners of 3 more apartments in the Complex of Estoril Sol.

Kimberley’s Illicit Process

By Khadija Sharife and John Grobler

ANTWERP—Somewhere between Africa’s diamond mines and the dazzling diamond bazaars of Dubai and Antwerp, a Belgian company called Omega Diamonds has constructed a financial triangular trade, where at least $3.5 billion worth of diamond profits simply vanished between 2001 and 2008. And, if Belgian investigators are to be believed, there was little anyone could do about it. Not only did Dubai authorities deliberately turn a blind eye to questionable corporate practices of tax evasion and systematic under-invoicing—“tax optimization" being the preferred term—but the Dubai Multi-Commodities Center (DMCC) leadership appears to have actively blocked investigation by other governments. Instead of being busted and black-balled from the industry, Omega Diamonds, owned by two of the largest industry players, was handed a get-out-of-jail-free card.

While Brussels would claim a major victory on march 14, 2013, after levying a fine of $195 million on Omega Diamonds—the biggest-ever imposed on a Belgian enterprise—the company and at least two of its principals would escape any other sanction. Ironically, a few days earlier, Omega’s former attorney Koen Geens was appointed as Belgium’s minister of finance, putting him in charge of tax investigators—the very office that was prosecuting his former clients.

But a year earlier, Omega’s main shareholder, Ehud “the Argentine” Laniado, sold all his property in Belgium, and according to the industry intelligence newsletter Rough & Polished. took up residence in the tax haven of monaco, beyond the reach of the Brussels tax inspectors. His partner, Sylvain Goldberg, appeared to have moved his operations to Switzerland and Israel—the former a major tax haven, the other, not exactly known for cooperating with foreign tax authorities. Both men remain members in good standing of Antwerp’s venerable Diamond Bourse, whose officials declined to comment on the Omega settlement.

Undoubtedly, Omega was able to beat the system because of its particularly complex web of illicit activities. In short, Omega’s illegal diamond trade linked countries in central Africa to Omega subsidiaries in Dubai and, ultimately, Antwerp. Employing corrupt African autocrats and money-hungry businessmen, Omega would purchase diamonds of questionable origin for little to no money in Angola, the Democratic Republic of Congo, and Zimbabwe. They would then ship the diamonds to Dubai, where they would be given certificates of mixed origin—legal under the Kimberley Process definition—and subsequently over-value the worth of those diamonds. From Dubai, the diamonds would be sent to Antwerp, where they would be sold on the biggest diamond market for more than their actual worth. The money gained from those sales would finance the personal bank accounts of Omega and many of the corrupt characters they employed in their tri-continental scheme.

A three-month investigation into the efficiency of the international agreement designed initially to combat blood diamonds, known as the Kimberley Process Certification Scheme (KPCS). reveals that one of the most effective tactics enabling the continued looting of Africa’s mineral resources is the practice of under-invoicing the value of diamonds through subsidiary companies, based in jurisdictions providing legal and financial secrecy, like Dubai. This maneuver alone has managed to subvert and cleanse several billion dollars worth of African diamonds of questionable origin. And although Omega agreed to pay the fine that Belgian tax investigators had imposed as part of an out-of-court settlement, it has denied all guilt.

These jurisdictions are often Kimberley Process-certified, enabling tax havens to act as transit countries for diamonds, serving the purpose of removing the origin of diamonds through certificates of mixed origin. But the root cause of the problem does not lie in the ineffectiveness of the Kimberley Process as a monitoring mechanism for actual conflict diamonds. It lies in the Kimberley Process’s commendable goal of removing the stain or reputation of “conflict” from diamonds, through a process of certification. Subverting this process requires narrowly defining the concept that now frames rebels as the sole source of conflict in Africa, which still produces at least 65 percent of the world’s production of raw, uncut diamonds. So the cleansed Kimberley Process diamonds, produced in African countries that have not been subjected to violence but which may be ruled by venal autocrats, have augmented the personal wealth of these nations’ rulers. Certified as 99 percent conflict-free, they may then be used to produce vast profits for a handful of individuals and families. This mechanism is only just coming into focus thanks to a series of court proceedings in Europe.

By 2007, when the first investigations leading to these proceedings were just debuting, Dubai had become a $35 billion-a-year juggernaut that, by virtue of its lax tax laws, secrecy, and its position straddling the old world of diamonds, represented by Antwerp and the new world of Mumbai and Shanghai. Players like Goldberg and Laniado had already spotted opportunities that a tax haven and diamond hub like Dubai offered. To understand how the Kimberley Process helped Dubai grow into what Britain’s Scotland Yard believes is the world’s largest entrepot for diamond and gold smuggling, it’s only necessary to understand what the reigning Dubai Diamond Council had hoped to achieve—and the myriad of unintended consequences that resulted.

Antwerp was the world’s leading diamond trading center and home to the World Diamond Council. As early as 2000, the World Diamond Council was working to protect its position in an industry where much of the world’s diamonds passed via Amsterdam’s Pelikaanstraat at the heart of their Diamantkwartier. Getting everyone to play by the same rules was critical to protecting Antwerp as home to the 500-year-old diamond cutting and trading business, while fending off threats posed by upstarts such as Tel Aviv’s Ran Gamat and, to a lesser extent, Dubai and Mumbai.

Dubai’s rise to preeminence may be traced in a barely straight line to 1992, when the beleaguered government in Luanda, the center of barely-legal diamond mining, was facing a loss of control over most of the Angolan hinterlands to UNITA. The government, led by UNITA’s rival MPLA, hired a group of former South African soldiers who styled themselves as Executive Outcomes (EO) to, at first advise, and later assume operational command of their military campaign against UNITA. Heavy arms, gunships, and specialized tracking technology—all expensive—would be needed to bring an end to the murderous campaign of Jonas Savimbi, the leader of UNITA. To fill that increasingly pressing need, the Luanda regime turned to a coterie of Russian-Israeli arms and diamond dealers, namely Sylvain Goldberg, Pierre Falcone, Arkadi Gaydamak, and Lev Leviev. And eventually, to Dubai. But not before the Kimberley Process sought to throw a monkey wrench into their business.

The Kimberley Process Certification Scheme (KPCS) was designed in 2003 to “keep diamonds tainted with violence out of the international trade,” and was supposed to be limited to the activities of rebel groups in diamond-producing nations of Africa—largely Angola and Zimbabwe. But the $800 billion Marange diamond field in Zimbabwe, looted through a web of politicians, the army, and opaque companies, was beyond the reaches of the entire Kimberley Process. Instead of bringing to its knees the trade in Zimbabwe’s “blood diamonds,” named for the brutality and looting by President Robert Mugabe’s political and military thugs, their operations continued to be financed by these very diamonds.

Various forms of violence, from physical to economic and social, fall outside of the Kimberley definition, including acts perpetrated by those who control the state and their corporate partners. As one cable, originating at the American Embassy in Belgium and disclosed by Wikileaks, states, “Belgium very recently has begun to take steps to monitor the flow of Zimbabwe-sourced diamonds through Antwerp’s Diamond Office … but those involved in the Zimbabwean illicit trade were savvy enough to mingle diamonds with those from other countries such as the DR-Congo, and then send them to other diamond trading centers in …Dubai where they could receive legitimately-issued Kimberley certificates that indicated the source was ‘mixed,’ and then be sent on to Antwerp.”

“What can we do in the face of this?” asked Chindori Chininga, chair of the Zimbabwean Parliamentary Portfolio Committee on Mines. “What is the value of the KP certificate if it comes from places that are also tax havens?” referring to Dubai’s ability to issue mixed origin certificates, eliminating the sources entirely. Chininga, considered a moderate Zimbabwe politician and member of the ruling ZANU party, cautioned that fingering those responsible for establishing or profiting from this corrupt system won’t work if the corruptors are never held accountable. “We must ask who the system is really working for,” said Chininga, who served as Zimbabwe’s minister of mines from 2000 to 2004. Several days after an interview with the authors, Chininga, who headed an investigation into the economic activities of diamond companies, was killed in a car accident ahead of forthcoming elections. At his funeral, some family members claimed he was murdered.

Intelligence dossiers authored by Zimbabwe’s notorious Central Intelligence Organization (CIO) would later reveal that six ZANU moderates including Chininga were “to be stopped,” and that elections were being rigged with the help of two African presidents, one of them Joseph Kabila from the Democratic Republic of Congo. Finally, according to these documents, money and diamonds were passing from African presidents and businessmen from Zimbabwe through to Dubai, Angola, and China. According to a South African Supreme Court document, including a judgment delivered in September 2011, the system works very well for companies like Omega. This document outlines how the company had effectively operated a massive transfer-pricing scheme through Dubai:

“Omega imported diamonds from Angola and Congo through an associated company in Dubai into Belgium. Omega ordered the shipment of diamonds purchased in Angola and Congo in accordance with the legally required Kimberley certificates, for delivery … in Dubai. The diamonds were packed in small parcels. Upon arrival in Dubai the small parcels were retained but repacked into larger parcels, containing diamonds from both Angola and Congo, without physically mixing the stones. Thereafter the new shipment of diamonds was provided with a new Kimberley Certificate indicating that the shipment emanated from the United Arab Emirates and marked ‘diamonds of mixed origin.’ The new shipment was issued with a new invoice … addressed to Omega wherein the value of the diamonds was increased.”

According to the seized invoices, the increase in value, from Dubai to Antwerp, was estimated at 20 percent to 31 percent. For each shipment, a new price list and a mixed origin Kimberley Process certificate were attached. Omega had systematically under-valued diamonds from Africa via their Dubai-based trading company, Tulip FZE, run by Vivian Hawkins-Green, sister-in-law to Laniado. The company then increased the value when exporting from Dubai to their Antwerp-based entities. This was done by taking advantage of the Kimberley practice of allowing non-producing diamond trading countries like the United Arab Emirates to mix diamond parcels as needed and then issue their own certificates of mixed origins, enabling Dubai to omit the real origins of diamonds—in this case, Zimbabwe, whose diamonds were initially banned from international traffic by the Kimberley Process. By becoming a member of the Kimberley Process, tax havens like Switzerland and Dubai legitimately obtain the right to obfuscate the origins of African diamonds. The entire system rests largely on the integrity of African diamond producing and exporting governments, diamond dealers, and conduit countries like the United Arab Emirates. The goal is to prevent blood diamonds, synonymous with Angola’s former rebel movement, UNITA, or Zimbabwe, from entering the international diamond trading chain.

The dubious strategy of under-invoicing was used by Omega, which had exported an average of at least $1.2 billion of diamonds every year between 2001 and 2008—$10 million per month from the Democratic Republic of Congo and $100 million per month from Angola. David Renous, a former Congo-based diamond buyer for Omega, claimed that a substantial number of these diamonds were under-valued and declared neither
in Angola nor the DRC.

Renous told Belgian and American investigators that this systematic under-declaration was done with the cooperation of key Angolan elites, including longtime President Josй Eduardo dos Santos. and was part of an elaborate scheme to compensate at least one arms trader, Arkadi Gaydamak, for rearming Josй Eduardo dos Santos’s party, between 1992 and 1998, and in defiance of UN sanctions on Angola’s protagonists. The arms, all of Russian design and East European origin, were supplied in violation of UN arms sanctions. But the arms dealers and other facilitators needed to be paid. In a conflict-ridden, cash-poor country like Angola, hard currency, especially in large quantities, is quite difficult to obtain. Along came diamonds and their merchants.

Gaydamak’s payoff was to become a silent partner in Omega’s monopoly with the Angolan government. Israeli diamond magnate Lev Leviev, active in Angolan diamonds since 1998, would be the principal financier. The Tulip FZE, Renous claimed, “generated profits. The profits could either be reinjected into the system to grow the capital, or used as desired. [Gaydamak] laundered funds legally. Nobody knew about it.” The system, Renous told investigators, not only allowed Gaydamak to launder his arms wealth outside of Angola through diamonds—an easy-to-access hyper-mobile resource, but also allowed mass profiteering from the value of diamonds. These were sold at rock bottom prices to Gaydamak’s own subsidiaries abroad.

But the alleged money-laundering, under-invoicing, and tax avoidance in Africa, all illicitly taking place under the umbrella of Kimberley Process-certification, were not the problems investigated by the Belgian court. The fraud lay in the fact that Omega and tulip then sought to avoid taxes in Belgium. In fact, Omega never officially kept more than two percent of the profits, in a valiant effort to sidestep taxes payable on such profits. Three of Omega’s connected entities including evaluation company MDC, as well as trading companies DexDiam and MBD, would trade the diamonds—on paper— and send cash onward to various bank accounts largely based in tax havens, such as Luxembourg, Dubai, and Switzerland. Other players in the operation are alleged to have included several Dubai-based diamond merchants, since all the profits would ultimately stay in Dubai. And all the companies, Renous claimed, were under the control of Laniado. Dubai is one of the top three diamond trading hubs, rivaling such historic centers as Antwerp.

There is little doubt why the Belgian investigators closed the file on a four-year-long investigation that stretched from Antwerp to Africa and the Middle East. Tax havens like the Kimberley Process-certified Dubai ensured the paper trail would lead to multiple dead ends. Prosecutors could not prove Omega benefitted from over-invoiced sales from Dubai to Antwerp. As the U.S. Embassy cable from Brussels, released through Wikileaks, quoted an investigator stating, “It’s like our fax line was directly connected to their shredder [in Dubai]." The eerie silence from the UAE in response to official requests for information was answer enough.

Dubai is one of the top three diamond trading hubs, rivaling such historic centers as Antwerp, and the world’s leading cutting and polishing hub, Mumbai. Dubai’s Almas towers, the tallest commercial building in the Middle East, is said to house more than 1,000 diamonds dealers, as well as 300 international and regional companies. In 2003, KPCS was inaugurated in the UAE by the ministry of economy, naming the Dubai Multi Commodities Center Authority (DMCC) the sole point of entry and exit for diamonds in the country. The Financial Secrecy Index (FSI), assessing the UAE’s opacity, ranks it at 80 percent, or “the top end of the secrecy scale." All of which has made Dubai a prime global transit point for diamonds of all provenance, described by Nick Shaxson, author of Treasure Islands, as “one of the filthiest spots on the planet.” And that has nothing to do with hygiene.

“Because of the Kimberley Process certificates, the diamond dealers did not want to ship the diamonds directly from their African buying offices to the market,” says one leading Belgian government diamond investigator, who requested we withhold his name for fear of political reprisals. “The shipments were diverted to the UAE (Dubai). The certificate and invoice was then changed to a desired price and then shipped to a trading center. This way the evaluation office in the trading center received a shipment of rough diamonds with a UAE Kimberley Process certificate ‘origin: mixed or unknown,’ and with a value close to the market price. The full purchase amount, as mentioned on the invoice, is transferred and diverted to different accounts all over the world, private accounts or accounts of individuals. In the bookkeeping, all transfers are attributed to the UAE supplier. It may be clear that the UAE as a transit point was only created to produce ‘new’ documents in order to mask the origin of the diamonds and to create a possibility to divert the payments.”

In another American embassy cable released by Wikileaks, former CEO of the Dubai Diamond Exchange (DDE), Noora Jamsheer, claimed that the Kimberley Process system in Dubai was corrupted, and that she was offered commissions to turn a blind eye. In 2007, she resigned because she was “unwilling to make compromises and overlook suspicious shipments of diamonds.” According to the cable, concerning one suspicious shipment, “In September 2006,… Ahmed bin Sulayem, DDE Chief Operating Officer, authorized the release of this shipment.” The Kimberley Process certificate from Ghana was not properly authenticated at the time of its release. As the court cable continued, “Jamsheer believes that Dubai and the UAE are being very short-sighted by not stringently abiding by the KP protocols. She thinks that the desire to make Dubai a hub of the diamond trade is the motivation for a willingness to gloss over some suspicious transactions.”

SETTING UP OURSELVES

In an attempt to gauge how quickly and easily layers of secrecy could be accessed for companies intent on under-invoicing commodities, we contacted Vandort Consulting and Intuit, two leading firms facilitating DMCC company formation. We explained that our primary purpose was to engage in “tax optimization” strategies for our diamonds, meaning to under-invoice by using different price lists, and to Kimberley Process-certify our diamonds in countries other than the countries of origin. We also requested as much non-disclosure and opacity as possible— nominees, anonymity, banking secrecy, and other layers of secrecy.

In seeking to enlist their help as clients, we told them, “We deal in Zimbabwean, Angolan diamonds. We often obtain KPC in Tanzania, South Africa, and Namibia for lower reputational risks, before exporting directly to our trading center. However, our partners have informed us that tax optimization banking would be better suited for a Dubai-based entity [as recipient of our rough diamonds]. Also, that DMCC can offer us use of mixed origin certification.”

Vandort provided a price list: establishment of a new company or subsidiary ($8,200), a flexi-desk ($4,200) or serviced office ($9,600), professional fees ($4,000), visas ($2,100), bank account ($1,500). There were no rules as to who would occupy the office. the entire process would take four to six weeks to establish. The companies could not operate in the UAE real economy, save through locals. Renewal of the trade license requires financials of the DMCC entity, not the parent company.

We explained how worried we were that artificially reducing our profits, avoiding taxes, or using different lists would result in external penetration of our company’s activities. The most accommodating consultant at Vandort suggested, "If you are worried about privacy of your economic activities for tax optimization purposes, you could…incorporate an off-shore company in, for instance, the British Virgin islands (BVI) which can hold the shares in the DMCC company. The costs to incorporate a BVI company are $2,500 including our costs.” The company informed us that DMCC would require all corporate papers, including beneficial owners, but that there had not yet been any government inquiries. Intuit suggested a more proximate tactic for the additional secrecy layer, using the Ras Al Khaimah (RAK) free zone in Dubai, which allows anonymity of ownership and the ability to protect assets legally from claims by others. It would take just a week to incorporate.

ROOTED IN ARMS TRADE

To understand the full implications for the Kimberley Process’s credibility and the industry’s claim to be its own best policeman, only one key fact is essential. The persons who’ve benefitted most from contributing to UNITA’s destructive 10-year campaign to seize power by way of a diamond-funded war were the very ones who allegedly benefit most from the Omega deal.

UNITA and its late leader Jonas Savimbi, along with former Liberian President Charles Taylor, were among the main reasons KPCS was implemented in the first place—to cut off their movements from financial oxygen.

To place this in its full historical perspective: twenty years ago, UNITA founder Jonas Savimbi angrily rejected his narrow loss to incumbent Angolan President Josй Eduardo dos Santos in UN-supervised elections, re-igniting one of Africa’s most brutal civil wars. In a country blessed or cursed, depending on your perspective—with some of the richest alluvial diamond deposits in the world, buyers from Antwerp were enlisted as financiers of the war.

In 1994, in an effort to deprive Savimbi of his source of cash for weapons, the UN slapped sanctions on all diamond dealings with the rebel leader. Faced with a major crisis of legitimacy and a threatened worldwide boycott of the diamond trade, the world’s largest diamond producer, De Beers, and the South African government initiated the Kimberley Process. Its chief aim was to sever all rebel movements from the formal diamond trade. Between 2001 and 2003, more than 50 countries and over 90 diamond traders formally signed up for the Kimberley Process Certification Scheme—including the government of Dubai, then just a tiny player with little more than $5 million in annual turn-over.

By 1997, the luanda regime found itself trapped. though their military campaign had pushed UNITA out of every major Angolan town, the government’s ability to pay for their mercenaries and expensive military hardware was increasingly constricted. Documents brought to light by the “Falcongate” investigation in Paris implicated the late french President Franзois Mitterrand’s son Jean-Christophe and a clique of top African officials in gun-running and money-laundering. Through this probe, it emerged that Gaydamak—vying with goldberg and leviev for control of Angola’s prolific diamond production—hit on a method that not only circumvented un arms sanctions, but also contributed greatly to undermining the very foundations of the Kimberley Process.

The meteoric rise of Isabel dos Santos. daughter of Angola’s president, to the position of Africa’s first woman billionaire can be traced to this system. First floated by Gaydamak in the mid-1990s, her goal was to create a diamond-buying monopoly, much like De Beers’ scheme in Namibia, Botswana, and South Africa. Her company, TAIS, was set up in 1997 and incorporated in Switzerland for the sole purpose of diamond trading. Two years later, as mercenaries helped the Angolan armed forces establish control of Angola’s prolific Lunda Norte diamond fields, President Josй Eduardo dos Santos decreed that henceforth only ASCorp Ltd—an Omega subsidiary based in Angola—would be permitted to buy and export Angolan diamonds. Total control, with zero accountability, coupled with an official monopoly produces its own set of opportunities—as events in Angola would so clearly illustrate.

By early 2004, these partners took full advantage of the higher legal hurdle set by the newly-created Kimberley Process by dropping the price they would pay officially for Angolan rough diamonds to below $200 a carat, thereby fattening the margin they in turn would make when selling to Antwerp and Tel Aviv. In 2007, the World Bank criticized the practice “based on concerns about special and privileged treatments.” In effect, the Luanda regime actively promoted a scheme that would rob their own country of several billion dollars of revenue lost to Omega—the intermediary that made it all happen.

Omega’s diamond-laundering scheme, a daisy-chain of briefcase companies registered in tax havens, all controlled by either Goldberg or Laniado’s clan, would launder money through blind investment trusts in jurisdictions ranging from Luxembourg to Cyprus. But Omega is just one company in this sordid tale. There are thousands of such companies working the murky world of Africa’s diamond fields. Actual losses to African countries from widespread under-invoicing and other form of illicit activities, according to the UN Economic Commission for Africa (UNECA), could be as high as $200 billion each year.

For their part, since 2011, Omega and the Angolan regime, notably President Josй Eduardo dos Santos, his military, and corporate allies, circumvented potential obstacles by operating out of another tax haven. In Geneva, they were able to continue business-as-usual through acquisition of shares in companies like De Grisogono, founded by the king of black diamonds, Fawaz Gruosi—publicly uninvolved in prior ASCorp dealings.

Not all governments are equal. The difference between diamond-producing countries and non-producing tax havens is vast. The latter provide the legal and financial-secrecy infrastructure enabling illicit activities, while the former struggle to generate revenue for citizens’ needs. But efforts to interdict the trade in rebel-produced diamonds fail to take into account the role of diamond-producing governments. Whether authoritarian, undemocratic, or corrupted, they may be far more pernicious than rebel movements. For unlike rebel groups, these regimes are legitimately accepted as global players—exploiting national resources in the name of citizens, but abusing or diverting national wealth for the profit of their rulers or criminal elements with ties to the leadership.

Alas, most of these activities still take place in a technically legal way within the bounds of the Kimberley Process, using the process to provide a veneer of legality to deeply criminal undertakings. Designed to shut out the violent activities of one specific group—rebel organizations, as a means of protecting revenues of the world’s largest diamond players—it has become a process that merely lubricates this spiral of illicit operations.

Instead, the geography needs to be broadened to include other forms of violence and violations—including economic violence from under-invoicing and tax avoidance; and political and civil rights violence, when harsh authoritarian or one-party state regimes are financed through revenues, facilitating directly and indirectly, cultural, social, and collective violence.

The Kimberley Process definition has enabled a 99 percent clean diamond industry to exist largely because the real violence of the industry is whitewashed, ignored, or excluded entirely from the framework—the criminal portion of which continues to exist entirely on the periphery. In the end, if the Kimberley definition remains limited to rebels, rather than the far broader array of often unsavory players who have forced their way into the industry, violating the letter and spirit of the system, there may be no fundamental way to save the diamond industry. The Kimberley Process as it is currently defined is a system that produces the wrong kind of results.

It would be difficult, if not politically impossible, to reform the Kimberley Process in its current form, particularly as it took the better part of two years to originally negotiate with all the diamond industry players. Still, a few tweaks could help curb the illicit off shore-based trade. The definition of conflict diamonds must be broadened to include economic and political conflicts—rather than simply violent conflicts—underwritten by illicit profits. No country that does not actually produce diamonds should be allowed to issue Kimberley Process certificates, and producing countries governed by authoritarian regimes, or dominated by big corporate players, who refuse to disclose pricing policies to investigating authorities should be suspended from the process. Better policing of the diamond police themselves—the key demand of clean diamond campaigners like Global Witness and Fatal Transactions, which unmet, led to their withdrawal from the negotiations process— appears to be the single most important aspect that could be quickly addressed. Finally, tax havens—including Dubai, Luxembourg, and Switzerland—should be barred from playing any role whatsoever in the diamond pipeline, save as end consumer destinations of diamonds themselves.

To accomplish these changes, of course, would take another injection of good faith from all the original signatories of the Kimberley Process—which, given the abuses and the loopholes that have clearly emerged, should be attainable. And while the stakes are high, if these revisions are not quickly implemented, the Process itself will soon become little more than another failed and empty gesture.

Tulip FZE’s Vivien Hawkins, sister-in-law to Laniado, responded to repeated interview requests stating, “We choose not to be interviewed and accordingly do not want to comment on subjudice matters and reserve our rights to invoke appropriate legal remedies against any public comments on subjudice matters.” Since then, court actions have terminated and a settlement has been reached. Still, Omega Diamonds, including Serge Majer (M.D.C) and Aslan Piha (Margaux) and its listed auditors, WF & Co, failed to respond to repeated interview requests.

Deutsche Bank Luxembourg responded, “Please be informed that banks in Luxembourg are bound by a duty of professional secrecy pursuant to the law dated 5 April 1993 on the financial sector. Based on this duty of professional secrecy, please [accept our] apologies that we are not entitled to answer your request and provide you with any information.”

Neither Angola’s Ministry of Finance, nor Angola’s state diamond companies including endiama and Sodiam, replied to multiple interview requests.

Representatives of the Kimberley Process, based in the DRC, also failed to respond at the time of print. Lev Leviev responded with threats of a lawsuit seeking “substantial damages” for unspecified issues. Attempts to contact Arkadi Gaydamak were unsuccessful. Jamsheer declined to be interviewed.

In Dubai, the Kimberley Process office and its listed head Mariam al-Hashemi were contacted. But the request was forwarded to the DMCC’s public relations office. Jade Mamarbachi, director of the public relations consultants Brunswick group, responded only by inquiring about the nature of the story, including “who else [we] were interviewing.”

Following several email exchanges, interview requests with the DMCC were denied. We replied “Dubai is both a major diamond trading hub and a tax haven,” central to the illicit activity. Mamarbarchi stated in a subsequent e-mail, “I understand, and they know that. I have gone through it with them. This is their stance.”

Corruption MPLA Soviet style Regime is a pervasive phenomenon

C orruption in the MPLA soviet style Regime in Angola is a pervasive phenomenon, hindering economic growth and government-sponsored liberalization programs.

1970s and 1980s

The Soviet press, despite the close relationship between Angola and the USSR, accused the ruling MPLA party of clientelism, corruption, and nepotism, accusing the government of illicitly accumulation US$1 billion. Ogonek said that "corruption has flourished on a scale which is unprecedented even in Africa. the ruling party in Angola. being pro-communist by nature, was ready to sacrifice everything and everybody." [1] 1990s

In April 1999 Gustavo Costa, a journalist for Expresso, wrote an article entitled Corruption Makes Victims, accusing Josй Leita-o, the chief presidential advisor, of embezzling government revenue. Police arrested Costa and charged him with defamation and injury. The Angolan Supreme Court found him guilty, sentencing him to eight-months imprisonment, suspended for two years, and fined him $2,000.[2] Rafael Marques, a journalist and human rights activist, wrote "The Lipstick of Dictatorship," an article criticizing corruption in the Angolan government and President Josй Eduardo dos Santos, on July 3.

The National Criminal Investigation Division (DNIC) questioned him on October 13 for several hours before releasing him. Later that day Morais gave an interview with Radio Ecclйsia and repeated his criticism of the dos Santos government. Twenty armed members of the Rapid Intervention Police arrested him along with Aguiar dos Santos, the publisher of Agora, and Antonio Josй Freitas, Agora staff reporter, on charges of defamation on October 16, 1999. Marques said dos Santos bore responsibility for the "destruction of the country. for the promotion of incompetence, embezzlement and corruption as political and social values."[3][4]

In May 1999 the World Bank threatened to cut off aid to Angola if the government did not take serious steps to counter corruption, beginning with an audit of the petroleum and diamonds industries, Angola’s primary sources of income.[5] 2000s

In 2002 the International Monetary Fund found the Angolan MPLA Regime could not account for more than US$900 million in 2006 due to "extensive corruption". Bestos de Almeida, spokesman for the Angolan Finance Ministry, denied any financial inconsistency existed. [6] Transparency International’s (TI) Corruption Perception Index (CPI) for 2003 found the governments of Angola and Zimbabwe the most corrupt in Southern Africa. On a scale of 0 to 10 with 0 the most corrupt and 10 the most transparent, TI rated Angola 1.8 and Zimbabwe 2.3, some of the highest corruption ratings in the world.
[7]

In 2004, Human Rights Watch found the government could not account for US$4 billion spent between 1997 and 2002.[8] Transparency International ranked Angola 142 out of 163 countries in the Corruption Perception Index just after Venezuela and before the Republic of the Congo with a 2.2 rating.[9] The The Heritage Foundation gave a 47.1% "free" rating in its Index of Economic Freedom in 2008. [10]

Negocios are corrupt business deals in Angola. [11] References

Since 1961 Angola has been at war. First against the Portuguese colonial administration, then since 1975 against the unelected communist dictatorship. When the 50,000 Cuban mercenaries left Angola by 1991, Angola enjoyed over a year of rare peace. Until the UN supervised elections of September 1992. The widespread MPLA fraud surrounding that shameful excuse of an election was followed by the worst outbreak of massacres committed by the MPLA troops ever seen in Angola. In just 3 days MPLA mobs murdered over 10,000 Bakongo and Ovimbundu Natives. The war exploded again with a ferocity never before seen in the region. More people died in the 2 years following "the election" than in the previous 30 years of war which it was meant to end!

Instead of punishing the Marxist MPLA soviet style regime for the electoral fraud and cold-blooded massacres of their opponents, Western governments inexplicably imposed total economic sanctions on the victims – those who supported UNITA. This blockade has prevented even food aid and medicines from being delivered to the millions of people living in Free Angola. So while Western governments continued to sell weapons of mass destruction (including napalm fuel-air bombs) to the MPLA Marxists aparatus in Luanda, they enforced severe sanctions against humanitarian aid reaching the victims of these attacks.

Observers already point to several deficiencies in the election campaigns, such as intimidation of the opposition, tight control over the media, MPLA’s use of oil and diamond resources to buy off political supporters, etc.

The state remains heavily centralised in the office of the presidency, who in several instances has overruled government ministries. Dos Santos governs through an extensive patronage network of friends, MPLA allies and relatives, popularly known as the Futungo. Members of this patronage network. have been provided with attractive positions in the political administration of Angola. This ruling elite enjoys virtually unchecked access to state funds and is widely accused of depriving Angolans of benefits from the lucrative oil deals.

The resource-rich patronage system has resulted in extreme inequalities in Angola, with the United Nations estimating that 70% of the population live on less than US$ 1 a day. This has raised concerns over Angola’s long-term stability. Economic reforms have been limited and the International Monetary Fund (IMF) has raised concerns that economic growth derives solely from high oil prices and not from sectors outside the oil industry.

Public spending is generally high, but low in social sectors (far below its regional neighbours), making public spending highly unsustainable. Each year, large amounts of oil revenues disappear from the state budget through clandestine channels to the ruling elite, and international observers have estimated that more than US$ 1 billion in oil revenues is lost annually.

Public services in Angola are highly inefficient and sometimes non-existent at sub-provincial levels, which are completely dependent on transfers from the central government. Public servants generally compensate for their low salaries by demanding bribes in return for public services, thus spreading corruption to virtually all sectors and levels of society. This pattern is aggravated by the fact that the 18 provincial governments are ruled by powerful provincial MPLA governors loyal to the president.

These individuals administer their provinces as small kingdoms with little interest in broad social and economic development. The ineffective and corruption-plagued public services, especially at the local level, coupled with the non-responsiveness of the Angolan government, has resulted in a loss of political legitimacy for the government, leading several observers to question the sustainability of the fragile democratic process in Angola.

References

^ Light, Margot (1993). Troubled Friendships: Moscow’s Third World Ventures, 77.

^ James, W. Martin (2004). Historical Dictionary of Angola, 41.

DE BEERS A DIAMOND IS FOR EVER

And so it is the MPLA Regime in Angola

In 2010 a further eight kimberlites were added to the De Beers Angolan portfolio bringing the total number to 158 discoveries in the past five years. The Lunda NE concession has yielded the most prospective portfolio at both an early and advanced stage of exploration, with 114 kimberlite discoveries. In 2010 the work programme focused on the deposit assessment phase which was successfully completed on the Mulepe-1 deposit of three adjacent pipes with a combined size of around 20 hectares. 100 carats of diamonds were recovered from these pipes for revenue determination purposes, and Mulepe-1 has now moved to the desktop phase which should be completed in Q2, 2011.

The way and manner in which the MPLA Regime exploits the Lunda State
The following is a list of Diamond Mining sites in the Lunda Region

CATOCA DIAMOND MINING SITE
The Catoca Mine is the world’s 4th largest kimberlite and is currently being operated by SMC (Sociedade Miniera de Catoca), which is in turn owned by Endiama (32.8%), Russia’s Alrosa (32.8%), Brazil’s Odebrecht Mining (16.4%) and the Diamond Finance CY BV Group (18%). The mine produced just over 2.6 Mct in 2001. The kimberlite yields quality diamonds, of which 35% is gem quality, fetching prices of around $75 – $100/carat. Reserves are estimated at 60 million carats. SMC intends increasing production to as much as 5 Mct per year.

This mine site is used by the MPLA Regime to pay its debt to Russia and China, there is strong presence of Israeli firms and personnel at this site also specially in the provision of technology equipment and staff.

LUУ DIAMOND MINING SITE
DiamondWorks, through its wholly owned subsidiary, Branch Energy, has numerous interests in Angola, including alluvial and kimberlite operations. DiamondWorks operated the Luo and Yetwene kimberlite mines. The Camatchia and Camagico diamondiferous kimberlite pipes are also located within DiamondWorks’ license areas. The Luo mine began production in 1997 and has produced almost 200 000ct, with diamonds fetching between $120 and 350/carat. The largest diamond recovered to date has been a 232.6 carat stone. The Yetwene mine began production in June 1998. Exploration activities on this property have been suspended due to the security situation.

DiamondWorks have alluvial concessions in and around the kimberlite operations, including the Luarica property (North of Luo) and the Alto Kwanza property in the Bie province of central Angola. The Alto Kwanza concession is Diamondworks’ largest, with an area of 18 000km2.

In this mine is from where the MPLA Regime operates his financial centre, and provides military and security logistic to beat, intimidate and assassinate the Lunda Tchokwe Native Population.

CAMAFUCA DIAMOND MINING SITE
Southern Era is currently investigating the Camafuca – Camazambo kimberlite pipe in the Calonda area of the Lunde Norte province. Camafuca is estimated to be the world’s largest undeveloped diamondiferous pipe with a surface area of 160 hectares. The pipe is approximately 3.3 kilometres in length and 500 metres in width, and lies 40 kilometres north of the Luo concession on the Chicapa River. Camufuca was the first kimberlite pipe to be discovered in Angola. Recent sampling of the Camafuca pipe yielded just over 1000 carats from a bulk sample of 3 500 m3treated. This represents a significant increase from previous historical estimates. Grades ranged from $126 – $140/carat, with 32% of the diamonds being greater than 1 carat in size and 21% greater than 2 carats.

A feasibility study to evaluate the technical and economic viability of the project is essentially complete and was presented to the Camafuca partners in April, 2000. Plans are to develop the higher grade portions of the pipe first – an exercise that is estimated to cost $14 million. The partners have accepted the feasability study and now plan to move ahead with the development of Phase 1 that intends developing the southeastern part of the kimberlite that contains 6.1 million cubic metres of material at an average grade of 0.18 carats per cubic metre. Mining of Camafuca has been complicated by a major river that dissects the kimberlite – initial mining will utilise dredging methods.

Ownership of the project is outlined as follows: SouthernEra Angola LDA 32%, followed by Endiama 20%, SML 15% and the Welox Limited 33%. Welox Ltd is part of the Leviev Group of companies. In mid 2002, the Angolan Government formally approved the operating agreement and formation of the operating company, to be called Sociedade Mineira do Angola, Lda (SMC).

This mine is the biggest diamond site in the Lunda State it is situated in the locality of Calonda, which provides direct income and revenue to the fortune of the Jose Eduardo dos Santos family. The MPLA Regime never speaks of it in “government”. it is never mentioned, and there exists a total obscurity on the matter.

CAMITONGO SASWAHA DIAMOND MINING SITE
This mine is managed directly by the manager of the Catoca Project, the income of this mine goes to the Regime MPLA elite and cronies, among them people from Sao Tome, Cabo Verde, Guine and Portugal.

PROJECTO LUANGUE DIAMOND MINING SITE
This mine is under the direct control of the MPLA leaders, and its revenue is shared by the top brass of the MPLA Regime, specially the ones committed to the Regime 100%, the Regimes hard liners.

CUANGO ALUVIAL DIAMOND MINING SITE
This mining site is the crown of the Generals of the Armed Forces of the MPLA Regime. In this mining site it is practised slavery acts found in the XVI century world, it is also where anyone and anything is and can be killed no questions asked nor any enquiries will ever exist, people are constantly going missing and disappear in this mining site.

ALTO CHICAPA DIAMOND MINING SITE
This mining site was given to the criolos (individuals) that helped the MPLA Regime gain power in its struggle and war against the Portuguese, it is also know as the centre of enrichment of the dominant families in Angola.

BAIXA DO MINUNGO DIAMOND MINING SITE
The Dictator Josй Eduardo dos Santos, gave the exploration of this mining site to his wife, Ana Paula dos Santos.

LUNGUENA DIAMOND MINING SITE
This mining site is located in the River Lueji a tribute river of the larger River Luangue, this is the site which was given to the MPLA Regime elite in particular the top brass of the SINFO, SIE and the secret services under the Control of the MPLA Regime. This site was set up as the revenue and reward for the loyalty and special services given to the MPLA Regime.

CAZOMBO COPER AND ALUMINIUM MINES
The Regime top brass who have been given the rights to exploit this sites are
General Joгo de Matos and General Led senior officers in the MPLA Armed Forces.

MPLA Generals Colonizing the Lunda, steal their wealth
further evidence of corruption at the epicentre of the MPLA regime Dictator

The corrupt general Kopelipa is also formally represented in the diamond industry, as a shareholder of Lumanhe. On February 13, 2004, a group of six generals had to give, equally, shares in mining company Lumanhe in favour of the current minister of state and head of the Military House of the President. This transfer occurred at a moment of frank rising power of General Kopelipa and its increasing control over the Armed Forces (FAA) and the generals now have seven each from 14:28% of the capital.

The corrupt Generals Armando da Cruz Neto, General Hendrick Vaal Carlos da Silva and General Adrian Mackenzie Makevela remain active at official functions, respectively, as governor of Benguela, the Inspector General Staff of FAA, and head of the Directorate of Primary Education and Preparation of the State Troops General Staff of the Angolan Armed Forces (FAA). The other three generals dedicate themselves exclusively to the business and are the former chief of General Staff of FAA, Chief of Staff and Chief of Army Commands, including Joao de Matos, and the brothers Luis and Antonio Coquette.

Five days after the entry of General Kopelipa corrupt in society, February 18, 2004, Hendrick Vaal General Carlos da Silva, signed as a representative of Lumanhe an agreement with Endiama and ITM Mining for the establishment of the Mining Society Chitotolo. The state, through Endiama, transferred, in this way, 15% of the share capital of the generals Chitotolo. The Lumanhe also owns 21% of the Cuango Mining Society (SMC), in partnership with Endiama (41%) and ITM Mining (38%).

The SMC is responsible for systematic violations of human rights in the village of Cafunfo in Cuango basin, where it has a large mining concession. Killings, torture, destruction of mines, and arbitrary police actions are part of the routine of the Mining Society Cuango against the villagers and miners. SMC enjoys the impunity of the generals who profit from the deal. A new report on human rights in the region is expected shortly.

A European government is also involved with the shady dealings of corrupt generals. This is the Portuguese government. In June 30, 2009, the consortium ITM Mining / Lumanhe terminated their contract operations in Calonda Mining Society, where he maintained a 50% stake, while the Mining Society of Lucapa, which holds the concession for diamond mining, guaranteed the other half actions. The Parpъblica SGPS, a holding company owned 100% by the Portuguese State, controls 81.13% stake in Sociedade Portuguesa de Empreendimentos (SPE), which in turn holds 49% stake in Sociedade Mineira do Lucapa. To the Angolan state has in the Endiama company the majority of the shares.

Jose Eduardo dos Santos a man that had only 2 shirts and a pair of suits. Has it is well remembered in the memory of those who meet and lived with him. Now he has his photo in all bank notes and Identification Cards of each Angolan.

Jose Eduardo dos Santos a man that had only 2 shirts and a pair of suits. Has it is well remembered in the memory of those who meet and lived with him. Now he has his photo in all bank notes and Identification Cards of each Angolan.

37 Million US Dollars in Mr. Jose Eduardo dos Santos bank account

The Bank "Banque Internationale du Luxemburg", in a document signed by its directors A. Roelants, J. Rieter and J. Bodoni declare that the beneficiary and owner of the Panamanian registered Company “Camparal Inc.” with the bank account numbers: 275748 and 275903 belongs to Mr Josй Eduardo dos Santos of Luanda, Angola. Furthermore, the French police confirms that COMPARAL of Josй Eduardo dos Santos represented in Paris by Mr Elнsio de Figueiredo. And in the bank account of COMPARAL (of Mr Eduardo dos Santos) the balance is USD$ 37,112,567.46

The company TUTORAL (registered in the name of Elнsio de Figueiredo) has USD$ 7,331,199.53

Mr. Pierre Joseph Falcone owner of the Bank Accounts 01-88-126279-03 and Acc.45885 of the Bank Leumi Le-Israel Geveva, Acc CO-325794 of the Bank UBS Geneva and of the Bank account 1.038.915 of the Bank Ferrier Lullin & Cie in Geneva has deposited USD $59,954,664.00

This moneys came out from the State Company SONANGOL of its Account CO-101457 Escrow Agreement 3.06.97 of the Bank UBS Geneva, where it was deposited USD$ 774,193,545.00 and distributed in several accounts.

Rigged: The Scramble for Africa’s Oil, Gas and Minerals

8 February 2012

The intensifying competition for commercial access to the world’s remaining deposits of oil, gas and minerals brings with it a serious risk of exacerbating corruption and violent conflict. Our new report shows that in Angola and Nigeria there is a risk that complex deals struck between governments and corporations for access to natural resources could be used corruptly to benefit vested interests in these countries, rather than the citizens. The report also points to major concerns over opaque sales of mining assets in the Democratic Republic of Congo to offshore companies.

Our research reveals two major problems in the government allocation of oil contracts:

Governments are not making clear the grounds for why a particular company is given a contract. In certain cases, they appear to allow certain companies special or preferential access to oil licences, leading to doubts about the integrity of the process.
Governments are awarding the licences to companies whose beneficial owners remain undisclosed. In certain cases, there are grounds for suspicion that some of the companies may be owned or controlled by government or their private sector proxies.

If citizens do not know why particular companies have been awarded natural resource licenses, it can lead to suspicions of wrongdoing, especially in countries like Nigeria, Angola and the DRC with track records of natural resource related corruption. Transparency is crucial for citizen’s ability to trust that there has been no conflict of interest and to ensure that Angola, Nigeria and the DRC use their natural resource revenues for development and poverty reduction.

Bribery, Money Laundry and Corruption
Criminal state of affairs, and wide spread Endemic Corruption MPLA Regime
Daylight theft and pillage of the state assets

This Report was elaborated in 2010

This report focuses among other in the commercial activities of of the Minister of State and Chief of the Military House of the Presidency of the Republic of Angola, General Manuel Hйlder Vieira Dias Jъnior “Kopelipa”.

It is to this individual is the responsibility of the regime sectors of defence and security of state of Angola. With this individual the Chief of Communications of the Presidency of the Republic, General Leopoldino Fragoso do Nascimento “Dino”, and the president of the Administration Board and Director-General of the State Oil Company Sonangol, Manuel Vicente, form the so called triumvirate, which today completely dominates the political economy of Angola, without any distinction between public and private funds

Manuel Vicente joins also the accumulated powers of the Generals and those of the State Oil Sonangol, the fact that he is one of the most influential members of the Political Bureau of the MPLA party, has the protйgй of the President of the Republic and the responsible for the fiscal inspection of the private businesses of the MPLA Party.

The State Oil Company Sonangol is the biggest company of Angola, and the largest contributing to the coffers of the State, several analysts have considered Sonangol as the principal instrument of maintaining the Corrupt Regime of Josй Eduardo dos Santos in the domains of the financial, political and diplomatic circles internationally, like wise is the single source of illicit enrichment of the leaders of the MPLA Regime.

In certain cases, they show solidarity with other junior members in the administration who are accomplices in allowing the theft of public money, by showing gratitude and sharing in the heist, these are normally members of the executive, and public senior officials who where involved and assisted in the theft, pillage of the public funds.

Strategic sectors such as the Oil sector, telecommunications, baking, social communication, diamonds, all make part of the empire build by this regime figures.

The companies which relate to what we have just mentioned above are: Movicel, Biocom, Banco Espнrito Santo Angola, Nazaki Oil & Gбs, Media Nova, World Wide Capital and Lumanhe.

Movicel
At present (2010) there are only two mobile phone service operators in angola one is Unitel and the other is Movicel.

Unitel
Operates since 2001, it is a result from the association by equal shares of (25%), between Sonangol, through its subsidiary MSTelcom (ex-Mercury), and Portugal Telecom, GENI and Vidatel.

Movicel was created by the government in 2003, as a subsidiary of the state company Angola-Telecom.

Through the Resolution N.° 67/09 of 26 August 2009, the Council of Ministers decreed the meditate privatization and without public tender the privatization of the company Movicel, they allocated the company to a consortium of angolan companies by the value of 200 millions de dollars.

For such effect, the MPLA Regime, invoked the difficulty on the mobilization of other investors for the privatization of the companies.

The MPLA Regime also argued of the urgency in generation funds to the coffers of government in "face of world financial crisis" ;

That decision, according to the government resolution, had into account the identification on the "structure of the national investment partners, that secures the financial resources vitals to the immediate application of the investment plans of Movicel and the financial backup awaited by the national treasury".

Mean wile 59% of the capital of the company Movicel was transferred to two companies linked to high ranking officers under the State Minister and Chief of the Military House, General Manuel Hйlder Vieira Dias Jъnior “Kopelipa”, the company Portmill and the company Modus Comunicare, as we will describe.

On the 10 of June 2009, General Kopelipa, and General Dino and Manuel Vicente, formally separated from the company Portmill Investments and Telecommunications from which they where both proprietors, with control of 99,96% of the company shares equally divided between themselves.

They gave their shares by the intermediary of a portuguese citizen called Ismкnio Coelho Macedo, to a group of high ranking officials of the Unit of the Presidential Guard (UGP), as per the grid shown under.

In the case of the company Portmill, the Lieutenant-Coronel Leonardo Lidinikeni, official of the Presidential Escort has 99,96% of the shares of the company.

In the company Modus Comunicare, the Lieutenant-Coronel Tadeu Agostinho dos Santos Hikatala, responsible for the presidential escort, is the share holder of 99,92% of the shares of the company. The United of Presidential Guard (UGP) is subordinated to the Military House (Casa Militar).

The private administrator of the Businesses’ of General Kopelipa, Mr. Ismкnio Coelho Macedo, made the operation of purchase, selling and restructuration of a small company of communications, publicity and marketing called Modus Comunicare – Comunicaзгo e Imagem Lda. which had already had expression in the market, and placed in its ownership list high ranking officials of the Presidential Palace.

The company was transformed into an anonymous society, dedicated to telecommunications on the 14 August 2009.

That date indicates that the process of recognition of such transaction, its transformation into an anonymous society and alteration of its business scope, only was concluded two weeks after the government of President Josй Eduardo dos Santos, atributed 19% of the shares of the company Movicel to this new company.

On the 29 July 2009, the Council of Ministers approved the privatization of 80% of the capital of the company Movicel in favour of the angolan companies Portmill Investimentos and Telecomunicaзхes (40%), Modus Comunicare (19%), Ipang – Indъstria de Papel e Derivados (10%), Lambda (6%) and Novatel (5%).

By its turn the state companies Angola Telecom and the Empresa Nacional de Correios e Telйgrafos de Angola have the following shares 18% and 2% of the social capital of the company Movicel.

We now present the list of beneficiary share holders on the companies:

Portmill, Investments and Telecommunications (40%)

As national director of Telecommunications Mr Aristides Cardoso Frederico Safeca, integrated the Commission for the Negotiations of Movicel, in accordance with the government edict No. 67/07 issued by the ex-Ministry of Finances Mr Josй Pedro de Morais (December 2002 to October 2008), dated of 19 January 2007.

That commission was headed by the then economic assessor of the President Josй Eduardo dos Santos, Archer Mangueira.

Since 2 October 2006, Aristides Safeca has the functions of President of the Administration Council and Director of the Belgian Company Parisa, S.A.

The same Aristides Safeca, in association with his Brothers Alcides Safeca, Secretary of State for Budget (Secretario de Estado do Orзamento – Ministry of Finances) and Amнlcar Safeca, Director of UNITEL, are majority partners in the company Trans Omnia,

in which the associate themselves with G eneral Fernando Vasquez Araъjo, Chief of the Main Department of Armament and Technical of the Army General Staff of the FAA. The company Trans Omnia has been privileged in multimillion contracts to the supply of food to the Angolan Armed Forces FAA.

Aristides Safeca accumulates the public functions with private sector functions, which is a norm in the MPLA Regime

The Vice-Minister for Telecommunications is also the President of the Administration Board of the foreign Company Parisa (Based in Belgium), making multiple business with the Angolan State for self enrichment and of those family members and associates.

The attribution of a quota to Novatel, in the privatization of Movicel constitutes another proof of public funds being diverted in determent of the State.

Novatel was created on the 29 April 2009, after the presentation of the recommendations of the Commission for the Negotiation of Movicel and 3 months before the formal announcement of the beneficiary companies by the Council of Ministers.

Fбbrica em Benguela avaliada em 294 milhхes de dуlares Segunda maior cimenteira quer liderar mercado interno

A Heidelberg, o segundo maior grupo cimenteiro mundial, arranca com a construзгo da fбbrica em Benguela durante o ano de 2013. A empresa vai se associar com a Tecnimуvel (Angola), Grupo Galileu (Portugal) e com a Caixa Social das Forзas Armadas Angolanas para criar a SLN – Fбbrica de Cimento e Clinker de Benguela.

O capital da nova fбbrica estб distribuнdo em 55% com os alemгes da Heidelberg, 34% com a Tecnimуvel, 11% com o Grupo Galileu e 10% com a Caixa Social das FAA.

O contrato de investimento foi assinado, em Dezembro de 2009, ainda por Aguinaldo Jaime (que liderava a Agкncia Nacional de Investimento Privado – ANIP) mas sу agora as condiзхes estгo criadas para o avanзo definitivo do projecto. Mais: o Novo Jornal sabe
que uma alta figura do grupo Heidelberg aterra, dia 8, na Catumbela (provнncia de Benguela), para liderar os acertos finais.

O investimento estб avaliado em 294 milhхes de US dуlares. A parte angolana entra com cerca de 25 milhхes de US dуlares de capitais prуprios e 71 milhхes de dуlares em maquinaria e equipamentos e outros bens fixos e corpуreos. Do exterior virгo cerca de 26 milhхes de US dуlares e outros 169 milhхes USD para importaзгo de mбquinas e equipamentos. O financiamento da fбbrica foi estabelecido em
moldes semelhantes.

O projecto arranca com capitais prуprios de 59 milhхes de dуlares, sendo que 49% pertencem aos investidores angolanos (25 milhхes de dуlares). Os restantes 51%, ou 30 milhхes US dуlares, pertencerгo ao investidor externo. Os capitais alheios, avaliados em 235 milhхes de US dуlares, serгo negociados junto da banca. 30% no mercado financeiro nacional e os restantes 70% no mercado internacional.

As autoridades nacionais, no acordo de investimento (que o Novo Jornal consultou em parte), comprometemse a conceder uma бrea de mil metros quadrados para o projecto, a investir nas ligaзхes ferroviбrias da regiгo de Benguela para facilitar a ligaзгo ao Porto do Lobito e a fornecer бgua e energia para garantir a operaзгo.

Tambйm serгo concedidas as isenзхes fiscais estabelecidas na lei Nє 17/03 de 25 de Julho, para alйm de estarem garantidas as questхes burocrбticas envolvidas em processos deste gйnero.

No acordo de investimento ficaram tambйm garantidas as questхes ambientais, mediante a apresentaзгo de um estudo de impacto de ambiental, como prevк a lei. Esta й, com certeza, uma das questхes mais sensнveis do investimento. A provнncia de Benguela estб inserida numa regiгo com forte apetкncia turнstica e num ecosistema relativamente frбgil – com zonas de habitaзгo e reproduзгo de
animais e alguma apreensгo pelo suposto avanзo do deserto do Namibe.

A recente estiagem deixou em sobressalto a regiгo sul de Angola.

MPLA has now the control of the private media in Angola

21 February 2012

Protests demanding reform and led by the youth and reported on national media challenged the despotic dictator Josй Eduardo dos Santos, who completed 32 years in absolute power.

Source: Committee for the protection of Journalists (Comitк de proteзгo de Jornalistas)

The Parliament, dominated by the MPLA party of Jose Eduardo dos Santos, analyzed legislation to "combat crimes" in the domain of technologies of information and social communication. The Law Project, since last year (2011), intends to harden the sentences for defamation and to criminalize the electronic diffusion of "recordings, images and videos" from anybody without the express consent of those in such recordings, images or videos.

In declarations to the Nations Radio Station, the Communist Dictator Jose Eduardo dos Santos, em clara alusгo a jornalistas cidadгos, atacou o uso da Internet para organizar "manifestaзхes nгo autorizadas com o intuito de insultar, denegrir, provocar tumulto e confusгo". (Um usuбrio do YouTube, kimangakialo, postou mais de 150 vнdeos de protestos).

In the same speech made in April 2011, Jose Eduardo dos Santos afirmou que os jornalistas gozavam de total liberdade para criticar sua lideranзa. Porйm, pesquisas do CPJ indicam que as forзas de seguranзa agrediram, prenderam e obstruнram o trabalho de jornalistas independentes que cobriam protestos e eventos oficiais. Personalidades e funcionбrios pъblicos usaram as forзas de seguranзa e os tribunais para acertar as contas com os repуrteres que investigavam denъncias de abuso de poder, corrupзгo ou mб conduta.

Two journalists, Armando Josй Chicoca and William Tonet, where condemned to prison, due to their critical coverage of the MPLA Regime; both appealed to their sentences and where released on the end of 2011.

Josй Manuel Gimbi enfrentou intimidaзгo por parte das forзas de seguranзa enquanto realizava reportagens do enclave militarizado e rico em petrуleo de Cabinda. Ataques ao serviзo de navegaзгo (DoS), targeting sites hosted in the exterior such as the popular Angolan Independent news sites Club-K and Angola24horas, where taken from the internet in October 2011, closed down by the MPLA Regime.

Law of "crimes" on the internet, restricts news and of social network sites.

Incarceration or treat of incarceration, and aggression to journalists to make them to refrain or be afraid in reporting in cases of corruption, involving members of the MPLA Regime.

Attacks and Persecution of Journalists in Angola 2012 by the MPLA Regime Security Apparatus

7 of March 2012 On the 7 of March 2012 the Journalist Francisco Mukkuta also known as "Coque" from the "Radio Station Despertar" was followed by elements of the MPLA Security Apparatus on a 4X4 Land Cruiser, of grey colour and without any number plaque which is issued by Frescangol, after conducting and interview on the Radio at 18:30 with two young Human Rights activist Mбrio Domingos and Kimbanba who have been earlier kidnapped and beating by the MPLA Security Forces apparatus in the vicinity of the Water Tank of the shanty town Cazenga, Luanda then taken to the area of the Sanitary Installations bordering the Cazenga, Cacuanco and Viana areas.

The Land Cruiser followed the Journalist from the door of the Radio Station to the car park next to his house.

Hand written message on a pamphlet with death treat to the Journalist Francisco Mukkuta also known as "Coque" from the "Radio Station Despertar". The message in hand writing reads:
"Koke is better if you move neighbourhood, take care thief.
Koke you are not afraid, better look out"

The note was delivered on the 21 March 2012 to the Journalist Francisco Mukkuta

25 Attacks on journalists in 2011 by the MPLA Regime Security Apparatus

In 2011 it saw an increase of attacks to journalists in Angola perpetrated by the MPLA Regime. Several cases of physical aggression, censorship, arrests and treats have severely increased in 2011 in comparison to 2010. Many of the Journalists involved, who where targeted where those journalists who covered the many youth protests against the MPLA Regime following the inspiration of the Arab Spring protests in north Africa in 2011.

List of attacks to Journalist in Angola by the MPLA Regime per year and the amount of fatal or attacked journalists.

2007 – 4
2008 – 4
2009 – 7
2010 – 7
2011 – 25

2 Two the number of independent Angolan Newspapers

With the exception of only two independent private newspapers the rest of the newspapers in Angola are in the hands of MPLA Party Officials, Civil Servants or are under the control of shareholder ownership by companies aligned with the MPLA Regime, including family members of the MPLA Regime ruling elite.

2 List of the two independent Angolan Newspapers

Note:
Folha 8 a weekly newsletter had its offices raided by the MPLA Regime Security Forces on the 12 March 2012, all the Computers where removed and taken form Folha 8 offices.

It is to be known that the Editor of Folha 8 publicly revealed a few months ago that he had written documents on the state of Foreign Bank accounts in the Name of the Dictator Jose Eduardo dos Santos. Is this a way for the MPLA Regime find out what those documents are and who made them available?

Luanda, Angola, 10 March 2012

All photos where taken on the 10 March 2012, the anniversary of the first Demonstration of 7 march 2011 in Luanda.
Those in the picture are among others the secretary of the Democratic Bloc Political Party and Civil Activists, on of them is a well known rapper.

7 Seven is the number of the Angolan Newspapers controlled by the MPLA Regime:

O Paнs
Expansгo
Exame
Angolense
A Capital
Semanбrio Angolense
Novo Jornal

8 years of prison

In the law of Internet in Angola, it is proposed a severe punishment "to those without consent, supply, transmit, facilitate, distribute recordings, films and photos of other peoples by means of a system of information".

At present the MPLA Regime as passed 4 Laws that criminalize news gathering activities.

1886 The Legal Law inherited from colonial era, determines 6 months of imprisonment for defamation of public officers.
2002 A Lei do Segredo de Estado impхe uma pena de dois anos de prisгo por posse de documentos oficiais considerados ‘sensнveis’. 2006 A Lei de Imprensa permite que tribunais suspendam meios de comunicaзгo por um ano.
2010 A Lei de Crimes Contra a Seguranзa do Estado estabelece uma pena de dois anos de prisгo por "insultos atravйs de palavras, imagens, textos ou бudio" contra o presidente ou instituiзхes oficiais.

2 the number of independent radio stations in Angola

Apart from controlling the public radio stations, the MPLA Party officials also control all Radio Stations in Angola apart from only 2 Independent and private Radio Stations.

2 Two independent Radio Stations:

Radio Ecclйsia
Radio Despertar

8 Eight Radio stations controlled by the MPLA Regime:

Radio Nacional de Angola
Television Pъblica de Angola
FM Radio LAC
FM Radio Comercial de Cabinda
FM Radio 2000
FM Radio Morena
Radio Mais
TV Zimbo

10 Journalists Killed since 1992

10 Journalists where killed by the MPLA Regime because of their work in the last two decades in Angola. Many more deaths of journalist occurred during the civil war committed by the MPLA Regime apparatus, which no one has ever been brought to justice for it.

Details of killing of Journalists in Angola by the MPLA Regime since 1992:

7 journalists assassinated
2 journalists killed by supposedly crossed fire
1 journalist killed during a reporting mission
0 Zero the number of detentions by the Police or by the Regime in reference to the assassinations of the Journalists in Angola

THE MPLA IS BUYING THE NEWSPAPERS IN PORTUGAL

Tobis – The MPLA Regime bought this Film Archive company which holds the Film from the decolonization era. The buying company was Filmdrehtsich Unipessoal, they paid 4 million euros for the Lumiar Studios. The archive – which includes the Colonial war time – was taken out from Tobis before it had become classified as national patrimony.

Cofina – The company Newshold controls 15,08% of Cofina, this company is controlled by the MPLA Regime is the source of the financing, it has almost 22% of the editorial and controls the following press titles in portugal: Correio da Manhг, Record, Sбbado and Jornal de Negуcios. This information clarifies why in the recent years, and more noticeable in the recent 6 months jornalists and editorial staff have been removed and fired for publishing articles which are not favourable of the MPLA Regime actions.

Newshold – This company has now achieved 1,7% in the portuguese media group SIC, Expresso, Visгo and Caras, among other titles. The MPLA Regime is trying to purchase 23% of shares that the Company Ongoing has in the company, which if they are allowed to purchase it, they will have the control of 25% of the Newshold media group.

The Russian / Chinese Mafia

The Russian and Chinese Mafia is lead and composed by Sam Pa [(Xu Jinghua) president the China International Fund (CIF) (?) and of China-Sonangol, Wang Xiangfei [Non Executive Director of China International Trust and Investment Company (CITIC Group)], Jin Liqun ( President of the Counsel of Supervision of China Investment), Wu Yang (one of the Directors of Group 88 Queensway), all conected to the Ministry of Security of the Communist Chinese State, and Lev Avnerovich Leviev (Russian Businessman Billionaire (Bukharian)-Israel), Arcadi Aleksandrovich Gaydamak (Russian Businessman Billionaire).

Lev Avnerovich Leviev sold his participation of 18% in the Diamond Mines of Catoca to China Sonangol International Holding Ltd for US$400 Million USD, having acquired that participation in the decade of the 1990 for only US$20 Million Dollars.

Xu Jinghua comes to Luanda monthly to get bags of Diamonds valued at of more than US$66,2 Million Dollars – All this information given to us by Superior Officers of the Angolan Counter Intelligence Unit.

Xu Jinghua [(Sam Pa), old soviet time student colleague of Josй Eduardo dos Santos in one of the Military Collages of the KGB. Xu Jinghua during the civil war he always appeared next to the Russians as a consultant, and the funny thing is that this same individual was also the agent of the counterintelligence of china in Angola. As is was told to us by one of the most close collaborators of General Helder Viera Dias “Kopelipa,” who asked for anonymity.

Xu Jinghua, Manuel Domingos Vicente and Josй Filomeno de Sousa dos Santos have always been involved in the management of China Sonangol International Holding Ltd, in both ways visible and invisibly.

Before the creation of China-Sonangol, Xu Jinghua served as intermediary of crude oil between the Angolan regime and the communist Chinese regime.

The General Manuel Helder Vieira Dias Jъnior (Kopelipa) occupied and was in charge of the protocol aspects, maximum security and Manuel Domingos Vicente was in charge of the administrative and logistic matters … while that, Josй Filomeno de Sousa dos Santos learned with his “adoptive uncle” Xu Jinghua, in Hong Kong, the secrets of the transnational administration …

Josй Filomeno de Sousa dos Santos was thus prepared to administer Billions and Billions of US Dollars and to abandon the administration bosy of China-Sonangol, some time in la second part of 2012, leaving behind Manuel Domingos Vicente, who staid as the Executive Director of China-Sonangol.

Due to his health conditions of Domingos, it is Francisco Lemos Josй Maria, supposedly direct cousin of Ana Paula Cristуvгo Lemos dos Santos, who has travelled to Hong Kong regularly in the name of the President of the Republic of Angola.

Question: Who is the real owner of China Sonangol International Holding Ltd Group and of Endiama China International Holding Limited owned by the Group 88 Queensway, localized in Hong Kong?

And more so. lets find out, the destination of Angola Gross domestic product (GDP), estimated at more than US$115.9 Billions Dollars (2011 estimate), oil & gas, raw materials, mining and derivates, farm land, etc.

China International Fund (CIF)

China International Fund (CIF) is a Chinese-owned officially private company based in Hong Kong that describes its major businesses as including "large-scale national reconstruction projects and infrastructure construction in developing countries". The China International Fund CIF and its associated companies in Hong Kong and Singapore invested upwards of $US 20 billion mainly in unstable African dictatorships.

They have made agreements with the Angolan and Guinean governments to explore for various resources in those countries. These agreements will result in billions of dollars of money being invested in the two countries.

The Company is under the suspicion of being a state-owned company, because “key personnel have ties to Chinese state-owned enterprises and government agencies.”

In a conversation between American Ambassador Dan Mozena and Chinese Ambassador Bolum Zhang, Zhang said, "the China International Fund CIF made many promises to Angola, and that while the company has a large presence in Angola, its weak management and lack of leadership have stalled many of the projects. Zhang said that as the China International Fund CIF is a "private company," the Chinese embassy does not actively participate or monitor its relationship with Angola. He added that China International Fund CIF continues to benefit from the Hong Kong-based owner’s "close relationship" with President Dos Santos."

List of the Henchmen of the MPLA Regime of Angola Terror

The Official List of the Henchmen of the MPLA Regime

L ooting the country’s riches by liquefying the natural assets of the nation through the creation of companies
under the name of family and members of the ruling elite of the MPLA Regime

"Angola Grow With Us"
70% of the Population lives under $2 US dollars a day
CORRUPTION – NEPOTISM – COMMUNIST IN ITS PUREST FORM

Information Last Updated: 18 February 2014

The personal fortune of Mr. Josй Eduardo dos Santos
is estimated to be
$20 Billion US Dollars or Ђ 14 Billion Euros
(Estimated in 2013)

From Rags to Riches

Josй Eduardo dos Santos was known to only have one suit and two white shirts
in the city of Brazzaville in (1963-1970), Josй Eduardo dos Santos is son of a stone mason and was born
in the Island of Sao Tome, and doesn’t speak any African Native Language, only fluent in Portuguese and Russian.

SUBMISSION OF CASES OF CORRUPTION

If you have any questions or wish to add information to any of these cases, you are welcome to send us any updated information in regards to the theft of public funds and illicit enrichment in Angola and occupied Cabinda, we are also keen on any information related to foreign multinationals, banks, financial institutions, government officials and governments relations with the MPLA Regime Nomenclature in cases of Public Corruption, Traffic of Influences, Criminal Activities between the MPLA Regime and Foreign Partners.

Rt Hon Mangovo Ngoyo
Keeper of Archives & Chief prosecutor

TOP 60 RICH PEOPLE IN ANGOLA LIST

With more than $20 Billion USD (2013 Estimate)

1 – Josй Eduardo dos Santos, President of the Republic

Isabel dos Santos (Daughter): First Born 1973 Isabel dos Santos assets worth $3 Billion US Dollars, the Richest woman in Africa

Josй Filomeno de Sousa dos Santos (Son): Born in 1977 from Jose Eduardo dos Santos second wife Luнsa Perdigгo Abrantes. He manages $5 Billion US Dollars in funds and assets

With more than $100 Million USD

2 – General Leopoldino Fragoso do Nascimento, (The US$750 Million Dollar Man), Member of the National Assembly

3 – Josй Leitгo, Chief of the Civil House of Luanda

4 – Elisio de Figueiredo, Ambassador

5 – Joгo de Matos, General

6 – Higino Carneiro, Minister of Public Works

7 – Helder Vieira Dias (Kopelipa), General

8 – Antуnio Mosquito, Businessman

9 – Valentim Amхes, Businessman

10 – Sebastiгo Lavrador, Banker

11 – Josй Severino, Businessman

12 – Joaquim Duarte da Costa David, Minister of Industry

13 – Manuel Vicente, Ex-Executive of the National Oil Company Sonangol, Vice President of Angola

14 – Abilio Sianga, Administrator of the National Oil Company Sonangol

15 – Mбrio Palhares, Executive of Bank BAI

16 – Aguinaldo Jaime, Deputy Minister to the Prime Minister

17 – Franзa Ndalu, General in Reserve

18 – Amaro Taty, Governor of Province of Biй

19 – Noй Baltazar, Director Delegate of ASCORP

20 – Desidйrio Costa, Minister of Petroleum

21 – Josй Filomeno de Sousa dos Santos, son of the Dictaror & Chairman Fundo Soberano de Angola

With more than $50 Million dollars but less than $100 Million Dollars

22 – Joгo Lourenзo, Secretary General of the MPLA Party

23 – Isaac dos Anjos, Ambassador

24 – Faustino Muteka, Minister of the Administration of the Territory

25 – Antуnio Vandъnem, Secretary of the Council of Ministers

26 – Dumilde Rangel, Governor of the Province of Benguela

27 – Salomгo Josй Luheto Xirimbimbi, Minister of Fisheries

28 – Jardim, Ex-Minister of Fisheries

29 – Dino Matross, 1°.Vice-Presidente da Assembleia Nacional

30 – Бlvaro Carneiro, Ex-Director Adjunto da Endiama

31 – Flбvio Fernandes, Ex-PCA da Multiperfil

32 – Fernando Miala, Ex-Director of the Services of Security of the State

33 – Armindo Cйsar, Businessman

34 – Ramos da Cruz, Governor of the Province of Huila

35 – Gomes Maiato, Governor of the Province of Lunda-Norte

36 – Joгo E. dos Santos, Governor of the Province of Moxico

37 – Gonзalves Muandumba, Governor of the Province of Lunda-Sul

38 – Anнbal Rocha, Ex-Governor of Cabinda

39 – Ludy Kissassunda, Governor of the Province of Zaire

40 – Luiz Paulino dos Santos, Ex-Governor of the Province of Biй

41 – Paulo Kassoma, Governor of the Province of Huambo

42 – Rui Santos, Businessman

43 – Mбrio Antуnio, Member of the Political Bureau of the MPLA Party and ADM. of GEFI

44 – Silva Neto, Ex-Administrator of the National Oil Company Sonangol Distribution

45 – Jъlio Bessa, Ex-Minister of Finances

46 – Paixгo Franco, President of FDES

47 – Mello Xavier, Member of the National Assembly and Businessman

48 – Kundi-Payhama, Ex-Minister of Defence

49 – Ismael Diogo, President of the Company FESA

50 – Maria Mambo Cafй (Diseased), Ex-Member of the Political Bureau of the MPLA Party

51 – Augusto Tomбs, Member of the National Assembly

52 – Generoso de Almeida, PCA DO BCI

53 – Luiz Faceira, General

54 – Cirilo de Sб, General

55 – Adolfo Razoilo, General

56 – Gilberto Lutukuta, ex-Minister of Agriculture

57 – Simгo Jъnior-Empresбrio (Grupo Chamavo e Gema)

58 – Carlos Feijу, Assessor of the President of the Republic

59 – Armando da Cruz Neto, Chief of the Armed Forces FAA

60 – Fernando Borges, Business man

MPLA Regime No.1

Josй Eduardo dos Santos, in power since 1979

SINCE 2007, 60 CUBAN BLACK SOLDIERS DIVIDED IN TWO PLATOONS PROTECT JOSE EDUARDO DOS SANTOS

They say that because they are black they will not be noticed and they where told to learn portuguese. The first platoon arrived in Angola between the 5 and 8 of October 2007, on the 24 of October 2007 arrived the second platoon. And in the old Cuban Communist fashion they where put to work at once, on the same day. They are administered by a Coronel.

The last time Cuban troops provided the private security of the Angolan President was under Agostinho Neto in the first years of Angola Independence.

On the 27 of May 1977, used the Cuban military men to suppress and kill the internal MPLA faction lead by Nito Alves.

The Cuban Forces took over the Rбdio Nacional de Angola, the barracks of the elite forces that formed the 9Є Brigade, and the Prison of S. Paulo, where the so called "nitistas" where in the morning of that day.

In the book livro Purga em Angola, it gives an account of that day the 27 of May, Dalila Cabrita and Бlvaro Mateus say that around 10:00 AM Agostinho Neto contacts Fidel Castro, reporting to him the events with alarm of the happenings in the City of Luanda, which in his words was taken by vandals and with the danger of an invasion from Zairian and South African Forces, which became known as «Operaзгo Cobra». (snake operation)”

The presence of Cuban Military men in Angola is contrary to the quadripartite treaties of13 December 1988, the “Acordos de New York ”, singed between Angola, Cuba, South Africa under the UN supervision, that made provisions for the withdrawal of Cuban and South Africa troops from the war theatre and the implementation of Resolution 435 that allowed the independence of Namibia.

Comrade Dictator – Josй Eduardo dos Santos

Dictator and self proclaimed Chief of State. Was a member of the group of Cuban troops who took Cabinda in the so-called north front. The MPLA awarded this bastard the distinction of General. And he is the Commander in Chief of the Armed Forces. He is the one who ultimately has absolute power over the regime.

Comrade Jose Eduardo dos Santos speaks no native language of Angola, which in it self its odd as if he was bourn and grew up in Luanda he would at least could speak Kimbundu, and it is well known that Jose Eduardo dos Santos was born in the Island country of Sгo Tomй and Prнncipe, from both parents from Sгo Tomй and Prнncipe, after the birth of their son they decided to immigrate and moved to Angola.

Biography of Jose Eduardo dos Santos

"I meet Jose Eduardo dos Santos in Exile and at that time he could not have had more than two pairs of Trousers and two pairs of shirts, so where does his massive fortune comes from?" – Declarations of the Political Activist Dr. Makuta Nkondo in a recorded interview on the 2 of April 2011 in Largo da Independecia, Luanda.

Jose Eduardo dos Santos was born in the Island and Country of Sao Tome in the village of Almeirim where he studied until the fourth class (that is primary School education).

His mother (Jacinta Josй Paulino) is of descent from people from Guinea and Cape Verde mixed with Sao Tomense after having immigrating to the island country of Sao Tome from Cape Verde due to the draught and hunger affecting that island.

Jose Eduardo dos Santos Father (Avelino Eduardo dos Santos) had originally as his family name Vandunen. The Vandunen are originally descendent from slaves, and they are from a Dutch polygamous father that had several offspring’s from different African women.

This name Vandunen comes from the Slaves and says nothing from the culture of Angola.

The Vandunen gathered a reputation for acting as mercenaries, assassins and thieves, this being the main reasons for the Father of Jose Eduardo dos Santos being ashamed of the name Vandunen and removed this name from his full name.

Jose Eduardo dos Santos is not and engineer of petroleum as we claims. He is lying to the people because he only studied until the 6th class in the High School of Salvador Correia in Luanda, after his parents immigrated to Angola.

He worked in a restaurant in Luanda and after an incident of removal and food theft, the Police agency PIDE was requested to apprehend him, thus is when he skipped as a fugitive to the neighbouring Congo.

Once in the Congo the MPLA Comrade Daniel Chipenda placed the thief Jose Eduardo dos Santos in a instruction course of telecommunications listening financed by the KGB, and it was due to this reason that Comrade Agostinho Neto placed him as the chief of the Communications DISA. This was his first work after 1975, and because of this Agostinho Neto placed him to commence fractionising the population and political manipulation of the society in order to establish a Communist State with the aid of the Russians and the Cubans.

He was swiftly placed as President of the MPLA after the mysterious death of Agostinho Neto in a suspicious medical treatment operation in Moscow. Comrade Agostinho Neto was having second thoughts in moving his allegiance to the United States and Europe and abandoning the Communist Block.

In the mean time the Soviets had this individual Comrade Jose Eduardo dos Santos who spoke fluent Russian and was married to a Russian women, was the perfect candidate to assure the Russians, Angola would not jump ship. The autopsy of Comrade Agostinho Neto was never preformed. Agostinho Neto died on the 10 of September of 1979 in Moscow.

As guerrilla war ends, corruption now bleeds Angola to death

By Tim Butcher, 30 Jul 2002

The scale of the MPLA Regime corruption problem only really registered when the senior army officer leant forward and whispered the magic word "diamonds".

"It is illegal to buy diamonds in Angola but if you know the right people they can fly you over the border to Kinshasa [capital of the Democratic Republic of Congo] and you can buy as many Angolan diamonds as you want," he said.

In Angola they use a Portuguese euphemism for "bribe". They say you pay a little extra so a person can have a gasosa or drink, but the sort of bribes being paid could buy more than just a little refreshment.

Whether it is army officers smuggling gems, government officials demanding multi-million-pound bribes for oil contracts or teachers wanting money for exam certificates, millions of pounds are being misappropriated every week.

And with more than one million of its 11 million population in need of food aid after the end of decades of civil war, corruption in Angola means yet more human suffering.

"Every person could be fed, every baby could be vaccinated, every bridge could be rebuilt and every mine could be lifted if the government of Angola properly used the millions it steals each year," a foreign aid worker said.

One provincial governor from the ruling Popular Movement for the Liberation of Angola, or MPLA, was recently exposed for selling schools to a friend who then charged pupils an attendance fee.

The wives of senior MPLA members go abroad for cosmetic surgery using a government fund meant to allow sick Angolans to travel for treatment.

So bad is corruption in Angola that it represents a grave challenge to the credibility of the new African Union which is supposedly committed to supporting good governance.

"The end of the war in Angola means that right now the main institution in the country is corruption," said Rafael Marques, a dissident journalist from Luanda who has been jailed by the Angolan government for his exposes.

"The system is rotten to the core and until you change the entire system nothing will change."

The systemic scale of corruption across the region compounds the task facing aid workers as they fight the consequences of the worst drought in the region in a decade.

At the top of the corruption charts is the Angolan oil industry, contributing more than 90 per cent of Angola’s Ј2 billion annual foreign earnings from enormous off-shore oil reserves.

Far from funnelling these earnings into much-needed social programmes, the government of President Jose Eduardo dos Santos has been accused of stealing up to a third of the annual income – hundreds of millions of pounds.

Global Witness, an international environmental watchdog, has also accused the MPLA of mortgaging the next few years of oil revenues in exchange for cheap loans.

The IMF has indicated that it will be reluctant to fund large-scale redevelopment in Angola unless some move is made towards accounting for the country’s oil money.

But Mr dos Santos has come out fighting, accusing the IMF of trying to interfere in the sovereignty of his country.

He has hired seven public relations consultancies in Washington to try to improve Angola’s standing among US congressmen, as well as making clear that oil companies will not be welcome in Angola if they reveal sharp business practices.

A footnote in BP’s 1999 annual figures stated that it had spent Ј75 million on a "signature fee" to win an offshore production contract. The payment never appeared in any government accounts.

BP has subsequently declined to publish details of signature fees paid for its three other big contracts in Angola.

All the Presidents Men a Global Witness Report on the MPLA Regime dated 1st March 2002

All the Presidents Men is the product of two years of investigations, and provides an update on the campaign for full transparency in the oil and banking sector. It continues an exposй, which started with December 1999’s A Crude Awakening, into the mechanisms of wholesale state robbery in Angola.

All the Presidents Men a Global Witness – Full Report in PDF

Oil Revenues in Angola: Much More Information But Not Enough Transparency 3rd December 2010

Significant gaps in the data published by the Angolan government about its earnings from the oil industry undermine its attempts to shed a reputation for corruption, says this new study by Global Witness and the Open Society Initiative for Southern Africa – Angola (OSISA-Angola).

A Crude Awakening 1st December 1999

Angola is sub-Saharan Africa’s second largest oil producer after Nigeria, with recent discoveries suggesting it could soon become the largest; this at a time when the 1999 UN Human Development Index (HDI) places Angola at 160 out of 174 countries, according to social indicators. Whilst Angola should be a country with a thriving economy, instead it is a country still at war, where a massive proportion of national wealth is unaccounted for, and where the well-being of the population appears no-longer to be a matter of priority for Government.

MPLA Regime: Above the Law: Police Accountability in Angola

This report documents cases of human rights violations by the police of the MPLA Regime in Angola between 2005 and 2007, which reveal a pattern of police abuse of power and the consistent failure to bring perpetrators of human rights violations to justice. It seeks to highlight the deficiencies in Angolan police accountability that contribute to, and exacerbate, these violations. The report concludes with recommendations for the improvement of police policies and practice, which, if fully implemented, would significantly contribute to a reduction in human rights violations by the police.


En Suisse, l’autre Angolagate des anciens d’Elf

а la chasse aux transactions financiиres pour reconstituer un vrai systиme de prison) et 45 millions de dollars rapatriйs en guise de « confiscation ». Le sort des deux jours-amende (soit le condamnй paie, soit il effectue sa peine de genevois aprиs une semaine au frais derriиre les barreaux. Jugement. une lйgиre peine de PDG d’Elf, le « factotum ».

Riccardo Mortara, expert financier et pilote d’avion, qui fut pendant des annйes le pour le compte du Congo-Brazzaville, le « chef d’orchestre des montages Rйpublique d’Angola ;

Jack Sigolet, ancien bras droit d’Andrй Tarallo, le Monsieur Afrique d’Elf et grand Baumettes, accrochй par un juge marseillais dans l’affaire du cercle Concorde. A sa sortie angolaise.

« entre 400 et 500 millions de dollars » par un fin connaisseur des circuits pйtroliers. Le Le banquier Franзois Rouge, propriйtaire de la Banque de patrimoine privйe (BPP), l’intermйdiaire franзais Pierre Falcone pose ses valises а Pйkin.

Les nouveaux circuits de la corruption

Elisio de Figueiredo, l’homme lige du prйsident Dos Santos, part s’installer en Asie, а

En 2003, alors que l’enquкte franзaise a portй un coup а la filiиre de trafic d’armes.

Le utilisй les services des anciens d’Elf-Aquitaine pour dйtourner des dizaines de millions de d’orgueil blessй de rodomontades de Charles Pasqua sur le trafic d’armes avec l’Angola et les cris dйtournements de fonds via d’anciens d’Elf.

Par David Servenay | Rue89 | 15/11/2009 | 13H54

la trace d’une sociйtй offshore titulaire d’un compte en banque au nom de China

Dynamic Development а Hong-Kong, qui a vu dйfiler 116 millions de dollars entre 2006 et 2008. De l’argent qui a servi а rйgler des achats de bijoux, pour six millions de francs suisses, via la sociйtй Sonnig de Mortara, offerts а des dignitaires de Luanda.

Riccardo Mortara, dйcrit comme le « garзon de course » de l’йquipe, a multipliй les ouvertures de comptes bancaires а Jersey, au Portugal, au Liban et а Hong-Kong. Comme le prйcise Le Temps, la clef de rйpartition des commissions est la suivante, selon la

Chambre d’accusation genevoise :

« 75% des fonds rйpartis semblaient concerner le prйsident angolais, 15% l’un de ses ministres et d’autres intermйdiaires. »
Les derniers 5% ont terminй dans les caisses de Crossoil, la sociйtй de Sigolet.
Le parquet de Genиve et les avocats d’accord pour йtouffer l’affaire
A lire aussi sur Rue89 et sur Eco89
Mais dйsormais, ils devraient avoir accиs au dossier pйnal. Ce qui les rendra peut-кtre de dossiers, soutiens du procureur gйnйral et les « nettoyeurs de cols blancs », ses йtait allй aux limites de ses prйrogatives. Un dйsaveu en bonne et due forme autre d’йtouffer cette belle affaire. Or, lundi 9 novembre, la Chambre d’accusation du L’accusation. Une collusion entre l’accusation et la dйfense pour obtenir le procureur gйnйral de Genиve, Daniel Zapelli, aux avocats des suspects franзais Claude Richard, lui aussi un ancien d’Elf, mettait en йvidence de supposйs liens. Alors que l’instruction est dйjа trиs avancйe, elle est devenue un scandale majeur, а cause

Isabel dos Santos daughter of the MPLA Dictator
Image showing companies partially owned by Isabel Santos

Isabel Josй dos Santos is considered by Forbes worth at least 50 million US Dollars and as the most powerful and richest woman in her country and among the richest in Africa.

6 December 2010 “Santoro Finance” last week bought almost 700,000 shares in the portuguese Bank BPI for around 986,000 euros, thus adding to the shares it already owned, the company said in a regulatory filing.

According to a statement filed with Portuguese stock market regulator CMVM, Santoro Finance said it had acquired a further 698,919 shares in the Bank BPI in purchases on the 26 November 2010 and 2 December 2010, and paid a total of 986,354 euros. With these acquisition, the company owned by the daughter of the MPLA Dictator, Isabel dos Santos, now has a 9.88% percent stake in the Bank BPI.

On 25 November 2010, Santoro Finance told the regulator it had acquired a further 997,00 BPI shares and at the time had a 9.8% percent stake in the BPI Portuguese Bank. Santoro Finance also owns 25% percent of BIC Portugal, an Angolan banking subsidiary. In Angola, BPI sold 49% percent of Banco de Fomento de Angola to Unitel, a telecommunications operators and one of the largest companies in Angola, which has Geni, a company also linked to Isabel dos Santos, as a shareholder with 25% percent.

INTERNATIONAL BANK CREDIT (BIC) – BANCO INTERNACIONAL DE CRЙDITO (BIC)

Isabel dos Santos, first born daughter of Comrade Dictator Eduardo dos Santos, and Portuguese businessman Americo Amorim (25%) are the main shareholders of the International Bank of Credit.

GENI
The starting point was the creation of UNITEL (mobile telephone) in partnership with Portugal Telecom. Founders: Isabel dos Santos
Activity: telecommunications and services.

PRODOIL
Associated to the Amec Paragon (Houston, USA). Between Angolan partners quoted Marta dos Santos, elder sister of the President.
Activity: Exploration and Production of Hydrocarbons, oil, natural gas, services, hotels.

SAGRIPEK
Capital divided between a group of partners Angolans in which includes Isabel dos Santos, which owns 51% and a Brazilian consortium.
Activity: agriculture, livestock, agro-industrial production.

Link between Angolan president’s son-in-law and state oil company
raises questions about transparency

15th March 2010

Sonangol. the state-owned oil company of Angola, nominated the son-in-law of Angola’s President dos Santos to the board of a holding company that owns a third of the listed Portuguese oil firm Galp Energia, Global Witness has learned.

Angola is an impoverished country that depends on its oil industry to pay for reconstruction after a long civil war. Angola has a reputation for severe corruption which Global Witness has been reporting on for the last decade.1 Angola’s people have one of the lowest life expectancies in the world: 46.5 years, according to the United Nations.2

Galp has major oil investments in Angola, a former colony of Portugal, and works closely with Sonangol, whose chairman Manuel Vicente sits on its board.3

A third of the shares in Galp are owned by a holding company called Amorim Energia BV. Forty-five per cent of the shares in Amorim Energia are owned by a company called Esperaza Holding BV, which is a subsidiary of Sonangol. The rest of Amorim Energia is ultimately controlled by Portugal’s Amorim family.4

The board members of Amorim Energia include Sindika Dokolo5, a businessman married to Isabel dos Santos, a daughter of the Angolan president. As this briefing will show, Global Witness has learned that Dokolo was nominated to this post in April 2006 by Esperaza Holding. The latter was wholly owned by Sonangol at the time, according to Dutch corporate records.6

"The son-in-law of the Angolan president, a private businessman, should not be working so closely with the state company which is responsible for managing Angola’s oil on behalf of its citizens," said Diarmid O’Sullivan of Global Witness. "This arrangement raises concerns about conflicts of interest to which Sonangol has not responded."

Sonangol’s minority partner in Esperaza Holding is Exem Holding AG. a secretive company based in the Swiss canton of Zug which does not publicly disclose the identities of its owners.7 A director of Exem Holding, a Paris-based financier called Konema Mwenenge, told Global Witness that he has a "professional" relationship with Dokolo. But Mwenenge declined to say whether Dokolo has a financial interest in Exem Holding.8 Dokolo himself, via his lawyer, declined to respond to questions from Global Witness.9 Sonangol’s chairman, Manuel Vicente, did not respond to written questions.10

The fact that the Angolan president’s son-in-law appears to have been representing Sonangol in its indirect investment in Galp does not amount to evidence of wrongdoing. But these findings raise further questions about the transparency of Sonangol, the state oil company which dominates the economy of Angola.

Sonangol collects billions of dollars a year in revenues on behalf of the Angolan government and controls other companies’ access to Angola’s oil and gas reserves, but does not publish its accounts and discloses little detailed information about its activities.

When President dos Santos called for "zero tolerance" of corruption in November 2009, a prominent member of the ruling MPLA party said Angolans should feel free to criticise the president over his family’s business dealings, Reuters news agency reported.11

Portuguese billionnaire Americo Ferreira de Amorim is the chairman of Amorim Energia. He told Global Witness, in a three-page response to questions about the issues raised in this briefing, that Dokolo had been appointed to the board of Amorim Energia "at the designation of Esperaza Holding".12

"The fact that Mr Dokolo is the husband of the daughter of President Jose Eduardo dos Santos does not seem in itself as relevant neither [sic] to qualify nor to disqualify him as a board member of Amorim Energia, and therefore was not a factor to have him appointed as a managing director of Amorim Energia," Amorim wrote in his letter to Global Witness. He added: "I can give you my personal views on the fact that the appointment of Mr Dokolo did not raise discussions concerning ethical issues."

Amorim said in his letter that the relationship between Amorim Energia and Galp was governed by a shareholder agreement that was in place before Dokolo came onto the former’s board. Global Witness does not assert, or seek to imply, that companies controlled by the Amorim family have engaged in any illegal or illegitimate activity.

At the end of 2006, Sonangol’s 100 per cent shareholding in Esperaza Holding had fallen to 60 per cent. The other 40 per cent was owned by a subsidiary of Exem Holding.13 Exem Holding, via its subsidiaries, has been granted access by Sonangol to potentially lucrative investments in Angolan oil and gas but appears to be otherwise unknown in the oil industry.

Sonangol has authorised subsidiaries of Exem Holding to:

* Acquire a 40 per cent stake in Esperaza Holding by the end of 2006, making it a partner in Sonangol’s indirect investment in Galp.
* Acquire a 10 per cent stake in an Angolan gas exploration venture announced in December 2007. This venture is controlled by Sonangol. Its other shareholders include Galp, Italy’s ENI and Spain’s Gas Natural.14 The venture has reportedly been awarded a ten-year gas exploration licence and exempted from taxes.15
* Pre-qualify, as of late 2007, to bid for oil licences in Angola.16

Global Witness asked the Exem Holding director, Konema Mwenenge, to describe the process by which Exem Holding had acquired these investments and investment opportunities. Mwenenge replied in an email that: "I can confirm as a Director of Exem Holding that its subsidiaries did respond to tenders in Angola. Information concerning the tenders is available on the web site of the national oil company of Angola."17

Sonangol’s website does report that a subsidiary of Exem Holding has been pre-qualified by Sonangol to bid for oil licences in Angola as a "non-operator" – that is, as a minority shareholder in a joint venture with other oil companies.18 However, there appears to be no information on this website about tenders in relation to Exem Holding’s other interests. Global Witness wrote back and asked Mwenenge where this information could be found, but he did not respond.

Although Sonangol has a reputation for being professionally run, its opacity and its close links to the ruling elite of Angola have long been a cause of public concern. The state oil company has long been used by the government to borrow huge sums in a highly opaque manner and with little public accountability for the use of the money.19

For more than a year, Global Witness has been investigating the relationships between Sonangol and certain private companies that invest in Angola’s oil sector, which are often complicated and hard to unravel because of a dearth of public information.

In August 2009, Global Witness reported on another little-known private company which was pre-qualified to bid for oil rights in Angola by Sonangol in late 2007. The shareholders of this company, Sociedade de Hidrocarbonetos de Angola, included a person called Manuel Domingos Vicente. The chairman of Sonangol, who has the same name, did not respond to a request for comment from Global Witness, nor did two other senior officials who also have the same names as shareholders in SHA.20

The International Monetary Fund agreed in late 2009 to lend $1.4 billion to Angola in return for policy pledges which include more transparency for Sonangol, but it remains to be seen whether these pledges will actually be implemented.21

"At a time when Angola’s government is promising more transparency to the IMF in return for a bailout, our findings show that Sonangol is still anything but transparent," said O’Sullivan.

Global Witness believes that Angola’s government cannot begin to reverse the country’s international reputation for severe corruption until:

* Sonangol explains its relationship with Dokolo and identifies the ultimate beneficial owners of Exem Holding, who are currently unknown to the public.
* Sonangol publishes its audited accounts and full details of oil revenue flows between foreign oil companies, Sonangol itself and the Angolan government.
* Sonangol relinquishes its control over the allocation of oil and mining rights in Angola to an independent agency that operates under full public oversight and awards these rights in a transparent manner.
* International oil companies in Angola commit themselves not to go into partnership with any smaller companies whose ultimate beneficial ownership is unknown to the public.
* The government ensures that civil society groups within Angola are able to freely discuss matters of public interest, including the oil sector, without fear of harrassment or censorship in any form.

For further information, please contact:
Diarmid O’Sullivan: +44 207 492 5863 or +44 7872 620 955
Amy Barry: +44 207 492 5858

Notes
1. Global Witness. A Crude Awakening. 1999; All the Presidents’ Men. March 2002. Time for Transparency. March 2004. Available at www.globalwitness.org
2. United Nations. Human Development Report 2009. Angola. The figures for life expectancy at birth are from 2007.
3. Galp Energia. Annual Report and Accounts 2008. Pages 6, 29 and 182
4. Amorim Energia BV. Annual accounts for 2008. Pages 3, 4 and 23.
5. Amorim Energia Annual report 2008. Page 3.
6. Amsterdam Chamber of Commerce. Handelsregisterhistorie. Esperaza Holding BV.
7. Handelsregister des Kantons Zug. Exem Holding AG.
8. Global Witness phone and email conversations with Mwenenge.
9. Correspondence between Global Witness and a lawyer acting for Dokolo.
10. Letter sent to Vicente by Global Witness on 15 September 2009.
11. Reuters. Angolan President calls on party to end corruption. 21 November 2009. Angolan President’s family taint corruption fight. 3 December 2009.
12. Letter from Americo Ferreira de Amorim to Global Witness. 18 January 2010.
13. Esperaza Holding B.V. annual accounts 2006. Page 3.
14. Eni. Eni acquires a participation stake in the Angola LNG Project. 10 December 2007. This press release refers to Exem Exploration & Production B.V. This company has since been renamed Exem Oil & Gas B.V. according to annual accounts filed by the latter for 2007, and is wholly owned by Exem Energy B.V, which is wholly owned by Exem Holding AG.
15. Reuters. Angola set to exempt gas explorers from tax. March 25 2009.
16. Angolan licensing round 2007/2008. Companies pre-qualified for Non-Operator. List published by Sonangol on its website. http://www.sonangol.co.ao/
17. Email to Global Witness from Mwenenge. 19 October 2009.
18. Angolan licensing round 2007/2008. Companies pre-qualified for Non-Operator. List published by Sonangol on its website. http://www.sonangol.co.ao/
19. See Global Witness. Undue Diligence. How banks do business with corrupt regimes. March 2009. Chapter Eight.
20. Global Witness. Angola. Private oil firm has shareholders with same names as top government officials. Media briefing. 4 August 2009.
21. International Monetary Fund. IMF lends Angola $1.4 billion to support reserves, reforms. Press release. 26 November 2009. See also Global Witness. IMF risks condoning corruption with new loan to Angola. Press release. 5 November 2009.

ZAP TV & INTERNET PROVIDERS

24 February 2012

ZAP, its an Angolan company that delivers TV and Internet content, with a participation 30% of its capital owned by ZON Multimйdia, commemorated this week end (February 2012) its second anniversary with the inauguration of its brand new installations in Luanda.

ZAP is owned in its majority 70% by the Angolan businesswomen Isabel dos Santos (daughter of El President Jose Eduardo dos Santos, the source of her wealth or her funds is unknown), the creation of the company ZAP constituted the first step in the process of internationalization of the company ZON Multimйdia in the Portuguese speaking countries.

The project of ZAP was born after Isabel dos Santos (daughter of El President Jose Eduardo dos Santos) became shareholder of the company ZON, with the purchase of 10% of the capital of that Portuguese company. ZAP was the first company to offer HD TV service in Angola.

In the opening ceremony of the inauguration of the coporate offices in Luanda situated in Talatona, the event was presided by the Minister of Social Communication Carolina Cerqueira, and by the Minister of Telecommunications & Technology of Information, Josй da Rocha, was also present at the event the President of the Executive Comission of ZON Multimйdia, Rodrigo Costa.

The Powerful Isabel dos Santos

Who is and how she lives the woman who is buying so much in Portugal? In the last 15 days (16 May 2012), she spent 82 Million Euros. The personal fortune of the first born daughter of Jose Eduardo dos Santos, known as the "Princess", has now surpassed the amount of investment in Portugal in the tune of 1.4 Billion Euros.

With jeans trousers and thorn T-Shirt, accompanied by a well-dressed lady and three children, a young woman arrives at Lisbon airport. A friend waits for some time, her flight from Luanda. Although she is famous and her name sparkles in all the headlines of newspapers of our country economic (Portugal), not to mention Forbes Magazine, where she figures as one of the largest fortunes in Africa, nobody, apart from him, recognizes her. Camouflaged in simple dress mode – although brand – lets the sparkle for her accompanier, in truth the "Au pair" of the children (4, 7 and 8 years). The girl of thorn jeans, yet, she is the one who is the boss. and the mother.

Maybe Isabel Josй dos Santos, 39 years old presumably completed last April, is only coming in a shopping trip. Simple things: a participation in the company GALP, a reinforcement in the position of ZON or another even bigger bite of the Bank BPI. The "Princes", as she is known is Angola, first born of the President Josй Eduardo dos Santos and of a Russian mother by the name of Tatiana, took a course in mechanical engineering electronics in King’s College, London, and displays a bewildering discretion, averse to parties and art openings, interviews or photographs of fuss and colourful African.

Completely westernised, anglophile, but speaking a perfect Portuguese, speaks French (that she uses with her Congolese husband Sindika Dokolo) and, presumably an impeccable Russian, she is a woman of the world.

One of these days, Portugal needed investment like her place of birth the dessert azeri (born in Baku, Azerbaijгo) needs drops of rain. Isabel dos Santos has been the angolan rain in service: through the company holding Santoro, she has 25% of the BANK BIC, now owner of the Bank BPN, and 19,4% of the Bank BPI. Through the company Esperanza Holding (like Holy Hope, a poem of Agostinho Neto), in partnership with Sonangol, 33,34% of the company Galp (45% of the company Amorim Energy).

And through the company holding Kento, 15% of the company ZON. Its around 1,4 Billion Euros in the value of shareholder in companies in the Portuguese stock market. Bank, Energy, Telecommunications – are her areas of interest, also of cement, and food produce distribution and art.

She is also the darling girl that owns the sophisticated restaurant in Luanda Oon.dah, where a meal costs in average around 100 Euros.

Os procuradores do Ministйrio Pъblico que estгo a conduzir a chamada “Operaзгo Furacгo” recolheram, em 2007, numa busca ao escritуrio do advogado Antуnio Frutuoso de Melo, documentaзгo relativa а constituiзгo de uma sociedade sediada numa offshore ligada а filha mais velha do Presidente de Angola, Josй Eduardo dos Santos. A referida sociedade, segundo fonte conhecedora do processo, foi utilizada por Isabel dos Santos para a compra de um apartamento em Lisboa.

In accordance with information obtained by the Portuguese newspaper Diario de Noticias, the offshore company, with headquarters in the USA, has finally been the subject of an investigation, because it was part of a list of clients of PIC (International Consultants), a fiduciary company that has already been search in connection to the "Operation Thunder". Such company was used to register an apartment bought in Lisbon by the husband of Isabel dos Santos.

Ora, uma vez que o advogado recorreu а PIC, empresa que fornecedora de serviзos no вmbito da constituiзгo de offshores, a sociedade de Isabel dos Santos e do marido (cujo nome nгo foi possнvel apurar) acabou por fazer parte da lista de clientes jб apreendida pelo Departamento Central de Investigaзгo e Acзгo Penal (DCIAP).

Licenciada em Engenharia Informбtica, em Londres, Isabel dos Santos tem diversificado os seus interesses econуmicos. Em Angola, atravйs da Unitel, a maior operador de telecomunicaзхes mуveis do paнs, mantйm uma parceria com a Portugal Telecom. Uma empresa que explora as redes de comunicaзхes por despacho do Governo angolano, que, por “razхes de manifesto interesse do Estado”, atribuiu а empresa a exploraзгo da rede mуvel.

In 2005, the First Born of Josй Eduardo dos Santos became shareholder of Banco Internacional de Crйdito (International Bank of Credit), with a participation identical to the Portuguese businessman Amйrico Amorim. And in partnership with this businessman gained entrance to the capital of the Portuguese company GALP by means of the consortium of Amorim/Sonangol, the National Oil Company of Angola, after that date and event there where no longer limits in her funding and investment with moneys of unknown origin.

THE DEALINGS OF ISABEL DOS SANTOS, DAUGHTER OF THE DICTATOR OF ANGOLA

UNITEL
Na reuniгo da Assembleia-Geral da UNITEL, a 4 Fevereiro 2006, Isabel dos Santos foi reconduzida ao cargo de administradora da principal operadora de telefonia celular.

A UNITEL й uma empresa privada de capitais mistos, com a participaзгo do Estado, que detкm 25% das quotas atravйs da Sonangol.

Atй а presente data, Isabel dos Santos mantйm-se como administradora da empresa. Dirigiu a reuniгo o presidente da Assembleia-Geral da UNITEL, General Leopoldino Fragoso do Nascimento, que na altura era o chefe de Comunicaзхes do Presidente da Repъblica, Josй Eduardo dos Santos.

O General mantйm-se como presidente da Assembleia-Geral da UNITEL, й consultor principal da Casa Militar do Presidente da Repъblica e, atй recentemente, tinha como Presidente do Conselho (PCA) de Administraзгo da UNITEL, o ex-PCA da Sonangol e actual ministro da Coordenaзгo Econуmica, Manuel Vicente.

Como foi Isabel dos Santos parar ao Conselho de Administraзгo da UNITEL e onde encontrou capital para ser accionista de uma das principais empresas privadas angolanas? A resposta a esta questгo certamente poderб ajudar a filha do Chefe do Estado a limpar o seu nome com brio.

BIC BANK
Since 2005, Isabel dos Santos is Administrator of the Bank BIC, where she owns 25% of the social capital, per the legal documents dated from the 7 June 2006.

Her name is present regularly in the portal of the Bank and on other documents of the company, in her quality or administrator of the Bank

DIAMONDS DEALINGS AND ISABEL DOS SANTOS
A associaзгo de Isabel dos Santos ao negуcio dos diamantes, em Angola, й bem conhecida. Em parceria com a sua mгe, Tatiana Cergueevna Regan, Isabel dos Santos constitui a 2 Abril 1997, em Gibraltar, a empresa Tais Limited, na qual detinha 75% das acзхes, cabendo o resto а sua mгe.

Por sua vez, a 11 Outubro 1999, o governo angolano, chefiado pelo seu pai, promulgou um acordo com a sua empresa, a Trans Africa Investment Services (Tais), o Group Goldeberg e Leviev Wellox, para a criaзгo de uma empresa mista de comercializaзгo de diamantes, a Angola Selling Corporation (Ascorp), (Conselho de Ministros (2003:1438-9); a 5 de Outubro de 2004, Isabel dos Santos transferiu a totalidade das suas acзхes para o nome da mгe e, por essa altura, a Tais jб havia mudado de denominaзгo para Iaxonh).

A aprovaзгo do consуrcio revelou conflito de interesses, nepotismo e indнcios de crime de suborno “passнvel de destituiзгo do cargo” (Art. 127є, 1, 2 da Constituiзгo). Para mais informaзхes sobre a participaзгo de Isabel dos Santos na Ascorp e as implicaзхes legais, consulte: Marques, Rafael, Diamantes de Sangue. Tinta-da-China: Lisboa, 2011:32-3.

OIL SECTOR AND ISABEL DOS SANTOS
O sector dos petrуleos em Angola tem sido o mais opaco e o mais controlado pelo Presidente da Repъblica, para serviзo dos seus desнgnios pessoais. A aprovaзгo final de qualquer contrato petrolнfero, por concurso pъblico ou nгo, cabe sempre ao Presidente da Repъblica.

O Decreto n.є 48/06, do Conselho de Ministros, sobre os Procedimentos de Concursos Pъblicos no Sector dos Petrуleos, estabelece que a aprovaзгo final dos concursos pъblicos cabe ao Governo, ou seja exclusivamente ao Presidente da Repъblica, como chefe do Executivo (Art. 14є, c).

Como exemplo, um ano antes de Isabel dos Santos ter apresentado queixa, o seu pai promulgou, a 27 Outubro 2006, a autorizaзгo conferida а Sonangol para associar-se, entre outras empresas, а Prodoil, para a realizaзгo de operaзхes petrolнferas no Bloco 1/06 (Decreto n.є 82/06).

A Prodoil й uma empresa criada a 9 Novembro 2001 pela Marsanto, e com participaзгo simbуlica da Prodiaman e Arlindo Fernando da Costa.

A Marsanto й uma empresa criada a 17 Dezembro 1996, pelos sobrinhos do Presidente Edson dos Santos Sousa e Esmeralda dos Santos Sousa, filhos da sua irmг Marta dos Santos, assim como o consorte desta Josй Pacavira Narciso.

Por sua vez, este cunhado de Josй Eduardo dos Santos й o PCA da Prodoil desde 2001.

Caixa Geral de Depуsitos vende participaзгo na Zon a Isabel dos Santos

A empresбria angolana pagou cerca de 85 milhхes de euros pela participaзгo de 10,88% que o banco do Estado detinha na empresa de telecomunicaзхes. Isabel dos Santo passa a ser a maior acionista privada da empresa, com 28,8 por cento do capital.

INVESTMENTS IN CAPE VERDE ISLAND

UNITEL a company which is Isabel dos Santos daughter of Jose Eduardo dos Santos owned by 25% ACQUIRED 70% OF THE CAPE VERDE ISLANDS PHONE COMPANY "T Mais" October 2012.

Isabel dos Santos, Africa’s Richest Woman

Daddy’s Girl: How An African ‘Princess’ Banked $3 Billion In A Country Living On $2 A Day

This story appears in the 2 September 2013 issue of Forbes
By Kerry A. Dolan and Rafael Marques de Morais

LAST DECEMBER (2012) Isabel dos Santos commemorated her tenth wedding anniversary to Congolese businessman Sindika Dokolo with a party. Subtlety wasn’t on the menu. She jetted in dozens of friends and relatives from as far as Germany and Brazil, who joined with hundreds of local guests in Angola for three days of lavishness, including a bash at the Fortress of Sao Miguel in the capital city of Luanda and a beachside Sunday brunch on the posh Mussulo peninsula.

The invitation, according to one attendee, came in a sleek white box, promising a celebration of “a decade of passion/ a decade of friendship/ a decade worth a hundred years. …” A decade worth $3 billion is more like it.

At 40 Dos Santos is Africa’s only female billionaire, and also the continent’s youngest. She has quickly and systematically garnered significant stakes in Angola’s strategic industries–banking, cement, diamonds and telecom–making her the most influential businessperson in her homeland. More than half of her assets are held in publicly traded Portuguese companies, adding international credibility. When FORBES outed her as a billionaire in January the government disseminated the news as a matter of national pride, living proof that this country of 19 million has arrived.

The real story, however, is how Dos Santos–the oldest daughter of Angolan President Josй Eduardo dos Santos–acquired her wealth. For the past year FORBES has been tracing Isabel dos Santos’ path to riches, reviewing a score of documents and speaking with dozens of people on the ground.

As best as we can trace, every major Angolan investment held by Dos Santos stems either from taking a chunk of a company that wants to do business in the country or from a stroke of the president’s pen that cut her into the action. Her story is a rare window into the same, tragic kleptocratic narrative that grips resource-rich countries around the world.

For President Dos Santos it’s a foolproof way to extract money from his country, while keeping a putative arm’s-length distance away. If the 71-year-old president gets overthrown, he can reclaim the assets from his daughter. If he dies in power, she keeps the loot in the family. Isabel may decide, if she is generous, to share some of it with her seven known half-siblings. Or not. The siblings are known around Angola for despising one another.

“It is not possible to justify this wealth, which is shamelessly displayed,” former Angolan prime minister Marcolino Moco tells FORBES. “There is no doubt that it was the father who generated such a fortune.” Isabel dos Santos declined to speak with FORBES for this article. Her representatives failed to respond to detailed questions sent months ago but last week issued this statement: “Mrs. Isabel dos Santos is an independent business woman, and a private investor representing solely her own interests.

Her investments in Angolan and/or in Portuguese companies are transparent and have been conducted through arms-length transactions involving external entities such as reputed banks and law firms.”

In turn, the spokesman accuses this article’s coauthor, an Angolan investigative journalist, of being an activist with a political agenda. The Angolan government jailed Marques de Morais in 1999 over a series of articles critical of the regime and has brought new criminal defamation charges against him over his 2011 book, Blood Diamonds: Corruption and Torture in Angola.

Finally, a representative of Mrs. Dos Santos said that any allegations of illegal wealth transfers between her and the government are “groundless and completely absurd.” That could well be. When your father runs the show, and can dictate which national assets are sold and at what price, what’s theft of public resources in one country can be rendered legal with a swipe of the pen.

President Josй Eduardo dos Santos could not be reached for comment. That is unfortunate, because the Dos Santoses, as Moco notes, have “some explaining to do.” FOR THREE CENTURIES the Portuguese extracted wealth from this mineral-rich country on Africa’s southwestern coast.

Almost immediately after Angola won independence in 1975, various internal factions began battling one another for the right to do the exact same thing. From this chaos, which lasted 27 years, Dos Santos, who had studied oil engineering in Soviet Azerbaijan and served as foreign minister upon independence, eventually emerged as president in 1979. He’s held on to power ever since, making him the planet’s third-longest-serving nonroyal head of state.

The president met his first wife (he’s been married at least twice), Tatiana Kukanova, while a student in Azerbaijan, and his first child–Isabel–was born there. By age 6 Isabel dos Santos was in Angola’s presidential palace, and while the family’s lifestyle wasn’t over-the-top by profligate African dictator standards (save the president’s dalliances–at least five of his children are from various mistresses), the family had Christmas trees flown in from New York and $500,000 worth of bubbly imported from a Lisbon restaurateur.

There was decadence enough for Isabel to earn the nickname “the Princess.” During Isabel’s upbringing the Angola economy sputtered, crippled by two factors: ongoing civil war and Dos Santos’ socialist policies. “In the 1980s you’d go to the supermarket and there would only be noodles on the shelves.

There wasn’t much there,” says University of Southern California associate professor emeritus Gerald Bender, who’s been studying Angola since 1968. For cloistered Isabel that reality was likely invisible; she eventually attended King’s College in London, where her mother, now a British citizen, lives, and earned an undergraduate degree in engineering.

However, as civil war resumed by the end of 1992, Isabel left for Angola’s capital city, Luanda, in a rush, allegedly after receiving death threats in London. By the late 1990s, when the civil war was winding down –a ceasefire was formally declared in 2002–President Dos Santos, like the Soviets he had studied under in the 1960s, was embracing a grab-what-you-can form of capitalism.

Over the past decade Angola has been one of the world’s fastest-growing economies. GDP grew at an 11.6% annual clip from 2002 to 2011, driven by a more than doubling of oil production to 1.8 million barrels a day. The government budget sits at $69 billion, up from $6.3 billion a decade ago. But predictably, precious little of the windfall has made it to the people. Some 70% of Angolans live on less than $2 a day. And by the government’s own count, 10% of the country’s population is scrambling for food due to drought and bureaucratic neglect. So where’s the money going? Start with a paranoid president-for-life.

The state security apparatus sucks more funds from the budget than health care, education and agriculture combined. A lot is clearly stolen: Between 2007 and 2010 at least $32 billion of oil revenue went missing from the federal ledger, according to the International Monetary Fund, which later tracked most of the money to “quasi-fiscal operations.” Angola comes in at 157 out of 176 nations ranked by Transparency International’s Corruption Perceptions Index.

It trails shining stalwarts of participatory democracy such as Yemen and Kyrgyzstan. And it’s within this environment that Isabel dos Santos has surfaced with an estimated net worth of $3 billion.

ISABEL DOS SANTOS’ formative business experience came at Miami Beach. Not the Florida city, but rather a rustic chic beachside bar and restaurant in Luanda that tries to emulate its namesake, down to the mediocre food and indifferent service. In 1997 the owner, Rui Barata, was having issues with health inspectors and taxmen. His solution: bringing in Isabel dos Santos, then 24, as his partner, with the idea, contemporaries say, that her name would keep pesky government regulators at bay.

Her initial investment was negligible, according to a source with knowledge of the deal, and the restaurant thrived: Sixteen years later it’s still a weekend hot spot. The lesson–the equity stake available to those with a gilded name–couldn’t have been lost on Isabel dos Santos, who was entering adulthood at the exact same time Angola’s riches were being unlocked.

Here’s what followed: First, Grab the Diamonds. Angola is the world’s fourth-largest diamond producer, selling an estimated $1 billion in gems every year from mines situated in the country’s northeast. The mines’ exclusive concession-holder is the state-owned company, Endiama. In 1999 President Dos Santos pushed Endiama to form a diamond-selling partnership. Three Israeli diamond merchants, including Lev Leviev, who FORBES now estimates is worth $1.5 billion, promised contacts and expertise.

The power behind the venture, according to British court records, was Russian arms dealer Arkady Gaydamak–a former confidant of President Dos Santos during the civil war of 1992-2002. The new company would be called Ascorp. Leviev and his partners, including Gaydamak, would wind up with 24.5% of Ascorp.

The government would retain 51%. The most surprising major shareholder? Isabel dos Santos, who emerged with a 24.5% stake through a Gibraltar investment company, Trans Africa Investment Services, that she had set up with her mother, according to TAIS’ annual report. (Leviev did not respond to a request for comment, and Gaydamak could not be reached at press time.) Angola’s 2010 constitution bars the president from stealing public money and acts of corruption, which would seem to prohibit the use of his position for the private enrichment of his family.

No matter: Angola’s Council of Ministers, controlled by her father, approved the Ascorp deal anyway. “In a country with separation of powers and real democracy, these presidential actions to enrich his family would have caused legal procedures for his impeachment,” says lawyer Salvador Freire, president of the human rights group Maos Livres. “In Angola he is the law.”

Ascorp was a cash cow, yielding millions of dollars in dividends per month, according to British court documents, but as the “blood diamond” business attracted international scrutiny in the middle of the 2000s, Dos Santos transferred to her mother total control of TAIS, now renamed Iaxonh Limited, according to Gibraltar’s Registry of Companies records accessed by FORBES.

It’s quite a parking spot, safely under the control of a British citizen, with Isabel dos Santos conveniently sitting in Angola as her mother’s sole heir. The mother could not be reached for comment. Telecom: Father Knows Best. In 1997 President Dos Santos issued a decree concerning the increasingly valuable telecommunications spectrum it controlled: The government must undertake a public bidding process for new telecom licenses. Two years later he defied his own decree–by issuing a new one.

The government could grant such a license without a public tender, as long as the grantee was a joint venture with the state. Eleven months after that the president, backed by his rubber stamp Council of Ministers, granted Unitel the right to be the first private mobile telephony operator in the country–with the condition that he had sole power to approve the project and to decide on the shareholding structure of the company, since it involved state funds. The state-owned oil company got a 25% stake, and Isabel emerged with her own 25% stake. A spokesman for Isabel dos Santos said she contributed capital for her Unitel stake but declined to specify how much. A year later Portugal Telecom paid $12.6 million for another 25% stake.

It was one hell of an investment. Mobile phones have revolutionized Africa, and as one of just two mobile phone networks in Angola, Unitel had amassed 9 million subscribers. Revenue last year was $2 billion, making it Angola’s largest private company. Her share is worth at least $1 billion, based on discussions with several analysts who follow Portugal Telecom. Banking: A Friend in Europe. As Isabel dos Santos diversified her Angolan business interests, in 2005 she diversified her network of powerful patrons. Enter Americo Amorim, a Portuguese billionaire worth $4.3 billion who has spent his life expanding his family’s business empire from cork to real estate, tourism and, especially, oil.

The billionaire, who did not comment for this story, was early to seek deals in Angola after hostilities ended. When the Dos Santos clan made a move into banking in 2005, they did so in partnership with Amorim and Fernando Teles, a Portuguese national who had been CEO of another Angolan bank. They formally opened Banco Internacional de Credito, known as BIC, according to the company’s annual reports. The hand of Isabel’s father again played a role: President Dos Santos, as head of the Council of Ministers, formally authorized the foreign investment in the capital of the bank. Specifically how it was financed is murky, as there is no public record showing who put money into the bank. BIC’s latest annual report shows that Amorim owns 25% of the bank.

Various documents reveal that another 25% is held through an investment vehicle controlled by Isabel dos Santos. Her spokesman says she was a founding member of the bank and had independent means to pay her share from her early business ventures. Regardless, BIC was a hit, in large part because of a deal to lend money to … the Angolan government. BIC made loans to the state worth $450 million, in addition to more than $350 million made to private ventures. BIC had assets of $6.9 billion in 2012. Isabel dos Santos’ stake is worth at least $160 million, FORBES estimates, based on the bank’s book value listed in its latest annual report. BIC officials could not be reached for comment. Oil: A Strange Partnership. Oil is Angola’s greatest natural asset.

The country produces 650 million barrels per year, most of it exported. The state-owned oil firm, Sonangol, is so profitable that it was only a matter of time before the Dos Santos family would start looking for ways to hitch a ride on its success. Isabel’s banking partner, billionaire Americo Amorim, would play the key role. In 2005 Amorim set up a subsidiary, Amorim Energia. He would control it with a 55% stake. The remaining 45%, at least originally, went to Sonangol via a Netherlands holding company called Esperaza Holding B.V. At the end of that year Amorim Energia went shopping, acquiring 33.3% of Galp Energia, Portugal’s former state-owned oil company, for roughly $1 billion, according to press reports.

At the end of 2006, according to investigative not-for-profit Global Witness, 40% of Sonangol’s stake in Esperaza ended up with a Swiss company called Exem Holding. No documents could be found that definitively tie Exem Holding to Isabel dos Santos, but her fingerprints are everywhere. Her husband, Sindika Dokolo, was put on the Amorim Energia board at the request of Esperaza, according to Global Witness. And the chairman of Isabel dos Santos’ holding company is also on the boards of Fidequity, a subsidiary of Exem Holding, and entities called Exem Energy and Exem Oil & Gas, according to public filings. Last year Amorim Energia paid $726 million for an additional 5% of GALP. Isabel’s estimated 6.9% stake in Galp is worth a recent $924 million.

Cement: Safeguarding the “Public Interest.” For most of President Dos Santos’ reign there’s only been one cement factory in Angola, owned by a firm called Nova Cimangola. By mid-2004 the government owned 39.8% of it, state-owned oil company Sonangol’s captive bank, BAI, owned 9.5%, and the remaining 49% was owned by Swiss firm Scanang, which was in the process of being taken over by Portuguese cement company Cimpor. The government began demanding a bigger stake, arguing that the factory was a strategic asset for national reconstruction in the aftermath of the war.

On Oct. 29, 2006 the president’s Council of Ministers’ Resolution 78/06 approved a $74 million payment to buy out Cimpor, declaring that the expenditure was necessary to safeguard “public interest, to restore the legality and to maintain the shareholding control of Nova Cimangola by national entities, incorporated in Angola.” The $74 million payment, according to an Angolan newspaper, came from BIC, the bank half-owned by Amorim and Isabel dos Santos.

The government would now own 89%, while BAI and Angolan individuals would control the remaining 11%. What followed, however, showed that the larger goal wasn’t to give Angola a larger stake but rather certain Angolans. Prior to the council’s approval a company called Ciminvest was incorporated in Angola. Ciminvest was initially fronted by the president’s former legal counsel, according to the articles of incorporation he signed. At one point Portuguese billionaire Americo Amorim owned an estimated 30% of Ciminvest, but his representative confirms that he transferred his stake in 2009. He would not comment on who took over the stake or what was paid for it.

The real owners are now widely understood to be Isabel dos Santos and her husband, though documents detailing ownership are not publicly available. However, Isabel admits on her resume that she chairs the board of Nova Cimangola, which she controls through Ciminvest. Without much ado, at no apparent cost, the company that was presidentially mandated to be controlled by “national entities” had become controlled by Isabel dos Santos. ISABEL DOS SANTOS’ holdings are more than just squirreled away assets to be unearthed in case of a rainy day.

They throw off hefty dividends that allow her to buy yet more assets in businesses seemingly unrelated to the exploitation of Angolan properties, such as her $500 million stake in Portuguese media firm ZON. Meanwhile, her father has taken steps to legally protect himself from all the plundering. Under Angolan law President Dos Santos’ decision to grant a license to Unitel for the personal benefit of his daughter could be considered an abuse of power.

To cover his legal bases, in 1992 the president fiddled with the law to reduce it to two grounds: taking bribes or betraying the country. Technically, he can argue, neither was violated in the case of Unitel. The larger strategy, though, is to portray Isabel as a hero.

In January, after FORBES declared her a billionaire, the Angolan regime’s mouthpiece (and the country’s only daily newspaper), Jornal de Angola. claimed that “while we give our best for Angola without poverty, we are elated with the fact that businesswoman Isabel dos Santos has become a reference in the world of finances. This is good for Angola and it fills Angolans with pride.” Angolans should be mortified, not proud.

The Son of Comrade Dictator Jose Eduardo dos Santos

José Filomeno dos Santos, aka "Zenu"

As chairman of the new Fundo Soberano de Angola (FSDEA), Josй Filomeno de Sousa dos Santos is mandated to get the US$ 5 Billion sovereign fund off the ground. Dos Santos represents a new round of leaders managing sub-Saharan Africa’s sovereign wealth. Dos Santos was a former board member of Banco Kwanza Invest, an Angolan investment bank.

Millionaire overnight, where the money come from?

Josй Filomeno dos Santos is CEO of the China Petrotechnical Corporation register in Hong Kong partner of SINOPEC Corp (China Petroleum & Chemical Corporation) The Father is the Dictator of the MPLA, Government, Armed Forces, etc… the uncle is Manuel Vicente, President of the Counsel and Administration (PCA) of the Angola Petrol Company Sonangol, family business is the best (wow is Angola a family run business? yeap it seems so). Jose Filomeno dos Santos, aka Zenu spent time in tour of China petroleum infrastructures in 2005.

José Filomeno dos Santos son of the Dictator Jose Eduardo dos Santos is being investigated by the German Authorities for Money Laundry

Josй Filomeno dos Santos, son of Jose Eduardo dos Santos the MPLA Regime Dictator, seen by some observers as a potential successor to become Head of State, is in the eyes of the German and Swiss media because of alleged illicit business activities.

Zenu, is the nick name for Josй Filomeno dos Santos, is a man that has already worked in several companies of the MPLA Regime: he was part of the Directors of Sonangol and was director adjunct of its subsidiary company AAA, before venturing in the world of International Businesses: he passed by Sweden, he studied in England and participated in several projects, such as “Afrikanische Innovations Stiftung”, Foundation for the Innovation of Africa, with head quarters in Switzerland.

The Swiss journalist specialized in economic matters, Lukas Haessig, recently published and article about the suspicious activities of Zenu dos Santos in Switzerland, in which he explains the function of the Son of the Dictator of Angola Comrade Jose Eduardo dos Santos, allegedly to finance building works for Charity in Africa. “Zenu dos Santos with this front pretends to create for himself a positive image”, sais Haessig.

The Director of the Foundation is a Swiss lawyer by the name of Thomas Ladner, who at the same time, also directs the company of financial services with the name of Quantum in Switzerland. Zenu dos Santos is also one of the promoters of the Bank Quantum Angola: “This for me is a web of companies – an Angolan network – always with the same individuals who work in together”, states the journalist.

The unclear role of a German Banker

Behind the businesses of Zenu dos Santos is Jean-Claude de Morais Bastos, a Swiss citizen original from Cabinda. It was through him that Zenu created his Bank “Quantum Bank” and recruited to this Bank Ernst Welteke, ex-president of the Central Bank of Germany, Mr. Ernst Welteke today occupies the functions of President of the Council of Administration of the Bank of the Son of Jose Eduardo dos Santos.

Haessig considers being “very peculiar” a ex-president of the Bundesbank (German Central Bank) exercising such functions in a Bank of the Son of the Dictator Jose Eduardo dos Santos, e, and at the same time, in a Bank in Switzerland with the same name, but that alegedly nothing has to do one with the other. "But looking for the Administration we can see that its Administrative personnel are exactly the same. Mr. Ernst Weltecke belongs to both Administration Councils and also the Angolan-Swiss citizen Basto de Morais is in both banks".

Accusations of Money Laundry

Angolan observers residents in Germany have already made serious public accusations against this network, which they qualify as a Laundry machine of money laundry from public funds in Angola. The laundry would be made with the participation and help of some German personalities, such as Ernst Welteke, writes an Angolan journalist resident in Germany, in an article published in the German magazine "afrika Sьd". Title of the article: “Dirty money seeks washing-up”.

The Swiss Journalist, Lukas Haessig, says that despite of no proof, for the time being. Deutsche Welle tried in vain to contact Mr. Ernst Welteke, member of the Social-Democrat German party, which in 2004 was forced to quit from the German Central Bank for suspicion of corruption.

Author: Antуnio Cascais/Cristina Krippahl
Revision: Helena Ferro de Gouveia
Translation into English: Mangovo Ngoyo

The Talented Mr. Bastos de Morais

Mr. Jean-Claude Bastos de Morais, the closest business associate of President Dos Santos’ son, Josй Filomeno “Zenъ”. He was convicted by a criminal court in the Swiss canton of Zug for “repeated qualified criminal mismanagement.” The judgment dates back to July 13, 2011.

Bastos de Morais first appealed the judgment. On December 11, he was scheduled to meet the deadline for another appeal at the High Court of Zug. The businessman withdrew from appealing, and the conviction has now entered into force. According to a press release issued by Bastos de Morais’ communications agency, Spicy Communications, the reason for the withdrawal is that he was “acquitted in all major charges.” And that what remained was “only a conditional fine and another one for two formally incorrect wage payments.”

He also denied to the “Handelszeitung” that his business activities in Angola are due to his good relationship with the Angolan princeling. “That’s not the case,” he said.

According to Bastos de Morais, the idea of setting up a state fund for venture capital is his brainchild. He mentioned to have close relationships with several ministers, including the minister of Economy, Abrahгo Gourgel, who “was willing to listen.” Through the attentive hears of the minister, and through a web of connections, Banco Kwanza secured hundreds of millions of dollars from the Angolan Central Bank to invest abroad. At the time, minister Abrahгo Gourgel, was the head of the central bank. “The Minister was able to place the idea, I was the producer.”

“I am a machine of ideas,” boasted Bastos de Morais.

Longtime business partner of Bastos, Marcel Krьse, who is currently the CEO of Banco Kwanza, was also convicted in the Zug court on the same case.

Bastos received a suspended fine of 160,000 Swiss Francs, and has to pay 4,500 Swiss francs. The court handed Marcel Krьse a suspended fine of 170,000 Swiss francs, and has to pay 5,000. A suspended fine means they don’t have to pay the fine unless they commit another crime within the next two years. Nevertheless, both get a criminal record.

Bank Kwanza Invest
www.bancokwanzainvest.com
Josй Filomeno dos Santos, on of the sons of the President Jose Eduardo dos Santos in one of the proprietors of the Bank Kwanza Invest.

Rбdio Kwanza
Rбdio Kwanza is the now Radio Station of Josй Filomeno, dos Santos son of the President Jose Eduardo dos Santos, it will start to broadcast in 2012.

The Eldest Daughter of Comrade Jose Eduardo dos Santos, gave a Diamond Mine to his oldest daughter.

The exploration of her Diamond mine in the mining zone of Camatué, in Lunda Norte.

Ngutuika Josefa Matias (dos Santos)

prestamos rapidos con rai asnef

Daughter of Elisabeth Kaenje Konambanfe and of Dictator Jose Eduardo dos Santos, but of course this daughter, born outside of his "official " marriage does not qualify for a Diamond Mine. UPDATE: January 2012 apparently rumours in Luanda, say that the Communist Leader Jose Eduardo dos Santos, finally has recognized this person has his daughter while in Zaire.

Welwitschia Josй dos Santos “Tchizй” another Daughter of Comrade Jose Eduardo dos Santos

Presidential Promiscuity Has Corrupted Society

By Rafael Marques De Morais
4 December 2009

In August, I sent a letter to the president of the Angolan republic, in which I drew attention to the fact that the attorney general of the republic was breaking the law by serving as the managing director of various private firms, something that is incompatible with the office that he holds. [1]

Several people have asked me about the lack of a response from the head of state and government regarding these complaints. My response has been that one cannot and should not expect any positive reaction from the president of the republic concerning corruption and respect for the law. I argued that Josй Eduardo dos Santos embodied the same promiscuity that he himself had condemned as the worst evil of his government. [2] I also stated that disrespect for the law was common practice for His Excellency.

In response to these questions, I present a brief investigation into the practices of the Eduardo dos Santos Foundation (FESA) as a case study of the president’s behaviour in relation to the institutions of state, current law and corruption. While serving as president of the republic, Josй Eduardo dos Santos also serves as chairman of his foundation, a private entity whose structures include members of the government, members of parliament, multinational corporations and private businesses. Research reveals several articles of legislation which have been ignored by FESA since it was founded in 1996, and which outlaw the use of public powers to personal ends, conflict of interests, influence-peddling and other corrupt practices.

Why has society seemed powerless in the face of the innumerable abuses of power by the president of the republic? This article tries to locate Dos Santos’s actions in the context of the collective mentality that is paralysing society: generalised corruption. The article questions the president’s political and moral legitimacy in continuing to rule the country after 30 years in power, while disrespecting the laws approved by his own government and allowing corruption to become institutionalised.

THE REIGN OF DOS SANTOS

According to Article 65 of the Angolan constitution, ‘the President of the Republic is not responsible for acts carried out in the exercise of his duties, except for cases of bribery or treason to the Fatherland’. (Some lawyers argue that Angolan legislation does not define the crime of bribery and that the provision on treason does not apply to the president. Nevertheless, as a signatory to the SADC (Southern African Development Community) Protocol against Corruption,[3] Angola makes up for this omission since the state has incorporated the protocol into its domestic law. [4] ) Thus, with a constitutionally enshrined freedom from responsibility, the president can do as wishes. His slightest whim is law. Lawyers from the ruling MPLA (Movimento Popular de Libertaзao de Angola – Partido do Trabalho) party go to extremes to interpret the president’s violations of the law as acts of sovereignty and as demonstrations of the political wisdom of their leader.

The 30-year reign of Josй Eduardo dos Santos has been successful in two respects. First, in the accumulation of wealth beyond measure, in shadowy ways and with impunity, by the presidential family, the closed inner circle of government, generals of the Angolan armed forces, high officers of the Angolan National Police, the MPLA elite and foreigners partners. Second, in the absolute control of political, economic and social power through a web of corruption that is complemented by strategies of repression.

In a recent talk on Radio Ecclesia I drew attention to a number of concrete cases of corruption in the highest echelons of the state. I referred to the ongoing violation of the law by members of the government and by those who control public resources. I quoted in particular the flouting of the Law on Crimes Committed by Public Office Bearers [5] and the Disciplinary Regulations for Public Management[6], which both clearly prohibit officials from using their positions or engaging in state business for personal benefit, beyond the proper remuneration for their work.

Several citizens have spoken to me about this subject. Yet it seems that society in general is still not yet prepared to deal with the truth. People feel offended, and can even become hostile, when someone exposes the truth to public view. This is one of the effects of generalised corruption, not of fear of repression. Even though the looting of public wealth has been laid bare, a large part of society prefers to survive by hiding behind the illusion that everyday corruption is an act of benevolence by those in power.

‘They [the power holders] plunder, but also allow others to plunder their share.’ This seems to be the justification among the more enlightened sections of society.

The fear that is so often evoked as an explanation for the impotence of society is simply the fear of losing the property or benefits that are to be gained through dealings based on institutional, party-political or family connections. This is the condition of citizens who are aware of reality and capable of effecting change. This is a middle class riding on the back of opportunism.

THE PRESIDENT’S LAW

The president of the republic, Josй Eduardo dos Santos, is the chairman of FESA, a private organisation which the Council of Ministers, chaired by President dos Santos, ratified as a public utility institution. [7] From an ethical and legal point of view, this act in itself reveals a conflict of interest and influence-peddling, in that the president, acting through a collegiate institution of government, approved his private foundation as a public utility.

According to the Regulations for Associations and Other Public Utility Institutions, [8] public utility status is bestowed upon ‘philanthropic or humanitarian associations, or aid and educational institutions founded by private individuals, of which the beneficiaries are the inhabitants of a particular place, and which are not administered by the State’. [9]

According to FESA itself, the foundation was created in 1996, ‘with His Excellency President Josй Eduardo dos Santos as its founder’.[10] Bestowing upon FESA the status of public utility thus violates the regulation referred to above, which was approved by the president of the republic as head of the Council of Ministers, and which is supposed to apply only to institutions created by private individuals. The president of the republic is not a private entity.

As the chairman of FESA, the organisation’s highest authority, the president of the republic plays an active role, with the power to chair meetings of the trustees’ committee, to appoint the members of the same committee, to convene meetings, to appoint and dismiss the president and vice-presidents of the foundation and to ‘determine the disposal of the foundation’s assets’, among other tasks. [11]

From an ethical and legal point of view, the incumbent president of the republic may not exercise any private function. Although constitutional law is not specific on the matter, this conclusion can be reached through extensive interpretation, according to the constitutional expert Mihaela Webba. If parliamentarians and judges may not fulfil private functions other than teaching, then the president of the republic as the bearer of the highest state office certainly may not.

Moreover, in Angola the president is an executive entity, since he is head of government and as such should, at the very least, respect the judicial regime applied to members of the government, namely the Law on Crimes Committed by Public Office Bearers. Even if this law does not apply to the president of the republic, by association and by interpretation Josй Eduardo dos Santos ought to comply with this law as a member of the government. [12] This law prohibits the use of public office for personal gain, and combining private and public roles. Good sense should have persuaded Josй Eduardo dos Santos not to establish the foundation while in office as president of the republic.

The very nature of the foundation conflicts with the statesmanlike behaviour that is expected of the president, and damages the supposed separation of public power from private interests. FESA, in point 1.2 of article 3 of its constitution, provides for delivering special consultancy services ‘with a view to technical assistance to public and private institutions (. )’. In point 1.3 of the same article, FESA intrudes into the realm of national politics by declaring itself ready to ‘contribute to the formulation of national policy conducive to the sustainable development of the country’. [13]

Article 4 of FESA’s statutes states that the foundation must ‘promote the creation of private business enterprises in which the foundation becomes a shareholder.’ [14] This is something which has happened with great success. FESA’s participation in commercial business, with no line drawn between the state and the private sphere, makes the president of the republic the representative of the commercial interests of a private association in which local meets international capital.

As proof of his absolute power, Josй Eduardo dos Santos has brought part of the government and other bodies of state, such as the National Assembly, into the management of FESA, in disregard of the law. The sustenance of such a decision corrupts the workings of the public administration. This is demonstrated by looking at the management structures of FESA and of its sporting offshoot, the Santos Football Club.

Santos Football Club [16]

Manuel Vicente, the chairman of the board of the Angolan state oil company, Sonangol, is breaking the Disciplinary Code for Public Management by serving as vice-chairman of FESA, a private function, even though he was mandated to do so by the president of the republic. On the other hand, Sonangol, a state company, is a member of the FESA general assembly, one of the main donors to the foundation and a partner in FESA’s investment arm, Suninvest, in the Empreendimentos Miramar project in Luanda. [17]

This is a modern high-rise complex currently under construction next to the Alto das Cruzes cemetery, and which includes a five-star Hotel Intercontinental [18], the biggest casino in the country and three apartment towers, with the most expensive flats currently on the market. Sonangol holds 43% of the shares and Suninvest 40%, while the foreign business that is building the project, the Nankwing Rainbow Company, holds the remaining 17%. [19] This raises the question of who is paying the millions of dollars needed for the construction of the project? Where is Suninvest getting its funds from? Or is Sonangol covering all the costs and offering shares to Suninvest? This information is not in the public domain.

Although the National Assembly has removed the explicit definition of acts of corruption from the Law on Economic Crimes, and its succeeding laws, Angola remains a signatory to the SADC Protocol Against Corruption, [20] the United Nations Convention Against Corruption, [21] and the African Union Convention on Preventing and Combating Corruption. [22] The legal mechanisms and definitions set out in these documents apply to Angola.

More seriously, there is a simple explanation for the total support that the president’s actions enjoy among members of the government, MPLA parliamentarians, and the leaders of the armed forces and the police: they do as the president wishes so that they too may act with impunity.

Let us take the example of the head of Sonangol, Manuel Vicente, whose personal businesses, such as Sadissa, engage in multi-million dollar deals with the state, but who has never been punished for such illegal acts. [23]

The same can be said of Manuel Rabelais. The minister of information is the managing director of various companies, some of which provide services to the state media outlets. Apart from giving away Channel 2 of TPA (Angolan Public Television) to the president’s children, Manuel Rabelais insists on breaking the law by keeping Tchizй dos Santos, the president’s daughter, as one of the interim directors of TPA. [24] Tchizй dos Santos is the managing director of Semba Comunicaзao, which is responsible for producing the content of TPA’s Channel 2. The law known as the Statute of the Public Manager prohibits the simultaneous holding of public and private office in the way that Tchizй dos Santos does. She has the double role of public servant and the main private supplier to TPA. What possibility does this leave for an oversight role by the state?

As members of FESA structures, ministers Manuel Rabelais, Francisca Espa­rito Santo and Mankenda Ambroise, vice-ministers Pinda Simao and Victoria de Barros Neto, as well as the ambassador to UNESCO, Sita Josй, and the Africa and Middle East Director in the Foreign Ministry Nelson Cosme, are committing the crime of abuse of power, according to the Law on Crimes Committed by Public Office Bearers (Lei dos Crimes Cometidos por Titulares de Cargos de Responsabilidade).

The Members of Parliament Domingos Peterson and Teresa Cohen are violating Line H of Article 16 of the Deputies’ Statute (Estatuto dos Deputados), by serving on FESA’s Curators’ Committee. [25] Two of the longest-standing members of the MPLA’s political bureau – the parliamentarians Afonso Domingos Pedro Van-Danem ‘Mbinda’ and Magalhaes Paiva ‘Nvunda’ – are also involved in the Santos Football Club.

The president in turn abuses the human resources that are put at his disposal for the fulfilment of his state duties and for his personal security by deploying them in the management of the Santos Football Club. This is the case with Manuel Paulo da Cunha and Generals Leopoldino Nascimento and Josй Joao Mawa.

Moreover, according to the Santos Football Club website, the club’s main objectives include commercial success through ‘finding the best and easiest route to acquire resources through the international known model of the "business-club"’. [26] Since Josй Eduardo dos Santos continues his role in FESA, and the Santos Football Clube is a FESA project, it is fair to say that the president is directly involved in private business.

Furthermore, FESA represents the most blatant example of influence-peddling ever seen in the country. The FESA general assembly includes representatives of the oil multinationals British Petroleum (BP), ExxonMobil, Total and of the Block 2 associates (Braspetro, Sonangol Chevron, and the Angolan private companies Somoil, Poliedro and Kotoil), as well as the diamond giant De Beers. The construction firms that have benefited the most from state contracts – the Brazilian Odebrecht and the Portuguese Soares da Costa, Teixeira Duarte and Mota Engil – enjoy presidential favour as members of the FESA general assembly and its main donors.

The firm that is almost exclusively responsible for the overseeing of the main state construction projects, Dar, offered FESA office space while the foundation was being set up. Dar is a member of the FESA general assembly, while its proprietor, the Lebanese Ramzi Klimk, is also the chairman of the foundation’s fiscal committee.

Klimk is also a shareholder in FESA’s investment arm, Suninvest, and of the German multinational Siemens, in Siemens Angola. [27] The main state-owned companies, Sonangol, TAAG (Angola Airlines), the diamond company Endiama and Angola Telecom also have seats in the FESA general assembly.

According to Article 21, point 1, line B of the FESA statutes, one of the requirements for a seat in the general assembly is the donation of at least a minimum sum ‘determined by the Council of Curators’. However, there is no public information as to what this minimum sum is. [28]

In terms of current legislation, [29] the monetary and material contributions by these companies to FESA can be defined as acts of corruption since they involve direct or indirect gifts to the highest state official, the president, who as head of the Council of Ministers has the power to decide on the awarding of all relevant state contracts. Until recently, FESA’s President Ismael Diogo, who works with members of the general assembly on a daily basis, was also a public office holder with the position of Angolan consul general in Rio de Janeiro.

Over 30 years in power, Josй Eduardo dos Santos has never earned a democratic mandate as president. Appointed president of the republic by the MPLA in 1979, he did not win an outright majority in Angola’s first and only presidential election in 1992, and the required second round of that election never took place. His current behaviour deprives him of any political or moral legitimacy to continue in office. As Manuel Jorge points out, ‘there is no legitimate power without respect for the law’. [30]

Since bribery is defined as an act of corruption, citizens ought to organise themselves to explore all the legal, civic and political means to insist on an independent audit of FESA’s activities, since there are plenty of indications that criminal action could be taken against the president of the republic, Josй Eduardo dos Santos.

Society urgently needs a debate on how to restore the legitimacy, honour and authority of the office of the president of the republic. The ongoing disrespect for the law is, in itself, a form of tyranny and the corruption of political power and of state institutions.

To take a stand against the political irresponsibility, impunity and corruption that are robbing Angolans of the prospect of a better collective future is an act that is in keeping with the constitution and with aspirations for a more moral society. Angola needs a leader who can restore morality to society and to government for the benefit of future generations.

[1] See the author’s letter about the attorney general’s business activities, addressed to the president of the republic on 13 August 2009. A copy is available at http://makaangola.com/wp-content/uploads/Letter-to-the-President-of-Angola.pdf
[2] Dos Santos, Josй Eduardo (2008) ‘Devemos corrigir todas as praticas negativas que afectam a imagem do Governo’, address at the opening of the 11th Extraordinary Meeting of the MPLA Central Committee.
[3] Assembleia Nacional, Resoluзao.° 38/05 de 8 de Agosto, Protocolo contra a Corrupзao da SADC.
[4] According to the SADC Protocol Against Corruption, ‘Corruption. includes bribery or any other behaviour in relation to persons entrusted with responsibilities in the public and private sectors which violates their duties as public officials, private employees, independent agents or other relationships of that kind and aimed at obtaining undue advantage of any kind for themselves or others.’
[5] Assembleia do Povo (1990) Lei n.° 21/90 de 22 de Dezembro.
[6] Comissao Permanente da Assembleia do Povo (1989) Lei n.° 10/89 de 30 de Dezembro. www.makaangola.com
[7] Conselho de Ministros, Resoluзao n°14/96 de 20 de Dezembro.
[8] Conselho de Ministros (2001) Decreto n.° 5/01 de 23 de Fevereiro.
[9] Ibid. Artigo 2°, n.° 3.
[10] See http://www.fesa.og.ao/fundacao/estatuto.htm
[11] See section II of the FESA Statures on the foundation’s organs, particularly article 8, which defines the role of chairman, and article 9 which sets out the competencies of the chairman in six lines.
[12] The Supreme Court controversially ruled on 21 December 1999 that ‘the President of the Republic is in a certain manner a member of the government since he presides over the formation of the government, having the power of decision in the Council of the Republic.’ The Angolan lawyer Antonio Paulo disagrees with this interpretation by the Supreme Court, and argues that from a constitutional point of view, the leadership of the government falls on the prime minister. Nevertheless, the president shelters behind this ruling as a way of legitimising his absolute control over the government’s decisions. He must therefore be held to account as a member of the government.
[13] See Fundaзao Eduardo dos Santos (2009) Alteraзao do Pacto Social da FESA, Diairio da Republica, III Sйrie, n.° 77, de 27 de Abril, p 3607.
[14] Ibid.
[15] Table based on information available on the FESA website. http://www.fesa.og.ao/fundacao/orgaos.htm
[16] Ibid. http://www.fesa.og.ao/projectos/sfc.htm
[17] See Miramar Empreendimentos, Limitada (2007) Constituiзao da sociedade Miramar Empreendimentos, Limitada, Diairio da Republica, III Sйrie, n.° 70, de 11 de Junho, pp.2169-71.
[18] See InterContinental Luanda at http://www.ichotelsgroup.com/intercontinental/en/gb/new-hotels/luanda
[19] Ibid. p.2170
[20] Assembleia Nacional, Resoluзao.n° 38/05 de 8 de Agosto, Protocolo contra a Corrupзao da SADC.
[21] Assembleia Nacional, Resoluзao n.° 20/06 de 23 de Junho, Convenзao das Naзaes Unidas contra a Corrupзao.
[22] Assembleia Nacional, Resoluзao n.° 27/06 de 14 de Agosto, Convenзao da Uniao Africana sobre a Prevenзao e o Combate а Corrupзao.
[23] Marques de Morais, Rafael (2009) Legal Doubts over Thales’ Angola Deal, text available at http://makaangola.com/?p=44〈=en-us
[24] Gabinete do Ministro da Comunicaзao Social (2009) Despacho n.° 38/09, 28 May.
[25] According to this point of law, one may not ‘use the position of member of parliament to benefit private interests, whether one’s own or of a third party, in any way’.
[26] See FESA (2009) Programas e Projectos, Santos Futebol Clube de Angola: Objectivos do Clube. http://www.fesa.og.ao/projectos/sfc.htm
[27] Vide Siemens, S.A, DiaЎrio da Republica, III Sйrie, n.° 94, de 4 de Agosto de 2006, pp. 2629-33.
[28] A public disclosure by a former member of FESA’s general assembly, the then Norwegian oil company Norsk Hydro (currently StatoilHydro) revealed that it contributed with an annual sum of US$100,000 to the president’s foundation. See http://www.hydro.com/upload/33521/Final%20Libya%20Investigation%20Report%202008-10-06.pdf
[29] As an illustration, the African Union Convention on Preventing and Combating Corruption defines corruption, in Article 4, point 1, line B as ‘the offering or granting, directly or indirectly, to a public official or any other person, of any goods of monetary value, or other benefit, such as a gift, favour, promise or advantage for himself or herself or for another person or entity, in exchange for any act or omission in the performance of his or her public functions’.
[30] Jorge, Manuel (2001) Poder e Autoridade: A Legitimidade em Questao, text sent to the Farum sobre as Mutiplas Consequкncias da Guerra, 14-15 March, Luanda.

The Private Present Diamond Mind of Welwitschia Josй dos Santos “Tchizй”

On the 5 of November 2010, Josй Eduardo dos Santos, authorized the Ministry of Geology, Mines and Industry to issue a concession in the region of Lunda-Norte of the Muanga Project to his daughter Welwitschia Josй dos Santos “Tchizй”.

On the 2 of December 2010 this concession came into law with the Presidential Decree No. 296/10

The Muanga Project was originally given issued on the 14 of July 2005 by Josй Eduardo dos Santos as an association between Endiama (51%), and the Society of Mining Development (Sociedade de Desenvolvimento Mineiro – SDM) (20%), Odebrecht (19%) and Di Oro (10%).

SDM is a consortium between Endiama and the Brazilian multinational Odebrecht.

Semba Comunicaзгo (Semba Comunications)
This communications company as has partners two sons of the President of Angola which are Welwitshea known as "Tchizй", and Josй Paulino dos Santos. The company is spending 17 million USD between 2011 and 2012 on adverts promoting the Republic of Angola and what a great place it is do do business the international news channel CNN, the money off course is paid from public funds, and the company gets its commission, all nice and clear. The name of the advert campaign is "Angola Grow With Us".
The web page of the company was www.semba-c.com and www.semba.ao

Semba Comunicaзгo, a private Angolan company, has been receiving millions of dollars directly from the presidency of the Republic of Angola’s budget to produce commercials to improve the image of Angola abroad. However, this company, incorporated on 11 October 2006, is owned by President Josй Eduardo dos Santos’ children, namely Welwitchea Josй dos Santos ‘Tchizй’ and Josй Paulino dos Santos ґCorйon Du.’ They are promoting the image of their father’s regime through campaigns broadcasted on CNN International. President Dos Santos has been in power for 32 years without ever being elected by the people.

The 2012 presidential budget alone allocates almost US $17 million for Semba Comunicaзгo to engage in a contractual agreement with CNN International for a new advertisement campaign.

Josй Eduardo Paulino dos Santos “Coreon Dъ”

The Company, Di Oro – Sociedade de Negуcios e Alta Costura Limitada, established in 2003, is owned by Tchizй dos Santos (73.34%), and her husband Hugo Andrй Nobre Pкgo (16.66%), and the President singer son Josй Eduardo Paulino dos Santos “Coreon Dъ” (10%).

At the time of the signing of the Muanga Mining Project, the company Di Oro –Sociedade de Negуcios e Alta Costura Lda (Society of Businesses and High Fashion Limited), had a different area and scope of business, has stated in article No. 2 of the company incorporation papers, which was “high class fashion designs, administration of industrial ventures, decoration, commercialization of cosmetics, clothing for weddings, cocktails, anniversaries and receptions”.

Josй Eduardo Paulino dos Santos “Coreon Dъ” left, Jose Eduardo dos Santos, centre with his latest wife on the right

On the 30 of September 2005, two months after the diamond mining concession was granted to both sons and the son in law of Josй Eduardo dos Santos they changed the name of the company to “Di Oro – Sociedade de Negуcios Limitada” (Society of Businesses Limited), and the Article No. 2 of incorporation was changed to “geological studies, diamond prospection and mining, association in the participation of mining businesses, hospitality industry and confections, general commerce, import and export”.

The Brazilian Multinational Odebrecht his heavily involved in accounts of corruption directly involving the President of Angola, by giving 10% of the Social Capital of the Muanda Mining Project to the sons of the President Dictator Jose Eduardo dos Santos, whom personally signed the contracts with the Director of the Brazilian Multinational Odebrecht Mr. Antуnio Mamieri.

The Contract of the Muanga Mining Project in Article No.25 states that Odebrecht and SDM both assume the compromise to make all investments. The only justification for the Di-Oro to receive 10% of the business is the privilege that has in gaining the signature of the President Jose Eduardo dos Santos.

The Dictator Josй Eduardo dos Santos is in the habit of giving mining concessions to his own sons and family, on the 30 November 2005 he gave a concession for Prospect, Research and Recognition of the deposits of primary diamonds in the Cabuia Mining Project, in the region north-east of Saurimo in Lunda Sul by Decree No. 106/05 of 9 December 2005 of the Council of Ministers.

The consortium formed by the company of Tchizй dos Santos, N’Jula Investments, Miningest and Sambukila, was given 5% of the social capital in the mining project, without necessity of any financial contributions to it, either material or technical.

In the mining Project Cabuia, the company Equatorial Diamonds owned by the businessman Hйlder Bataglia, assumed the entirety of the finance of the project in his own account and risk, and stayed with 44% of the total of shares.

The company Endiama, in its quality of representing the state, received 51% of the shares. The contract was celebrated for a period of 5 years by Executive Decree No. 7/06 of 30 of January 2006, of the Ministry of Geology and Mines, such contract received some changed to its original configuration, in relation to the Mining Project of Cabuia.

The consortium of Tchizй dos Santos gained a new amount of 30% for the diamonds exploration period. The company Endiama (35.5%) and the company Equatorial Diamonds (34.5%).


Media Nova
www.medianova.co.ao
Media Nova (New Media) is the biggest editorial media in Angola they are controlled and owned by two sons of Mr. El President Jose Eduardo dos Santos, yep the same old giza, you should get the hang of the way things are run in "Angola" by now.
Media Nova owns Radio More ( Rбdio Mais) and the TV Channel Zimbo (TV Zimbo).

www.radiomais.co.ao
Rбdio Ecclesia was the radio channel more widely listened in Angola but as from 2012 it can only broadcast in certain areas, on the contrary Radio More ( Rбdio Mais) can broadcast everywhere at leisure, Radio More ( Rбdio Mais) you guess it, it is owned by the Company Media Nova which is owned by two sons of Mr. El President Jose Eduardo Dos Santos, owned by Welwitshea Josй dos Santos “Tchizй” and of Josй Paulino dos Santos “Corйon Du ".

Maria Luнsa Perdigгo Abrantes “Milucha"

Maria Luнsa Perdigгo Abrantes “Milucha" is the mother of Welwitshea Josй dos Santos “Tchizй” and of Josй Paulino dos Santos “Corйon Du”.

Maria Luнsa Perdigгo Abrantes “Milucha" is also the president of the National Agency for Private Investment in Angola ANIP (Agкncia Nacional para o Investimento Privado).

ANA PAULA CRISTУVГO LEMOS DOS SANTOS

Born 17 Outubro 1963, tendo feito os seus estudos primбrios em escolas da capital. Cedo se sentiu atraнda pela abertura ao mundo proporcionada pela navegaзгo aйrea, tendo sido assistente de bordo das Linhas Aйreas de Angola durante dez anos.

Contraiu matrimуnio com Josй Eduardo dos Santos, no dia 17 de Maio de 1991. Do enlace matrimonial nasceram trкs filhos: Eduane Danilo (nascido a 29/09/1991), Joseana (nascida a 5/4/1995) e Eduardo Breno (nascido a 2/10/1998), incluindo o nъcleo familiar mais cinco filhos do lado paterno, anteriores ao casamento.

Eduane Danilo Lemos Dos Santos
Eldest son of Ana Paula Cristovao Lemos dos Santos
with Jose Eduardo dos Santos

Front view of the Solar de Alvalade Building in Luanda

Rear view of the Solar de Alvalade Building in Luanda

Main Entrance Front view of the Solar de Alvalade Building in Luanda

Eduane Danilo Lemos Dos Santos son of Jose Eduardo dos Santos and Ana Paula dos Santos
new purchased Penthouse Apartment on the 17 top Floor of the Solar de Alvalade Building in Lunda
valued at US$ 4,000,000 (Four Million US Dollars)

Eduane Danilo Lemos Dos Santos, um dos filhos mais novo do Presidente da Repъblica, foi recentemente brindado com um apartamento avaliado em quatro milhхes de dуlares norte-americanos, no edifнcio "Solar do Alvalade", localizado na rua Comandante Gika, adjacente a sede da OMA Nacional. O presenteado й filho mais velho do casamento com Ana Paula dos Santos.

Trata-se do apartamento mais caro do edifнcio por estar localizado no ъltimo andar (17 piso) com uma vista dos dois lados da cidade. Muito recentemente, e por orientaзгo do “ofertante” que se desconhece, foi partida uma parte do imуvel para dar lugar a uma nova estrutura decorativa revestida de mбrmore branco.

No 7 July 2012, foi alugado uma grua para carregar as novas mobнlias e material da cozinha para o apartamento. O facto foi encarado pelos vizinhos como uma demonstraзгo "de poder", visto que todos os moradores do prйdio usam elevadores e escadas para carregar os seus bens (mas nunca uma grua).

Eduane, de 21 anos de idade, se encontra neste preciso momento a estudar arquitetura na Inglaterra, serб o morador mais novo daquele edifнcio e com o apartamento mais caro.

Vivem igualmente no referido edifнcio, o ministro da Administraзгo e Territуrio, Bornito de Sousa (que aparece de quando em vez), o chefe adjunto do SINSE, Fernando Eduardo Octavio, o ex-administrador da RNA, Eduardo Magalhгes e o secretario de Estado junto a PR, Manuel Magalhгes.

Em tempos, Manuel Rabelais foi-lhe recusado um pedido para colocar vidros na varada do seu apartamento no oitavo andar. A administraзгo do edifнcio convocou-lhe para uma reuniгo onde lhe foi transmitido que nгo permitiam alteraзхes porque iria tirar a estйtica do imуvel.

Atй aqui nгo se sabe se o mesmo irб recorrer da decisгo uma vez que o apartamento de “Danilo” dos Santos sofreu alteraзхes, sem merecer qualquer objecзгo da direcзгo administrativa do referido edifнcio.

LAWYERS WHO HAVE REPRESENTED THE MPLA REGIME

Jean-Yves Le Borgne, french lawyer on the pay roll of the MPLA Regime

Reinhart Marville Torre’s lawyers
(Lawyers to Corrupt and Criminal Regimes)
"To retain our competitive edge, and mindful of our clients, lawyers and support staff, we constantly monitor and seek to control our cost base".

Jean Reinhart, lawyer to the MPLA Corrupt Regime

MPLA Regime No.2

General Antonio dos Santos Franзa, aka “Ndalu”

No decision is taken without his presence. In al decisions even on those more sensitive such as High Command decisions in the Regime, the last word is his. He is revered as the strategist. He is a Regime figure such as Comrade Carlos Feijу, all call him “The Chief”. Comrade General Franзa “Ndalu” is the father of the hawks. After the Dictator Jose Eduardo dos Santos, General Ndalu is the only person in the Regime that can order to “shut the mouth” of Comrade Vice President “Nandу” and the mouth of Comrade General “Kopelipa”.

In the inner circle of the MPLA Regime it is mentioned that the Armed Forces of Angola belong to Comrade President Jose Eduardo dos Santos, but the Generals belong to Comrade General “Ndalu”. He is the mentor of Comrade General “Kopelipa”, of Comrade General Joгo de Matos and others. He is the leader of the hawks in the MPLA Regime. All Generals have to obey him. In 2005 De Beers Angola Prospecting appointed General Antonio Dos Santos Franca ‘Ndalu’ to the board of the company as non-executive chairman.

Monopoly security of oil fields. Its founders were the generals Joao de Matos, France Ndalu, Armando da Cruz Neto, and Antonio Luis Faceira and Hendrick.

General Antonio dos Santos Franзa aka “Ndalu” also has Investments in Air Gemini, the Lumanhe Company (diamonds) with Escom, linked to the Group Espirito Santo.

MPLA Regime No.3

General Manuel Hйlder Vieira Dias, “Kopelipa”

The security of the Dictator Comrade President Jose Eduardo dos Santos is in his hands. He is the closest Henchmen of the Dictator and the one who has access to his home. (also only Comrade Vaz da Conceiзгo and Comrade General Leopoldino have access).

He is Minister of State and Chief of the Military House. In Government he follows all military issues, defence, police and intelligence. All promotions in this areas have to pass through his hands first for appraisal. The Dictator Comrade President Jose Eduardo dos Santos appreciates his discrete side not getting involved with any group. He was the individual who the Dictator sent to convince the dissident Comrade Carlos Feijу to return to the presidential circle. Comrade Kopelipa is in the list of the 5 largest fortunes created by corruption of the MPLA Regime. He avoids political fights with the others in the Regime. He was the responsible of ending the carrier of the Regime Dissident General Fernando Miala.

NO PROOF OF ORIGIN: This insignificant piece of shit speaks no native language of Angola it is known he was born in Cape Verde and Island lost in the middle of the Atlantic somewhere between the African continent and South America.

BUSINESS IS GOOD IF YOU ARE A MPLA REGIME HENCHMEN

List of a few of the many companies owned by Comrade General Kopelipa

MACON
Revolutionize public transport in Luanda (buses and taxis). Hйlder Vieira Dias, head of the Military House of the presidency and director of the Office of National Reconstruction is a member-founder.

AutoStar
Owns 40% of this company that distributes Car Parts and sales new cars like the Mercedes brand. Comrade Manuel Josй Van-Dъnem
another MPLA Regime Henchmen has 10% on this same company.

Activity: transport, trade.

World Wide Capital (WWC). As of April 2011 Comrade Kopelipa now owns 8,37% of the Bank BIG.

Hypermarket Kero
January 2012

Based on the Information of the Director General of the Hypermarket Kero the Brazilian Citizen Joгo Santos, the investment interests in the Kero Hypermarket is made up from a joint of capitals from a group of Angolan Investors and the Private Bank Atlвntico: “The US$35 millions are a joint of own capital and the resources made available by the partnership with the Private Bank Atlвntico”.

On the 10 th of December 2011 the Minister of Commerce Idalina Valente, inaugurated the third Hypermarket of Kero in Luanda in the new location of Kilamba. This housing project is the biggest of Angola and was under the responsibility of the Cabinet of National Reconstruction which is under the Command of General Manuel Hйlder Vieira Dias Jъnior “Kopelipa”.

Presently (January 2012) the project is managed by the State Oil Company Sonangol and it is directed by Comrade Manuel Domingos Vicente.

The company proprietor of the project is Zahara, which is one of the Angolan companies that belong to the Group Aquattro International S.A. Who controls 99,96% of its capital.

This group of companies has in the last three years became the most dynamic and the leader of private development and investment in the angolan economy, it is exclusive property of three individuals: the President of the Board of Administration of Sonangol the State Oil Company Comrade Manuel Vicente;

the Minister of State and Chief of the Military House of the President of the Republic General Manuel Hйlder Vieira Dias “Kopelipa”; and its principal advisor General Leopoldino Fragoso do Nascimento.

These three partners hold an equal share in the Grupo Aquattro International S.A. each one has 33,3% of the social capital in the Group.

Coronel Joгo Manuel Inglкs, Logistics Officer in the Military House, and his Brother Domingos Manuel Inglкs, private assistant of the businesses of General Manuel Hйlder Vieira Dias Jъnior “Kopelipa”, have a symbolic representation 0,5% of shares in the Group.

This company was created by three partners, Ismкnio Coelho Macedo, portuguese citizen, and an administrator of the Private Bank Atlвntico, the one who financed in part the Hypermarket Kero.

Sonangol State Oil Company has a quantitative participation in the Private Bank Atlвntico, of 7,5%, and it is represented in the Bank by a non executive administrator appointed by Sonangol Comrade Baptista Sumbe, who is a close associate and employed by Senior Comrade Manuel Vicente.

The Hypermarket Kero, in the housing estate of Cajъ, Talatona, shows Comrade Manuel Domingos Vicente a member of another multimillionaire project which was financed by the State Oil Company Sonangol, the housing project was created for the accommodation of its workers, for the extended family of the President, and for the nomenclature elite of the MPLA Regime.

General Manuel Hйlder Vieira Dias Jъnior “Kopelipa” and Comrade Manuel Domingos Vicente in the development of a housing project in the location of Kilamba, they both are the responsible for the taking of decisions in the project.

The Trio made up by Comrade Manuel Domingos Vicente, Generals Manuel Hйlder Vieira Dias Jъnior “Kopelipa” and Dino is also propriety of the Private Company Delta Imobiliбria, by which the Angolan State has contracted to manage and oversee the sale of the houses at millionaire prices.

For the moment Comrade Manuel Domingos Vicente henchman of the MPLA Regime and the Generals of the Regime are granted total impunity in front of the law has they are the “de-facto” right hand men of Josй Eduardo dos Santos.

Pumangol with participation of “Kopelipa”

Pumangol, it is a new company (2011) in the Angolan market of comercialization and distribution of oil products, “downstream”, Angola,
it is a company constituted between the multinational company Puma Energy International, and the Trafigura Group and a group of Angolan investors. Among these the main partners are the Chief of the Military House Gen M H Vieira Dias “Kopelipa” and Leopoldino do Nascimento “Dino”. both very near to several titles and both having several businesses in common.

Before of the constitution of Pumangol (the bureaucratic set up process was done in an unusual speedy and timely manner unusual in Angola, supposedly by direct influence of Angolan personalities interested), Sonangol, through its holding, announced the intention of purchasing 20% of the participation in the Trafigura Group in the Company Puma Energy International, which mean that by the path it also has indirect interests in the new company.

Since its set up Pumangol has already opened up 15 distribution posts of gasoline in Luanda (end of 2011 early months of 2012), some of these gas stations are of big proportions.

Pumangol thus does not need to deal with the usual paper word and red tape and becomes more competitive in the “midstream”.

Pumangol does not depend of the Sonangol Refinery; it imports directly, in accordance with the plans that traces and which execution controls.

Angola officials held hidden oil stakes

Financial Times
By Tom Burgis and Cynthia O’Murchu, FT.com

(Financial Times) Three of the most powerful officials in Angola have held concealed interests in an oil venture with Cobalt International Energy, the Goldman Sachs-backed explorer whose operations in one of the world’s most promising energy frontiers are under investigation by US authorities, the Financial Times has learned.

The recently departed head of the national oil company and an influential general confirmed to the FT last week that they and another general have held shares in Nazaki Oil and Gбz, the local partner in a Cobalt-led deepwater venture launched in early 2010.

Warning its shareholders that it might face liabilities under US anti-corruption laws, Houston-based Cobalt said in February that the Securities and Exchange Commission and the Department of Justice were investigating its Angolan operations.

The three men’s previously opaque shareholdings in Cobalt’s local partner could raise questions about compliance with US anti-corruption law, which makes it a crime to pay or offer anything of value to foreign officials to win business.

Manuel Vicente, who was the head of state-owned Sonangol until his appointment in January as minister of state for economic co-ordination, and General Manuel Hйlder Vieira Dias Jъnior, known as Kopelipa, the head of the presidency’s military bureau, confirmed their holdings in Nazaki in near-identical letters.

As head of Sonangol, Mr Vicente oversaw Africa’s second-biggest oil industry. Asked whether they had exerted any influence over the award of Cobalt’s oil rights, Mr Vicente and Gen Kopelipa denied wrongdoing. They said they had held their Nazaki interests "always respecting all Angolan legislation applicable to such activities, not having committed any crime of abuse of power and/or trafficking of influence to obtain illicit shareholder advantages".

They said their interests and those of General Leopoldino Fragoso do Nascimento were held through Grupo Aquattro Internacional. Aquattro is named as a Nazaki shareholder in two company documents from 2007 and 2010 obtained by the FT. They said Aquattro had been "recently dissolved" but did not say whether they had disposed of their interests in Nazaki.

Gen Fragoso do Nascimento, a former head of communications in the presidency, did not respond to requests for comment.

Mr Vicente and Gen Kopelipa added: "Should the continued operation of Cobalt in the Angolan petroleum sector be unviable as a result of any failure to comply with any American law, there will certainly be [Angolan] and/or foreign entities interested in substituting for it in the assets it owns in Angola." Gen Kopelipa added that "that hopefully will not happen".

Responding to FT inquiries about the three officials, Cobalt stressed that its extensive and ongoing due diligence "has not found any credible support for [the] central allegation that Angolan government officials, and specifically the officials identified. have any ownership in Nazaki". It would be happy to review any proof.

"Cobalt has at all times complied fully with both US and Angolan laws," it said. Nazaki, which did not respond to a request for comment, denied the allegation, Cobalt said.

Goldman, one of Cobalt’s founding investors and its biggest shareholder, declined to comment, as did the SEC and DoJ. Sonangol did not respond to requests for comment.

Kopelipa Pitta Gros Vieira Dias

The son of General Manuel Hйlder Vieira Dias Jъnior “Kopelipa”

4 November 2012 – The of son General Kopelipa bought the Portuguese Company Viauto from the Company Santogal, a Company from the Portuguese Group Espirito Santo.

Viauto represents in Portugal and Spain the Car Brands of Ferrari and Maserati in both nations markets, but the deal made with the Son of General Kopelipa only corresponds to the Company Interests and Operations in Portugal.

Kopelipa Pitta Gros Vieira Dias, has and owns several businesses in Portugal, both in the bar, club and restaurants sector and in the Real Estate sectors, with this purchase he enters the selling of luxury cars in the Portuguese market.

It is not know the origin and source of his funds nor in which way and manner the funds will arrive in this European Community Country, Portugal. The Bank of Angola in an attempt to combat the exit of capitals from Angola, forbid that any Angolan citizen transfer to the exterior no more than $ 60,000 USD per year.

MPLA Regime No.4

Manuel Domingos Vicente

Comrade Manuel Domingos Vicente (son-in-law of the Dictator Jose Eduardo dos Santos) receives $6 Million USD per year from the Oil Company Exxon for Rent of a Apartment in Barrio Corimba in Luanda, Angola, the Oil Company Exxon deposits the annual rent directly into the personal account of Comrade Manuel Domingos Vicente in a Swiss Bank.

Chinese unelected Vice Premier Li Keqiang (R) meets with Manuel Domingos Vicente (L), chairman and chief executive officer of Sonangol, Angola’s state-owned oil company, in Beijing, May 9, 2010.

Manuel Domingos Vicente
(son-in-law of the Dictator Jose Eduardo dos Santos)

Comrade Manuel Vicente is the 39є most important man of the Portuguese Economy.
So how much money does he has in Portugal? Just ask the Immensely Incompetent and Corrupt Portuguese Authorities.

In the start of 2010 he was in the path to become Minister of State for Economic Coordination, he also seen the name of one of his protйgйes Comrade Baptista Sumbo being denied to substitute him has President of the Administration Council of Sonangol the MPLA run and control State Oil Company.

The importance that the Dictator Jose Eduardo dos Santos has given him denotes that he has now passed into the list of natural candidates to the presidential succession. He has received much power whereby he has now be given the control of Transport, Economy and Public Works. In the last years it is to him that Comrade Dictator Jose Eduardo dos Santos started to ask for the names of who should and should not be promoted. Some in the unelected Regime say that he is in training for the passage of the political testament. He is placing individuals of the MPLA Run State Oil Company Sonangol into Governmental Posts.

BCP (Banco Comercial Portuguкs) this Bank is the largest investment of the MPLA Regime in the portuguese economy. Sonangol, the State Oil Company of Angola controls 11,57% of shares in this bank, which confers to the MPLA Regime the largest share holder in the bank. Recently (early 2012) dictated the rules and structure of the institution. And selected the model of administration and appointed the names to the Council of Administration. We must understand that the MPLA Regime is advised in such matters by the Cuban advisors in the same way the Cuban Regime advises and controls the Regimes in Venezuela, Nicaragua, Argentina, Ecuador and Bolivia.

Manuel Domingos Vicente has accumulated one of the largest fortunes in Angola. He is also referred in the Regime structures as the financial facilitator of the New Rich inside of the MPLA Regime.

Opening ceremony of the Hypermarket Kero in Luanda

Hypermarket Kero : Partner in the Hypermarket Kero (Please read the details in MPLA Regime No.3)

Link between the MPLA Regime Dictator son-in-law and
state oil company raises questions about transparency

15th March 2010

Sonangol, the state-owned oil company of Angola, nominated the son-in-law of Angola’s President dos Santos to the board of a holding company that owns a third of the listed Portuguese oil firm Galp Energia, Global Witness has learned.

Angola is an impoverished country that depends on its oil industry to pay for reconstruction after a long civil war. Angola has a reputation for severe corruption which Global Witness has been reporting on for the last decade. 1 Angola’s people have one of the lowest life expectancies in the world: 46.5 years, according to the United Nations. 2

Galp has major oil investments in Angola, a former colony of Portugal, and works closely with Sonangol, whose chairman Manuel Vicente sits on its board. 3

A third of the shares in Galp are owned by a holding company called Amorim Energia BV. Forty-five per cent of the shares in Amorim Energia are owned by a company called Esperaza Holding BV, which is a subsidiary of Sonangol. The rest of Amorim Energia is ultimately controlled by Portugal’s Amorim family. 4

The board members of Amorim Energia include Sindika Dokolo 5. a businessman married to Isabel dos Santos, a daughter of the Angolan president. As this briefing will show, Global Witness has learned that Dokolo was nominated to this post in April 2006 by Esperaza Holding. The latter was wholly owned by Sonangol at the time, according to Dutch corporate records. 6

"The son-in-law of the Angolan president, a private businessman, should not be working so closely with the state company which is responsible for managing Angola’s oil on behalf of its citizens," said Diarmid O’Sullivan of Global Witness. "This arrangement raises concerns about conflicts of interest to which Sonangol has not responded."

Sonangol’s minority partner in Esperaza Holding is Exem Holding AG. a secretive company based in the Swiss canton of Zug which does not publicly disclose the identities of its owners. 7 A director of Exem Holding, a Paris-based financier called Konema Mwenenge, told Global Witness that he has a "professional" relationship with Dokolo. But Mwenenge declined to say whether Dokolo has a financial interest in Exem Holding. 8 Dokolo himself, via his lawyer, declined to respond to questions from Global Witness. 9 Sonangol’s chairman, Manuel Vicente, did not respond to written questions. 10

The fact that the Angolan president’s son-in-law appears to have been representing Sonangol in its indirect investment in Galp does not amount to evidence of wrongdoing. But these findings raise further questions about the transparency of Sonangol, the state oil company which dominates the economy of Angola.

Sonangol collects billions of dollars a year in revenues on behalf of the Angolan government and controls other companies’ access to Angola’s oil and gas reserves, but does not publish its accounts and discloses little detailed information about its activities.

When President dos Santos called for "zero tolerance" of corruption in November 2009, a prominent member of the ruling MPLA party said Angolans should feel free to criticise the president over his family’s business dealings, Reuters news agency reported. 11

Portuguese billionnaire Americo Ferreira de Amorim is the chairman of Amorim Energia. He told Global Witness, in a three-page response to questions about the issues raised in this briefing, that Dokolo had been appointed to the board of Amorim Energia "at the designation of Esperaza Holding". 12

"The fact that Mr Dokolo is the husband of the daughter of President Jose Eduardo dos Santos does not seem in itself as relevant neither [sic] to qualify nor to disqualify him as a board member of Amorim Energia, and therefore was not a factor to have him appointed as a managing director of Amorim Energia," Amorim wrote in his letter to Global Witness. He added: "I can give you my personal views on the fact that the appointment of Mr Dokolo did not raise discussions concerning ethical issues."

Amorim said in his letter that the relationship between Amorim Energia and Galp was governed by a shareholder agreement that was in place before Dokolo came onto the former’s board. Global Witness does not assert, or seek to imply, that companies controlled by the Amorim family have engaged in any illegal or illegitimate activity.

At the end of 2006, Sonangol’s 100 per cent shareholding in Esperaza Holding had fallen to 60 per cent. The other 40 per cent was owned by a subsidiary of Exem Holding. 13 Exem Holding, via its subsidiaries, has been granted access by Sonangol to potentially lucrative investments in Angolan oil and gas but appears to be otherwise unknown in the oil industry.

Sonangol has authorised subsidiaries of Exem Holding to:

  • Acquire a 40 per cent stake in Esperaza Holding by the end of 2006, making it a partner in Sonangol’s indirect investment in Galp.
  • Acquire a 10 per cent stake in an Angolan gas exploration venture announced in December 2007. This venture is controlled by Sonangol. Its other shareholders include Galp, Italy’s ENI and Spain’s Gas Natural. 14 The venture has reportedly been awarded a ten-year gas exploration licence and exempted from taxes. 15
  • Pre-qualify, as of late 2007, to bid for oil licences in Angola. 16

Global Witness asked the Exem Holding director, Konema Mwenenge, to describe the process by which Exem Holding had acquired these investments and investment opportunities. Mwenenge replied in an email that: "I can confirm as a Director of Exem Holding that its subsidiaries did respond to tenders in Angola. Information concerning the tenders is available on the web site of the national oil company of Angola." 17

Sonangol’s website does report that a subsidiary of Exem Holding has been pre-qualified by Sonangol to bid for oil licences in Angola as a "non-operator" – that is, as a minority shareholder in a joint venture with other oil companies. 18 However, there appears to be no information on this website about tenders in relation to Exem Holding’s other interests. Global Witness wrote back and asked Mwenenge where this information could be found, but he did not respond.

Although Sonangol has a reputation for being professionally run, its opacity and its close links to the ruling elite of Angola have long been a cause of public concern. The state oil company has long been used by the government to borrow huge sums in a highly opaque manner and with little public accountability for the use of the money. 19

For more than a year, Global Witness has been investigating the relationships between Sonangol and certain private companies that invest in Angola’s oil sector, which are often complicated and hard to unravel because of a dearth of public information.

In August 2009, Global Witness reported on another little-known private company which was pre-qualified to bid for oil rights in Angola by Sonangol in late 2007. The shareholders of this company, Sociedade de Hidrocarbonetos de Angola, included a person called Manuel Domingos Vicente. The chairman of Sonangol, who has the same name, did not respond to a request for comment from Global Witness, nor did two other senior officials who also have the same names as shareholders in SHA. 20

The International Monetary Fund agreed in late 2009 to lend $1.4 billion to Angola in return for policy pledges which include more transparency for Sonangol, but it remains to be seen whether these pledges will actually be implemented. 21

"At a time when Angola’s government is promising more transparency to the IMF in return for a bailout, our findings show that Sonangol is still anything but transparent," said O’Sullivan.

Global Witness believes that Angola’s government cannot begin to reverse the country’s international reputation for severe corruption until:

  • Sonangol explains its relationship with Dokolo and identifies the ultimate beneficial owners of Exem Holding, who are currently unknown to the public.
  • Sonangol publishes its audited accounts and full details of oil revenue flows between foreign oil companies, Sonangol itself and the Angolan government.
  • Sonangol relinquishes its control over the allocation of oil and mining rights in Angola to an independent agency that operates under full public oversight and awards these rights in a transparent manner.
  • International oil companies in Angola commit themselves not to go into partnership with any smaller companies whose ultimate beneficial ownership is unknown to the public.
  • The government ensures that civil society groups within Angola are able to freely discuss matters of public interest, including the oil sector, without fear of harrassment or censorship in any form.

For further information, please contact:
Diarmid O’Sullivan: +44 207 492 5863 or +44 7872 620 955 and Amy Barry: +44 207 492 5858

1. Global Witness. A Crude Awakening. 1999; All the Presidents’ Men. March 2002. Time for Transparency. March 2004. Available at www.globalwitness.org
2. United Nations. Human Development Report 2009. Angola. The figures for life expectancy at birth are from 2007.
3. Galp Energia. Annual Report and Accounts 2008. Pages 6, 29 and 182
4. Amorim Energia BV. Annual accounts for 2008. Pages 3, 4 and 23.
5. Amorim Energia Annual report 2008. Page 3.
6. Amsterdam Chamber of Commerce. Handelsregisterhistorie. Esperaza Holding BV.
7. Handelsregister des Kantons Zug. Exem Holding AG.
8. Global Witness phone and email conversations with Mwenenge.
9. Correspondence between Global Witness and a lawyer acting for Dokolo.
10. Letter sent to Vicente by Global Witness on 15 September 2009.
11. Reuters. Angolan President calls on party to end corruption. 21 November 2009. Angolan President’s family taint corruption fight. 3 December 2009.
12. Letter from Americo Ferreira de Amorim to Global Witness. 18 January 2010.
13. Esperaza Holding B.V. annual accounts 2006. Page 3.
14. Eni. Eni acquires a participation stake in the Angola LNG Project. 10 December 2007. This press release refers to Exem Exploration & Production B.V. This company has since been renamed Exem Oil & Gas B.V. according to annual accounts filed by the latter for 2007, and is wholly owned by Exem Energy B.V, which is wholly owned by Exem Holding AG.
15. Reuters. Angola set to exempt gas explorers from tax. March 25 2009.
16. Angolan licensing round 2007/2008. Companies pre-qualified for Non-Operator. List published by Sonangol on its website. http://www.sonangol.co.ao/
17. Email to Global Witness from Mwenenge. 19 October 2009.
18. Angolan licensing round 2007/2008. Companies pre-qualified for Non-Operator. List published by Sonangol on its website. http://www.sonangol.co.ao/
19. See Global Witness. Undue Diligence. How banks do business with corrupt regimes. March 2009. Chapter Eight.
20. Global Witness. Angola. Private oil firm has shareholders with same names as top government officials. Media briefing. 4 August 2009.
21. International Monetary Fund. IMF lends Angola $1.4 billion to support reserves, reforms. Press release. 26 November 2009. See also Global Witness. IMF risks condoning corruption with new loan to Angola. Press release. 5 November 2009.

MPLA Regime No.5

Comrade Fernando da Piedade Dias dos Santos aka Nando

Prime Minister of Angola between 2002 to 2008, then President of the National Assembly, then February 2010 was appointed vice-president of Angola, by private choice of Dictator Josй Eduardo dos Santos

In the familiar circle of Comrade Jose Eduardo dos Santos he is seen as the better person who would protect them in adverse times. He is one of the rarest figures of the Regime that in the absence of Comrade Dictator Jose Eduardo dos Santos, would guarantee inner stability, in 1992 during the war with UNITA he was the guarantee of stability in person. He is respected because he had the merit to overthrow the Dissident General Fernando Miala who he was his mortal enemy.

In the inner hard side of the nucleus of the Regime the are scared of him, and rumours about that with him, “he it will be worse than the Comrade Dictator Jose Eduardo dos Santos”. People in his inner circle do not think that Jose Eduardo dos Santos is grooming him to replace him.

He hopes that one day he will be the “Constitutional Substitute” to the Presidency. He has become lately a switched of political figure, fact that disturbs him to bits. He no longer seems to be received by the Dictator. He has made know via third parties to the Dictator Jose Eduardo dos Santos that he doesn’t enjoys his new political situation. His office is where it functioned the old Prime Minister Paulo Kassoma. The Regime wanted to transfer him to a new office near to the Presidency, in an office next to the Ceremonial Office but he refused.

He is one of the principal shareholders of the African Bank of Investments "Banco Africano de Investimentos" (BAI).

Mr Nando has also other businesses he owns a Ranch and he owns a Water Company which is managed by his sons, he also moves in the areas of real estate and construction.

MPLA Regime No.6

Comrade Carlos Feijу

He is part of the doves faction in the Regime. He is in practice the figure who has in fact taken in the role of running the executive administration. He is not a member of the Political Bureau of the MPLA Party but participates in the meetings in the quality of “invited” of the Comrade Dictator Jose Eduardo dos Santos has the Dictator makes a point in introducing him in such capacity.

The Provincial Governor and the Ministers of the Social Departments and of Economy report directly to him, this makes of Comrade Carlos Feijу a figure in a superior position than that of the Vice-President of the MPLA Communist Regime. He has become the main individual in the investment policies in Guinea-Bissau a major hub in Africa for the Narco Trafficking.

Company created by Simon Junior, its current president is Jose Leitao, former head of the Civil House of the Presidency. Account among its shareholders with the lawyer Carlos Feijу. Activity: supermarkets, cinemas, private clinic, shareholder of Coca-Cola Angola, partnerships with South African companies and Chinese.

Comrade Paulo Kassoma is the one on the left with the glasses.

Comrade Paulo Kassoma

He is constitutionally the third person in the State. He is referred as the person that more consensus gathers inside of the inner thought centre of the Regime He has no inner enemies at present. Comrade Dictator Jose Eduardo dos Santos nurtures strong admiration for him and recognizes in him a sense of humility.

In the eve of the Fraudulent Elections of 2008 where the Regime gained 80% of the votes after 37 Years in Power, and the economy, the country totally destroy by corruption and terrible management and total neglect by the unelected Communist Regime. Comrade Dictator Jose Eduardo dos Santos visited the region of Huambo having become “amazed” by what he had seen. At night on his return to Luanda he called him on the phone to inform him of his desire of making him his next Prime Minister of Angola. One of his best friends is the Vice-President “Nandу”. They studied together in the school of Sгo Domingo when they where kids.

In European circles of intelligence Comrade Paulo Kassoma his seen as one of the possible substitutes for the Dictator Jose Eduardo dos Santos to the Post of President of the Republic, but he has yet to give signs of his desire for such a post in the Regime

MPLA Regime No.8

General Antуnio Josй Maria

He is the Chief of the Military Intelligence Service (SIM). He has the power of influence next to Comrade Dictator Jose Eduardo dos Santos in relation to military matters. The Generals have no sympathy for him. He is the Senior Officer of the Armed Forces that has mostly shown obedience to the wimps of the Regime, and is therefore the source of his power (a perfect ass licker “general”).

In 1992 e became an enemy of Fernando “Nandу” in regards to the assassination by the MPLA Regime of Adolosi Paulo Mango Alicerces the Secretary General of UNITA, Adolosi was his colleague when studying in the Huambo Higher Seminary, and during the war took refuge in his house. He was the mentor for the promotion of the Regime Dissident General Fernando Miala. In 2006 he had serious differences with Comrade Kundy Paihama.

He has already threatened Sebastiгo Martins the Chief of the MPLA Regime Secret Service SINFO.

He has influenced the dismissal of the ex Chief of the Armed Forces Comrade General Francisco Furtado and also responsible for the dismissal of the ex Commander of the Second Military region Comrade General Jack Raul and his both assistants of the Military Intelligence Service SIM Comrade General Zй Grande and Comrade General Joгo Massano.

He has also made animosity with Comrade General “Kopelipa”. In short he is a member of the Regime that imposes order in the Generals.

MPLA Regime No.9

He retains much influence in the south part of Angola where the population assume that he is their man that represents them in side of power. He is the individual in which Comrade Dictator Jose Eduardo dos Santos seeks no fights with. When the MPLA Regime was forces by the international community to end the one party only policy he was one of the Regime personalities who people fought he would leave the MPLA party to start his own party.

Since then Comrade Dictator Jose Eduardo dos Santos started to pay more attention to him and to his Native Ovimbundos.

Kundy Paihama visiting reclusive Regime of North Korea

Comrade Kundy Paihama is an equal partner in the Investment Group Angola Casinos (Casinos de Angola) the Complex is calculated in US $3,5 millions Dollars. One of the equal partner of the Investment Groups is a foreigner which is hiding from prosecution and police in Europe, his where about are unknown. Comrade Kundy Paihama promised (January 2012) that he will sort things out in order to became the majority share older partner.

Comrade Kundy Paihama has a taste for expensive and luxurious watches he bought a $50,000 USD watch and made it public. Now he says in his own words "that the trick is to keep the mouth shut, he can not say and he cannot buy what he likes".

MPLA Regime No.10

Comrade Roberto Antуnio Victor Francisco De Almeida

Chairman of the National Assembly

Date of Birth: 05/02/1941, Place of Birth: Kaxicane, Icolo e Bengo Ethnicity: Mbundu

Career: Director General, Foreign Affairs Ministry, 1975; Minister of External Trade, 1976; Coordinator, MPLA Urban Committee, Luanda, 1978-79; Deputy President of National Assembly, 1980; Secretary, MPLA ideology sub-committee, 1982; MPLA representative for Biй Province, National Assembly, 1992; President, National Assembly, 1996 to date.

Commentary: A member of the MPLA old guard, Roberto De Almeida has built up a formidable business and political network. With good contacts in Europe, especially in Moscow, he has also developed ties with some French-speaking former activists of Holden Roberto’s Frente Nacional de Libertaзгo de Angola (FNLA).

He his the Vice-President of the Communist MPLA Regime party.


MPLA Regime No.11

Comrade – Juliгo Mateus Paulo aka Dino Matross

Secretary General of the MPLA Party. He has importance for having been Minister of Security, for which reason even by not being active he can be called to give advise on sensitive matters. His political power of influences remains next to the Administration of State.

MPLA Regime No.12

Comrade Joгo de Almeida Martins aka “Jъ”

His power is in the MPLA party. He is presently the ideological architect of the MPLA policy, and he operates like a specie of Vice-president in the shadows. From this apreciation is why they call him the little “Lucio Lara”. In party matters his vision is always taken into consideration by Comrade Dictator Jose Eduardo dos Santos. No decision is taken without his knowledge first.

The inner circle of the MPLA Regime acknowledge him with political wisdom. Party leaders state in informal circles that in the lack of Comrade Dictator Jose Eduardo dos Santos, Comrade Jъ can maintain the Regime together. His adversaries for the post of President are “Manuel Vicente” and “Nandу”. While both of this individuals fight the succession struggle Jъ Martins is laying down the foundations for the succession.

Comrade General – Higino Carneiro

After the Dictator Jose Eduardo dos Santos Comrade General Higino Carneiro is the Richest Henchman of the Regime of the MPLA.
In 2009 he had a small fight with “Kopelipa” concerning labour matters. He was one of the ministers that was more involved with state matters. He accompanies Comrade Dictator Jose Eduardo dos Santos to all his foreign trips.

In October 2010 Comrade Dictator Jose Eduardo dos Santos invited him to the post of Governor of Luanda, but he refused saying that he only accepts that post if he can have his own powers for the job and without any interference from central power. He has acquired illegitimately like the rest of the Members of the MPLA Regime an amazing personal fortune, and he is the political figure that more supports the MPLA Party. He is responsible for moving $200USD million dollars from INEA to the MPLA campaign in 2008.

CABUTA ORGANISATIONS
"Holding set up by General Higino Carneiro, Minister of Public Works and governor of Kwanza Sul and family. Activity: agriculture, agro-industry, hotels, tourism, banking, insurance.

From the endless list of Businesses he has 12 hotels dispersed in the territory of Angola, has big haciendas (Cabuta Hacienda is one of them), he owns Banks (Bank Keve and Bank Sol), he owns an aviation company with a fleet of 14 light aircrafts called Air Services, which recently was in talks to start flights between Sao Paulo, Brazil and Luanda, etc.

Puma Air
He was a Partner with the Brazilian citizen Gambogi de Souza, the company was based in Brazil a Puma Air.

MPLA Regime No.14

Comrade Aldemiro Justino de Aguiar Vaz da Conceiзгo

He is the political figure of the MPLA that exercises political coercion over the Media in Angola. His puppet is Luis de Matos the National Director of Information. He has the job of assessing Comrade Dictator Jose Eduardo dos Santos in making him read all political happenings in Angola.

One of his known assess is his capacity to manipulate public opinion. He is presently in the Military House managing the Office of Psychological Action and Information. He his in charge of overseeing all of the Regime Propaganda.

MPLA Regime No.15

Cвndido Pereira dos Santos Van-Dъnem, Minister of Defence

MPLA Regime No.16

Miguel Maria Nzau Puna
a.k.a. o "Porco" e "Traidor"

Miguel Nzao Puna is also known by is nick name "Porco" (The Pig) and "Traidor" (The Traitor), it was this Pig who was at one time the Secretary General of UNITA, and Miguel Maria Nzau Puna was instrumental in the betrayal of Dr. Jonas Malheiro Savimbi location and personal security, which lead to the massacre and assassination of Dr. Jonas Malheiro Savimbi. A native born of Cabinda, thus the Noble and Glorious Cabinda Patriots wipe their arses with this communist, treacherous pig.

The Pig alias the Traitor Miguel Maria N`Zau Puna among other things served as the ambassador of the MPLA Regime to Canada from September 28, 2000 to 2008.

MPLA Regime No.17

Eduardo Leopoldo Severim de Morais

Minister of Finance

Finance Minister Eduardo Leopoldo Severim de Morais, who succeeded Josй de Morais in 2008.

MPLA Regime No.18

Antуnio Domingos Pitra Costa Neto

Minister of Public Administration, Employment and Social security

Antуnio Domingos Pitra Costa Neto is partner in GEMA a company created by Simon Junior, its current president is Jose Leitao, former Head of the Civil House of the Presidency. Account among its shareholders with the Lawyer Carlos Feijу and Antуnio Domingos Pitra Costa Neto, vice-president of MPLA and Minister for Employment and Social and Security.

Activity: supermarkets, cinemas, private clinic, shareholder of Coca-Cola Angola, partnerships with South African companies and Chinese.

Antуnio Domingos Pitra Costa Neto is also partner with Brazilian businessman Valdomiro Minoru Dondo in the company 2000 Empreendimentos.

MPLA Regime No.19

General Bento Kangamba

The name of General Bento Kangamba apears next and connected to the individuals from whom where ceased Millions of Euros by the French Authorities. General Bento Kangamba is member of the Presidential Family, he is married to Avelina Escуrcio dos Santos, who is the daughter of Avelino dos Santos, the eldest brother of Josй Eduardo dos Santos.

He is the President of the Kabuscorp Football Club in Luanda, among other things he is the Secretary of the Provincial Committee of Luanda of the MPLA Party for the organization and mobilization in the rural and periphery areas of the capital city of Luanda.

MPLA Regime No.20

General Leopoldino Fragoso do Nascimento

"The US $ 750 Million Dollar Man"

How a Swiss commodities giant used shell companies to make an
Angolan General three-quarters of a Billion Dollars richer

By Michael Weiss @ foreignpolicy.com
13 February 2014

Revolutionary communist regimes have a strange habit of transforming themselves into corrupt crony capitalist ones and Angola — with its massive oil reserves and budding crop of billionaires — has proved no exception. In 2010, Trafigura, the world’s third-largest private oil and metals trader based in Switzerland, sold an 18.75-percent stake in one of its major energy subsidiaries to a high-ranking and influential Angolan general, Foreign Policy has discovered.

The sale, which amounted to $213 million, appears on the 2012 audit of the annual financial statements of a Singapore-registered company, which is wholly owned by General Leopoldino Fragoso do Nascimento. Details of the sale and purchaser are also buried within a prospectus document of the sold company which was uploaded to the Luxembourg Stock Exchange within the last week. "General Dino," as he’s more commonly called in Angola, purchased the 18.75 percent stake not in any minor bauble, but in a $5 billion multinational oil company called Puma Energy International. By 2011, his shares were diluted to 15 percent; but that’s still quite a hefty prize: his stake in the company is today valued at around $750 million.

The sale illuminates not only a growing and little-scrutinized relationship between Trafigura, which earned nearly $1 billion in profits in 2012, and the autocratic regime of 71-year-old Angolan President Jose Eduardo dos Santos, who has been in power since 1979 — but also the role that Western enterprise continues to play in the Third World.

Despite a boom in its oil revenue over the last few decades, and dos Santos’s own declared zero-tolerance campaign against corruption, Angola has yet to implement any meaningful development programs for a citizenry of 14 million, many of whom still live in poverty. "Angola is incredibly compelling from a human rights point of view partly because of the corruption and the fact that this is a government that has the resources to respond to the needs of its people and to fulfill the huge economic and social and cultural rights and yet is not doing so," said Leslie Lefkow, the deputy director for Human Rights Watch’s Africa Division. Meanwhile, Trafigura has spent the last several years cultivating lucrative commercial interests in Angola and buying up shares in at least seven different companies, ranging from real estate to cargo shipping.

Unsurprisingly, it has assiduously pursued investment in Angola’s oil sector, according to Marc Gueniat, the senior researcher at the Berne Declaration, a Swiss NGO that monitors corporate transparency. (The group is named for the 1968 accord signed by scholars and intellectuals calling for more equitable business practices in an increasingly globalized economy.) "I am not aware of any other country where one company has such a dominance on the oil imports as Trafigura has in Angola," Gueniat said. "It effectively has a monopoly to supply petroleum products in the country. What sense does this make from an Angolan perspective?" Gueniat has extensively documented the curious arrangement between Trafigura and the dos Santos regime, including deals that directly involve General Dino, whose actual legal ownership of former Trafigura assets was previously unsubstantiated although suspected.

In a February 2013 Berne Declaration report titled "Trafigura’s Business in Angola," Gueniat found that the commodities trader, which is the third-largest company in Switzerland in terms of money brought in "seems to have committed itself to agreements in which the risk is high that the distinction between public and private interests becomes confused." Most of Trafigura’s investments in Angola have been managed through a Singapore-registered company called DTS Holdings, also known as the DT Group.

The two directors of this entity are General Dino and Claude Dauphin, a French billionaire who helped found Trafigura and is today its chief executive officer. As the Berne Declaration noted: "While DTS Holdings is involved infrastructure, logistics and real estate, it is oil where the majority of its revenues are generated. The group is party to a swap contract, which may be one of the largest in the world.

They export unknown quantities of Angolan crude and in return, since 2009, have been supplying Angola with all of the oil-derivative products required to meet domestic demand." DTS Holdings’s monopoly on oil-derivative products has proved remarkably lucrative. In 2011, DTS Refining — the subsidiary responsible for controlling the company’s contract with the Angolan state — was valued at $3.3 billion. Trafigura’s investments tend to involve or enlist the so-called "triumvirate" of regime officials who oversee large swaths of the Angolan economy.

Angolan Vice President Manuel Vicente, said to be dos Santos’s anointed successor, as well as the former CEO of Sonangol, Angola’s state oil company, is one member of this triumvirate. Another is Gen. Manuel Helder Vieira Dias Junior, also known as "General Kopelipa," who is now the chief of the Security Intelligence Bureau of the Presidency, a national security agency. Kopelipa is widely considered to be the most powerful man in the country, and the only real rival to President dos Santos’s influence. That makes his deputy, the third man in the trio, extremely well placed: General Dino, formerly the head of communications for the Angolan presidency and then General Kopelipa’s special advisor. He was appointed to this role in September 2010 by in a presidential decree which was heralded in Diario da Republica, the state newspaper of Angola. Whether he’s still formally in this role is somewhat unclear.

Trafigura, in a statement, noted that "Leopoldino Fragoso do Nascimento is a leading Angolan business man and a long standing partner of Trafigura and holds no current position in the Angolan Government." But the Angolan journalist and watchdog Rafael Marques de Morais counters, "When ranking officials are dismissed or resign, the president must publish his decision in the daily gazette. Also, as a general he should have been retired from the army to be able to take a private job." Regardless of his position now, the Berne Declaration makes clear that he was indeed General Dino at the time Trafigura "befriended" him, which may account for how he managed to buy a nice chunk of one of its most valuable assets.

Here’s how it happened. In 2010, a Singapore-registered company known as Cochan Pte Ltd. invested approximately $213 million in cash and in kind to purchase an 18.75 percent stake in Puma Energy International, a company acquired by Trafigura in 2000. Headquartered in Singapore and claiming to "bring secure, safe and affordable fuels, lubricants and other oil products to millions of business and retail customers every day," Puma Energy International is in the business of supplying, storing, refining, and selling petroleum-based products. It employs 6,000 people in over 30 countries, operates 1,500 gas stations, and has regional offices from Puerto Rico to Australia.

The investment in that 18.75 percent stake was made via Cochan Pte’s Marshall Island-registered holding company, Cochan Holdings LLC. Cochan Pte’s sole shareholder is an entity known as Cochan Ltd .– this one registered in the Bahamas, an offshore tax haven much sought for its corporate secrecy laws. In 2011, owing to an enlargement of shares in Puma Energy International, Cochan Pte’s 18.75 percent stake was diluted to 15 percent. It was not at the time disclosed, however, who the ultimate legal beneficiary was of the Bahaman parent company.

That mystery has now been solved thanks to Cochan Pte’s financial statements for 2012, which were audited by global accounting firm Ernst & Young, copies of which have been obtained by Foreign Policy, and by a newly published prospectus document which corroborates the audit. The owner of the Bahaman Cochan is none other than General Dino, making him the owner of Cochan Pte (in Singapore) and now the sole owner of 15 percent interest in Puma Energy International. "Where did a general get $213 million dollars to invest?" asks Arvind Ganesan, the director of the Business and Human Rights Program at Human Rights Watch. Another question asked by anti-graft monitors contacted by Foreign Policy is how General Dino managed to enrich himself so extravagantly in such a short period of time, and through a transaction with one of the world’s largest commodities trader.

Yet General Dino wasn’t the only one to gobble up shares in in the oil company. In 2011, Trafigura also decided to sell another 20 percent stake of Puma Energy International to Sonangol Holdings LDA, a holding company of Sonangol, the Angolan state oil company. This transaction apparently satisfied both buyer and seller because, as the Financial Times reported last November, Trafigura sold an additional 10 percent interest in Puma Energy International to the Angolan state oil company for $500 million. That means, that as of this writing, 45 percent of a $5 billion multinational is owned by either the dos Santos regime or General Dino. But that’s not all.

The Ernst & Young audit of Cochan Pte further discloses that General Dino owns 50 percent of DTS Holdings. If this company’s subsidiary, DTS Refining, was valued at $3.3 billion in 2011, then General Dino’s half interest in DTS Holdings is likely worth a small fortune today. Combined with his stake in Puma Energy International, he is almost certainly an on-paper billionaire, again raising the question of how he obtained the initial capital to make such remunerative investments. Foreign Policy contacted Trafigura for comment. A spokesperson for the company, Victoria Dix, emailed back confirmation of the sale as well as General Dino’s ownership of Cochan.

Dix quotes from a prospectus document for the bond issued by Puma Energy International in January 2014, which does indeed name General Dino as the ultimate owner of the Bahaman entity. However, that prospectus is only available on the Luxembourg Stock Exchange website and was only uploaded on Feb. 3, 2014. There was no mention of General Dino’s direct ownership of Cochan in any public press statement linking him to this much-scrutinized transaction four years ago.

The prospectus also confirms that General Dino was appointed a special advisor to Kopelipa in September 2010 but adds that he "no longer serves in such capacity." It does not say when he stepped down from his position or whether or not he currently holds any other active role in the dos Santos government. (As recently as April 2012, the Financial Times referred to General Dino as one of three of the "most powerful officials in Angola.") Nevertheless, the prospectus confirms that General Dino was an active public official in Angola when he bought his stake in Puma Energy International.

Dix declined to respond to Foreign Policy’s question about whether or not Trafigura was concerned that selling a sizable stake in a multinational oil company to an Angolan official, while simultaneously investing in Angola’s publicly owned energy economy, constituted a conflict of interest. Puma Energy’s bond prospectus, though, does seem to address these concerns by stating: "Certain of our direct shareholders, Sonangol, Cochan and Trafigura, and certain of their beneficial shareholders, as well as local partners have in the past or are currently, and may in the future, be the subject of criticism or allegations by the press relating to fraud, corruption, bribery and non-compliance with sanctions, and have in the past or are currently, and may in the future, be subject to investigation by certain regulatory authorities and other governmental and non-governmental entities relating to such matters.

These allegations and criticism can be found in the public domain. Such allegations and criticisms do not relate to their shareholding in or relationship with us." While Trafigura has not done anything illegal in selling its assets to either the government or an Angolan individual, General Dino may have violated his own country’s Law on Public Probity. Passed in June 2010, or about two months after he was named an advisor to General Kopelipa, this law criminalizes the act of a state official "acquiring for [himself] or for another, in the exercise of [his] duties, responsibilities, employment or public function, goods of any nature whose value is disproportionate to the capital gains or income of the public servant." The law also requires those officials to disclose their assets and revenue, and the sources of both, once every two years, although, according to Freedom House, the "dominant interpretation of the law is that the president, vice president, and president of the National Assembly are exempt from this requirement."

General Dino is no stranger to corruption allegations within and without Angola. He currently features in a still-pending U.S. federal investigation into the activities of an American oil company.

Along with General Kopelipa and Vice President Vincente, General Dino is a shareholder in Nazaki Oil & Gas, an Angolan enterprise that partnered with the Texas-based Cobalt International Energy, a U.S. concern whose main shareholders are Goldman Sachs and a joint energy fund controlled by the Carlyle Group and Riverstone Holdings, an American private equity firm. In 2009, Cobalt received licenses to operate two deepwater blocks in the Angola seabed thought to contain large reservoirs of recoverable oil.

Cobalt’s original investment was $500 million in 2005, but, as the Angolan journalist Rafael Marques de Morais points out in a comprehensive study titled, "The Angolan Presidency: The Epicentre of Corruption," this was roughly the same amount that Sonangol itself had previously invested in the Carlyle Group and Riverstone Holding’s joint energy fund. In other words, he claims, the money that private U.S. enterprise was investing in Angola actually already belonged to the Angolan people.

Interestingly, in 2011, Cobalt further admitted that it’d been made aware of a "connection between senior Angolan government officials and Nazaki." But the Texan oil company chose to go ahead with the deal anyway. In November 2012, the U.S. Securities Exchange Commission and the Justice Department launched an investigation into Cobalt International under the Foreign Corrupt Practices Act, which outlaws U.S. citizens or companies paying bribes to foreign officials. The U.S. government’s suspicions were triggered by Nazaki’s links to the triumvirate of General Dino, General Kopelipa, and Vice President Vincente. The investigation remains ongoing. Cobalt, meanwhile, maintains that it did nothing wrong.

It told the Financial Times in April 2012 that it had "not found any credible support" to corroborate ties between Nazaki and these three Angolan officials. Vincente and Kopelipa also denied that their interests in the company consisted an "abuse of power." Still, the Financial Times disclosures about Cobalt’s ties to General Dino and these other Angolan political figures cost the company close to $1 billion in market capitalization. * * * For its part, Trafigura’s history outside of Angola has similarly merited unflattering attention — quite a lot, in fact, for such a short corporate lifespan.

The commodities trading giant was founded in 1993 following the departure of a number of senior commodities traders — including Eric de Turckheim and current CEO Claude Dauphin — from Marc Rich & Co. run by the eponymous American billionaire who fled to Switzerland in 1983 to evade U.S. federal prosecutors. Rich at that time had been charged with 64 crimes including racketeering and "trading with the enemy," namely Iran. He died last June but not before being infamously pardoned by President Clinton in 2001.

Other Marc Rich & Co. traders left to found Glencore, today Switzerland’s largest commodities trader, which last year merged with XStrata, a Swiss mining giant. According to a 2005 BusinessWeek article, Rich’s own money may have helped to found Trafigura "to expand his empire," although he is thought to have divested at some point. A 2012 bond prospectus put out by Trafigura’s finance subsidiary states that the company, which now has 81 offices operating in 54 countries, and a total of 9,000 employees, is "exclusively owned by over 750 senior employees," although their identities are not stated.

The French-born, 63-year-old CEO Claude Dauphin is widely regarded as Trafigura’s single largest shareholder. A separate 2010 bond prospectus discloses that he owns "less than 20%" of the company. Trafigura was accused of violating sanctions against Iraq in 2001 when it took part in removing 500,000 barrels of oil from the country, according to the 2005 Volcker Report on the abuses and misuses of the United Nations’ "oil-for-food" program. The report found that Trafigura had bought Saddam Hussein’s crude from a Bermuda company known as Ibex Energy — itself owned by a former Marc Rich & Co. trader named Jean-Paul Cayrй.

Trafigura denied having any links to Ibex Energy but, in the end, its Swiss arm, Trafigura AG, was fined $20 million by the U.S. government after pleading guilty to falsifying information about the origins of the oil, which subsequently was sold on to American refineries. In October 2009, the details of confidential scientific report Trafigura had commissioned three years earlier were published by the Guardian showing that the company bore responsibility for dumping tons of toxic waste in Abidjan, the capital of the Ivory Coast and created a public health crisis for tens of thousands of people. Effects ranged from severe burns to the skin and to the lungs; permanent ulceration; corneal damage; vomiting, diarrhea, loss of consciousness and death.

Trafigura, the Minton Report found, had used an amateur chemical reduction process to lower the sulfur quotient in a consignment of cheaply-bought contaminated gasoline; the result led to the creation of a corrosive and poisonous black sludge that was then discarded recklessly by a ship called the Probo Koala. Following this, Amnesty International and Greenpeace launched a three-year investigation into Probo Koala incident, concluding in a lengthy report published in 2012 that Trafigura hadn’t adequately safeguarded against a repeat of toxic waste dumping and calling for the company to be brought up on criminal charges in Britain.

The company’s operations "are essentially run from London," as the Guardian’s David Leigh wrote. Trafigura countered by alleging "significant inaccuracies and misrepresentations" in the Amnesty/Greenpeace study, although it declined to specify what these were. Trafigura had initially tried to keep its pollution of the Ivory Coast hidden from public view, despite a raft of damning internal company emails that were leaked to the press.

Leigh accused the company of engaging in a "massive cover-up" and documented the legal avenues it had pursued which included "launch[ing] a libel case against BBC Newsnight, forc[ing] an alleged correction from the Times, demand[ing] the Guardian delete articles, and. [trying] to gag journalists in the Netherlands and Norway with legal threats." To even publish an article on the Minton Report, the Guardian had to fight a "five-week legal battle." Then, in December 2012, Trafigura again found itself mired in African controversy when Wynter Kabimba, the Zambian justice minister, was hauled before his own country’s Anti-Corruption Commission to account for allegations that the Swiss trader paid Midland Energy Zambia, a company he owned, to facilitate an oil and diesel deal. Trafigura denied that it had ever made any payments to Midland Energy Zambia.

As far as African countries go, Angola is at once a bad place for conducting clean and transparent business transactions and a good place for garnering sweetheart deals with state officials inclined to ignore their own laws and look the other way. Much of Angola’s $114 billion GDP has either gone missing or straight into the pockets of the ruling elite. Transparency International’s Corruption Perceptions Index ranked Angola 153 out of 177 countries in 2013, and the U.S. State Department noted in 2012 that the Angolan "business environment remains one of the most difficult in the world.

Investors must factor in pervasive corruption, an underdeveloped financial system, poor infrastructure and extremely high on-the-ground costs." Last year, Isabel dos Santos, the president’s 40-year-old daughter, was declared Africa’s only female billionaire, and the continent’s youngest, with a net worth of $3 billion, according to an article in Forbes.

Perhaps most famously, between 2007 and 2010, the International Monetary Fund found that $31.4 billion had disappeared somewhere along the way from Sonangol to the government’s bank accounts. Even though the dos Santos regime later claimed to have accounted for 85 percent of the money in "losses," Sonangol is still seen as the "personal ATM of the government," according to Human Rights Watch’s Arvind Ganesan, who has spent 15 years studying corruption in Angola. "The fundamental problem in Angola with oil money is that, as the second largest oil producer in sub-Saharan Africa, there should be enough revenue to make Angola a model of development around the continent and really around the world," says Ganesan. "But that doesn’t happen.

The reason is that the dos Santos government is opaque in how it uses the funds." Instead, the richer the dos Santos regime becomes on oil revenue, the more it cracks down on dissent and oppositional activity. Rafael Marques de Morais, the muckraking journalist who has anatomized the triumvirate’s dodgy commercial involvements, now faces possible jail time — for what, exactly, he’s never been informed. "I’ve been indicted now to go to court, but after 8 months of investigations and questioning, I was never allowed to see a word on the charges against me," he told Foreign Policy. Even minor challenges to the authoritarian status quo are met punishingly.

In October 2013, for instance, 17-year-old Manual Chivonde Bapista Nito Alves, who’d been arrested a month earlier for ordering T-shirts that read, "Out Disgusting Dictator," was tossed into solitary confinement and kept for weeks without access to lawyers, family, or doctors. (Under Angolan law, juveniles may not be kept in pretrial detention, much less solitary confinement.) Nito Alves is now the first citizen to be charged under a 2010 state security law which prohibits "insulting" the Republic of Angola.

The lesser insult, apparently, is making dos Santos’ cronies exorbitantly rich at the expense of the people whose lives they are meant to better. In a speech delivered before the PMLA in 2009, President Dos Santos condemned "[i]rresponsible people, people of bad faith, [who] have taken advantage. to squander resources and to carry out illicit and even damaging and fraudulent acts of management." General Dino, it seems, has yet to be included in this category.

ANGOLA: A Family run business

The Private Government of Mr. Josй Eduardo dos Santos and his Family

Josй Eduardo dos Santos Dictator of Angola since 10 September 1979 – present

Josй Filomeno de Sousa dos Santos aka Zenu son of the Dictator Josй Eduardo dos Santos, was nominated a member of the Council of Administration of the Petroleum Fund (Fundo Petrolнfero) of the State Oil Company SONANGOL by presidential order Nє 19 /2012. He is also the executive vice president of the Administration of the Bank Kwanza Investment (Banco Kwanza Investimento). He is being groomed by his father the Dictator to be a presidential candidate in the election period after 2017. As chairman of the new Fundo Soberano de Angola (FSDEA), Josй Filomeno de Sousa dos Santos is mandated to get the US$ 5 billion sovereign fund off the ground. Dos Santos represents a new round of leaders managing sub-Saharan Africa’s sovereign wealth. Dos Santos was a former board member of Banco Kwanza Invest, an Angolan investment bank. Son of the Dictator of Angola he was born in 1977 from Jose Eduardo dos Santos second wife Luнsa Perdigгo Abrantes.

Eduardo Santos nephew of the Dictator Jose Eduardo dos Santos was nominated a member of the Council of Administration of the Petroleum Fund (Fundo Petrolнfero) of the State Oil Company SONANGOL by presidential order Nє 19 /2012.

Afonso Van-Dъnem M’Binda. Minister of External Relations 1985-1988 is the Husband of Luzia Inglкs Van-Dъnem who was the leader the MPLA Ruling Party Woman’s Organization until 2011 and which is now the President of the National Electoral Commission of Angola

Cвndido Pereira dos Santos Van-Dъnem. Minister of Defence is a cousin of the Dictator Josй Eduardo dos Santos, and Kopelipa Minister of State and Chief of the Military House, and Josй Vieira Dias Van-Dunem Minister of health.

Carlos Alberto Lopes

Carlos Alberto Lopes Finance Minister, brother-in-law of the Dictator Josй Eduardo dos Santos.

Fernando da Piedade Dias dos Santos ‘Nandу’ Vice-President of Angola, from 2010 – present; Speaker of the National Assembly 2008-2010; Prime Minister 2002-2008, he is cousin of the Dictator Josй Eduardo dos Santos

Fernando Josй de Franзa Dias Van-Dъnem Prime Minister 1991-1992; 1996-1999, cousin of General Manuel Hйlder Vieira Dias ‘Kopelipa’

Isabel dos Santos. daughter of the Dictator Josй Eduardo dos Santos; investor; owner of key mobile phone operator and bank, the richest woman in Angola

Josй Vieira Dias Van-Dъnem

Josй Vieira Dias Van-Dъnem. cousin of General Manuel Hйlder Vieira Dias ‘Kopelipa’ Minister of State and Chief of the Military Bureau of the Presiden t

Josй dos Santos da Silva Ferreira

Josй dos Santos da Silva Ferreira . is the head of the super ministry which oversees Chinese contracts and projects

Luzia Inglкs Van-Dъnem

Luzia Inglкs Van-Dъnem ex-Secretary General of OMA, the women’s mass movement of the ruling party MPLA, and now President of the Angola National Commission, she is the wife of Afonso Van-Dъnem M’Binda who was the Minister of External Relations 1985-1988

Lionidio Ceita
President of the Administration Council of the State Water Company EPAL, Mr. Lionido Ceita is the Brother of Ana Paula dos Santos Wife of the Dictator Josй Eduardo dos Santos

– Manuel Domingos Vicente chairman and chief executive officer of Sonangol, Angola’s state-owned oil company, he is son-in-law of the Dictator Josй Eduardo dos Santos

General Manuel Hйlder Vieira Dias ‘Kopelipa’ Minister of State and Chief of the Military Bureau of the President, cousin of Dictator Josй Eduardo dos Santos.

Pedro de Castro Van Dъnem. 1942-1997 Minister of External Relations of Angola 1989-1992; Minister of Public Works and Urban Affairs 1992-1997

– Antonio dos Santos Franзa aka “Ndalu”

casamento da filha do general Antonio Franзa “Ndalu”, ocorrido sexta 9 March 2012 in portugal. O correio da manha, num artigo assinado por Sofia Rкgo realзa que Ana Paula dos Santos, mulher do presidente de Angola, Josй Eduardo dos Santos, deslocou-se a Portugal para assistir ao casamento de Irina Franзa, prima da famнlia. Na festa, que se realizou no hotel Penha Longa, em Sintra, e juntou parte da elite angolana, nгo faltaram luxos.

Convidados ficaram hospedados em luxuoso palбcio

A noiva, cantora e filha do general Antфnio dos Santos Franзa “Ndalu” e da ex-embaixatriz de Angola nos EUA Maria Joгo Jardim, deu o nу com Sйrgio Pugliese (um dos directores da petrolнfera BP em Angola), numa cerimуnia que contou com cerca de 600 convidados. Irina chegou com uma hora de atraso, аs 17h30, numa charrete, vestida de branco pйrola e a acenar aos convidados, entre eles, a ministra da Agricultura de Portugal, Assunзгo Cristas (que nasceu em Angola), Sнlvia Rizzo e Romana.

Segundo a media portuguesa o general “Ndalu” e a esposa Maria Joгo Jardim sгo realmente grandes e poderosos anfitrхes em Portugal, tudo para poder receber com carinho e muito luxo a comitiva de convidados vips de vбrias nacionalidades, inclusive do Brasil, de onde veio grande nъmero de amigos para prestigiar o casamento de Irina Jardim Franзa e Sйrgio Pugliese.

A primeira-dama de Angola, Ana Paula dos Santos, veio a Portugal para assistir ao enlaceFranзa “Ndalu” acomodou os hospedes do casamento da num fantбstico palбcio que virou hotel, o Seteais, da poderosa cadeia Tivoli, que possui os mais luxuosos hotйis pelo mundo.

O Seteais merece comentбrio. afinal, ele й mais que um hotel de cinco estrelas, й um luxuoso e romвntico palбcio que nos transporta para o requinte da arquitectura do sйculo XVIII. Ele estб localizado na encosta de uma serra, vila Patrimуnio com vista para o castelo dos Mouros e o Palбcio da Pena.

Para alйm da primeira dama angolana, Ana Paula dos Santos e o general Joгo de Matos que foi o padrinho do noivo estiveram tambйm como convidados figuras destacadas como o General Pedro Neto, a deputada Вngela Braganзa e o seu esposo, o ministro dos assuntos parlamentares, Norberto Santos “Kwata Kanawa”, o ex- embaixador em Portugal, Rui Mingas, o ex- Ministro do Interior, General Roberto Leal “Ngongo”, o ex- SG do MPLA, Joгo Lourenзo e a sua esposa Ana Dias Lourenзo. Na vertente cultural, esteve Mъsico Coreon Du, o rapper PM e sua noiva Telma Escorcio e o produtor Gil Inglкs radicado nos Estados Unidos da America.

– General Bento Kangamba

The name of General Bento Kangamba apears next and connected to the individuals from whom where ceased Millions of Euros by the French Authorities. General Bento Kangamba is member of the Presidential Family, he is married to Avelina Escуrcio dos Santos, who is the daughter of Avelino dos Santos, the eldest brother of Josй Eduardo dos Santos.

He is the President of the Kabuscorp Football Club in Luanda, among other things he is the Secretary of the Provincial Committee of Luanda of the MPLA Party for the organization and mobilization in the rural and periphery areas of the capital city of Luanda.

List of the Richest Men of the MPLA "Nomenklatura"

The New rich MPLA Regime bets in Business

I miss Angola and from Angonotнcias and other sites to learn of the generals that enabled me to move quite at ease throughout the territory during the war, arrived only in areas where the mercenaries, soldiers. and, worse, where people were attacked by the military and where assassinated without having no one to turn to. It continues to find unforgivable that the international community, because of the wealth that prey on the MPLA Angola, did not press the organisation of free elections in the country.

‘Invest in Angola is now the currency of our rich’ says the ‘Weekly Angolense. The newspaper, which caused scandal in 2004 with the publication of the richest men listed the "nomenklatura" Angolan, again loading two weeks ago with a "portrait" of private groups that proliferate in MPLA Angola, to lift the ‘boom’ economic and confesses intention of the government to stimulate domestic private groups and to enter into strategic sectors such as banking, oil or diamonds.

The Director of the ‘Weekly Angolense ", Graca Campos, admits that the list is not exhaustive and does not support a thorough investigation. They are the ‘business’ giving that talk and that illustrate the importance of political lobbying activities and’ desire ‘for foreign investors to form partnerships with political figures of the regime or their relatives. With the proper salute to the ‘Weekly Angolense ", that is, in short, from A to Z, the portrait of private groups more’ exciting ‘of today in Luanda.

ARMINDO CЙSAR & SONS
In the beginning was the Maboque, company specializes in catering, hotel and "Catering. It is said that counts among its shareholders with family members of Comrade Dictator Jose Eduardo dos Santos and a pleiades of generals. But in the last five years the group grew and multiplied itself. Activity: the earlier, more fishing (catch and marketing), hotel and tourism, real estate, trade (hypermarket Interpark), training and services.

INTERNATIONAL BANK CREDIT (BIC)
Isabel dos Santos, first born daughter of Comrade Dictator Jose Eduardo dos Santos, and Portuguese businessman Americo Amorim (25%) are the main shareholders. Created in June, has already opened 13 branches (8 in Luanda) and raised more than 165 million dollars in deposits.

COMMERCIAL BANK OF ANGOLA (BCA) BANCO COMERCIAL DE ANGOLA (BCA)
It includes among its shareholders three former MPLA Regime prime ministers: Lopo do Nascimento, France Van-Dъnem and Marcolino Moco. Solomon Xirimbimbi (Minister of Fisheries), Augusto Thomas (former Governor of Benguela, former Minister of Finance) and businessman Jaime Freitas (COSAL, Interauto, Tecnomat) are the other members. In 2005 sold 50% of the shares to Absa Bank of South Africa, which in turn was bought by Barclays Bank, the United Kingdom.

CABUTA ORGANISATIONS
"Holding set up by General Higino Carneiro, Minister of Public Works and governor of Kwanza South and family. Activity: agriculture, agro-industry, hotels, tourism, banking, insurance.

FINANGEST
Among the shareholders are listed Josй Pedro de Morais, Ex-Minister of Finance (December 2002 to October 2008), General Pedro Neto, chief of General Staff of the Air Force, and Kundi Paihama, Minister of Defence. Activities: games and lotteries, publishing record, transport, services, construction, "import-export ‘insurance, security.

GEMA
Created by Simon Junior, its current president is Jose Leitao, former head of the Civil House of the Presidency. Account among its shareholders with the lawyer Carlos Feijу and Antуnio Domingos Pitra Costa Neto, vice-president of MPLA and Minister for Employment and Social and Security. Activity: supermarkets, cinemas, private clinic, shareholder of Coca-Cola Angola, partnerships with South African companies and Chinese.

GENI
Companies in the sectors of banking, oil, diamonds and construction thrive as’ boom in MPLA Angola. The starting point was the creation of UNITEL (mobile telephone) in partnership with aPortugal Telecom. Founders: Isabel dos Santos, Brig Leopoldino Fragosodo Birth (Head of Communications of the Presidency), Anthony Van-Dъnem (former secretary of the Council of Ministers) and Manuel Augusto da Fonseca, the bureau’s legal Sonangol. Joined them to the Franco-Brazilian businessman Pierre Falcone. Activity: telecommunications and services.

GENIUS
Created by General Joao de Matos (ex-chief of General Staff General of the FAA) and Mбrio Pizarro (former Governor of the BNA). The crown jewel of the group is GEVAL-Angola Joint-venture with the Brazilian Vale do Rio Doce, No. 1 worldwide for mining.
Activity: mining (diamonds, manganese, others). Projects: electricity, telecommunications. Participations: Torres of Caramel (Luanda), Fine Shopping Centre

IMPORБFRICA-IMPORCAR
Faustino Muteka former Minister of Administration of Territory and current secretary of the MPLA Party for the mobilisation is the figure-of-bow of the group, which are associated with capital from Portugal to India. Activity: construction, agriculture, trade, sale of cars, real estate.

In the photo the Angolan actres Lesliana Pereira, the Brazilian Xuxa, and the Valdomiro Minoru Dondo

MACON
Revolutionized the public transport in Luanda (buses and taxis). Hйlder Vieira Dias, head of the Military House of the presidency and director of the Office of National Reconstruction, Brig Leopoldino Fragoso and Julio Bessa, former Minister of Finance, in partnership with the Brazilian native with Angolan citizenship Valdomiro Minoru Dondo are members-founders.
Activity: transport, trade (the Shopping Centre Kinaxixi is "stuck" for two years).

Note on the dark activities of Mr. Valdomiro Minoru Dondo
In 2010 the Brazilian Federal Police discovered his name in a dark operation with an Official of the International Airport of Rio de Janeiro which has now been dismissed.

XAVIER MELLO
There is much that Mr George Mello Xavier by MPLA in 1992 ceased to be ‘the entrepreneur of the regime "but remains active, influential and irreverent.
Activity: construction, tourism, hospitality, beverage, agro-industry,

PECUS
Created by Portuguese group Tecnocarro, Jose Rйcio, was sold to brothers Anthony and Luis Faceira.
Activity: production and marketing of meat, which leads sector.

PRODOIL
Associated to the Amec Paragon (Houston, USA). Between Angolan partners quoted Marta dos Santos, elder sister of the Comrade Dictator Jose Eduardo dos Santos.
Activity: Exploration and Production of Hydrocarbons, oil, natural gas, services, hotels.

SAGRIPEK
Capital divided between a group of partners Angolans (BAI, GCP, Banco Keve, Higino Carneiro, Mello Xavier, Faceira brothers, Isabel dos Santos), which owns 51% and a Brazilian consortium.
Activity: agriculture, livestock, agro-industrial production.

SOMOIL
First private company to enter the Angolan oil exploration. Founded by Desidйrio Costa, Minister of Petroleum, and Alberto de Sousa. Activity: oil and derivatives (lubricants)

SUNINVEST
Directed by Ismael Diogo, Consul of Angola in Rio de Janeiro and President of the FESA (Eduardo dos Santos Foundation).
Activity: pharmaceutical industry (partnership with the Laboratory Teuto of Brazil), urban transport, waste removal (Luanda), trade.

VALENTIM AMХES
He came to Luanda from the Central Plateau, which has a large property and controls much of the trade. He joined the Central Committee of MPLA in 2004 and among its members include the General Fernando Miala, the information services outside of the presidency.
Activity: road and air transport, hotel and tourism, ‘rent-a-car’ trade.

SECURITY
The security companies deserve to be treated separately, as it was by way that many MPLA generals first entered in business and acquired the capital that allowed them highest flights. They are now the hundreds, more or less sophisticated, and provide all kinds of services, from the safety of the premises personal escorts, transport of funds and installation of monitoring systems. The ‘Weekly Angolense "highlighted the following:

ANGO SEGU
Company pioneer in industrial safety. Its founding the generals Fernando Miala and Josй Maria and Santana Andrй Pitra (Petroff) former Minister of Interior and Commander-General of Police.

ALFA 5
Created by General Joao de Matos and other generals and officers. It controls 50% of the safety of large areas of exploitation of diamonds.

TELESERVICE
Monopoly security of oil fields. Its founders were the generals Joao de Matos, France Ndalu, Armando da Cruz Neto, and Antonio Luis Faceira and Hendrick. Investments in Air Gemini, the Lumanhe Company (diamonds) with Escom, linked to the Group Espirito Santo.

COPEBE
Created by Pedro Hendrick Vaal Neto (former minister of social communication), Roberto Leal Monteiro "Ngongo" and Nelson Cosme, ambassador of Angola in the Organization of Central African States.

Valdomiro Minoru Dondo
Became rich with Businesses in Angola

Valdomiro Minoru Dondo, is a Brazilian Business man who became rich with the Socialism of the Angolan market, he did not made the miracle alone. He is the owner of a conglomerate of more than 20 companies, which the solitary client is the MPLA Regime itself, he is the partner of at least 5 local authorities, including regime leaders without portfolio, who made millionaire contracts with him.

But the relation with power goes further. In Brazil Minoru has negotiated at least 3 buildings for Angolan leaders and their families members.

His wife, Agla Dondo, is personal friend of Ana Paula dos Santos, wife of Josй Eduardo dos Santos, the dictator who has has hold the grip on power for the last four decades which Minoru has businesses.

Considered a myth in Angola Minoru gets annually an officially $4.5 Million USD in profits from public contracts, in Brazil he is known for the extravagant birthday parties of his wife, in one of these parties he send to make a giant cake in the shape of a Louis Vuitton hand bag.

In the businesses of Minoru, there are no limits between public and private.

Has a physical person he is partner of Pedro Sebastiгo Teta, vice Minister of Science and Technology of Angola, in the company Jъpiter; he is partner of brigadier Leopoldino Fragoso, Dino, in the company Supermar; he is partner of the sister of the first lady of Angola, Artemнsia Cristina Cristуvгo de Lemos, in the company Bob’s; he is partner again of Leopoldino Fragoso, in the company Tilбpia Psicultura; he is partner of Pitra Neto, Minister of Work and Social Security of Angola, in the company 2000 Empreendimentos; he is partner of the Chief of the Military House of the Presidency of Angola and Director of National Reconstruction of Angola, General Manuel Hйlder Vieira Dias, o Kopelipa, in the company Medicamentos e Cosmйticos (Medicine & Cosmetics) he is partner of Prenda; and also, has juridical person (by Midras), of the ex-Minister of Finances Josй Pedro de Morais (December 2002 to October 2008), in the Company Gesa Health.

Minoru is also the 3rd largest shareholder of the BNI Bank, this Bank has in its social composition again the ex Minister of Finances Josй Pedro de Morais (December 2002 to October 2008), and the Ex-Chief of Armed Forces and General of the Army Joгo de Matos and the President of the National Assembly, Paulo Kassoma, represented by his daughter, Kanda.

Hб oito anos, Josй Pedro de Morais e o ex-governador do Banco Nacional (o Banco Central daquele paнs) Amadeu de Jesus Castelhano Maurнcio (demitido em 2009) foram favorecidos com 21 remessas do Trade Link Bank (uma offshore nas Ilhas Cayman), procedentes do Brasil, no valor total de US$ 2,7 milhхes.

Pelos extratos bancбrios obtidos com a quebra do sigilo bancбrio da Trade Link nos Estados Unidos, durante as investigaзхes sobre o valerioduto, a offshore fez 20 remessas no valor aproximado de US$ 2,6 milhхes para contas de Morais entre 2003 e 2005. As remessas variaram de US$ 76 mil a US$ 360 mil. Os documentos oficiais registram que, sу em 2003, a Trade fez 12 transferкncias para o ex-ministro, no valor de US$ 1,4 milhгo. Os recursos saнram de uma conta do Trade Link, no Banco Standard, em Nova York, e seguiram atй uma conta em nome de Morais no Banco Internacional de Crйdito (BIC), em Lisboa, Portugal.

Nos extratos da offshore, consta tambйm uma remessa de US$ 176 mil para Amadeu Castelhano, entгo a mais alta autoridade monetбria de Angola, no dia 12 de marзo de 2002. O dinheiro saiu da conta da Trade no Standard, passou pelo Banco Africano de Investimentos e, depois do giro, voltou a uma conta em nome de Amadeu, no Citibank, em Nova York.

Minoru й prуximo de ambos. De Morais, й sуcio em dois negуcios. Jб os cartуrios de registro de imуveis do Rio revelam que, em 30 de janeiro de 2004, o empresбrio comprou de Antфnio Jacinto Castelhano (parente de Amadeu) as sobrelojas 207 e 208 do edifнcio situado na Avenida Presidente Vargas 590, no Centro.

Nos anos 1990, revela ainda a pesquisa nos cartуrios cariocas, Minoru fez dois negуcios com Sebastiгo Basto Lavrador, outro ex-governador do Banco Nacional: em novembro de 1997, o empresбrio foi procurador de Maria Fernanda Noguera Alcвntara Monteiro Lavrador (mulher de Lavrador) na compra do apartamento 301 da Praзa Ataualpa 86; dois anos depois, em 9 de julho de 1999, o empresбrio vendeu para o prуprio Lavrador a sala 201 do bloco 10 da Avenida das Amйricas 500, na Barra, com direito a quatro vagas de garagem.

Em Angola, Minoru jб foi acusado de fazer negуcios com o Ministйrio da Saъde, a Casa Militar, o Ministйrio das Finanзas e vбrios governos provinciais, supostamente transferindo os recursos para empresas suas situadas em paraнsos fiscais, como Ilha da Madeira, Ilhas Cayman, Suнзa e Miami. Mas as investigaзхes ordenadas pelas autoridades locais nada constataram atй hoje.

O escвndalo mais recente, divulgado pelos meios de comunicaзгo independentes, atingiu a Midras, unidade do grupo VMD (a holding de Minoru) para a бrea de medicamentos. Para disfarзar a grande concentraзгo de recursos e de contratos nas mгos de uma ъnica empresa (a Midras), Minoru teria criado mais de uma dezena de filiais para receber os recursos federais, sustentou a denъncia.

Como ocorre com as empresas de Minoru no Brasil, que recebem recursos do BNDES para atender аs encomendas do governo angolano, a Midras teria captado emprйstimos em bancos de vбrias partes do mundo, especialmente da Europa, em nome do Ministйrio da Saъde, para fornecimento de medicamentos para a rede pъblica hospitalar.

De acordo com a denъncia, o emprйstimo й originalmente concedido а Neofarma, do grupo VMD, comeзando assim um efeito cascata destinado a disfarзar o desvio de parte do emprйstimo. Na etapa seguinte, a Neofarma encomenda a compra a outra empresa de Minoru, a Nova Бfrica, que ficaria com parte do lucro. Mais empresas completam essa cadeia, atй garantir que uma fatia do emprйstimo se perca no caminho.

A pioneira das mais de 20 empresas de Minoru em Angola й a Macon, criada para explorar os transportes coletivos no paнs, atй entгo limitados a tбxis (lotada) e caminhonetes. Em reportagem sobre os investimentos do governo central em grandes "elefantes brancos", cuja utilidade й duvidosa, a "The Economist" citou que foram comprados trкs mil фnibus, mas o paнs sу tinha na ocasiгo 1.500 motoristas.

A ъltima manobra de Minoru teria sido a aquisiзгo da empresa DGM, que cuida do desenvolvimento de sistemas de pagamento de benefнcios para o Instituto Nacional da Seguranзa Social. A DGM teria sido comprada pela Angola Prev em junho. Suspeita-se que o governo esteja preparando a compra da DGM por US$ 500 milhхes, muitas vezes mais do que o seu real valor: a avaliaзгo feita por uma empresa brasileira foi desqualificada por uma instituiзгo financeira internacional.

From Mr. Valdomiro Minoru Dondo website

International businessman Valdomiro Dondo applies his entrepreneurial acumen in both his professional and charitable endeavors. Under the auspices of his executive work with Brazilian firm Midras Group, L.L.C. Dondo has spent two decades fostering a powerful connection between Latin America’s largest country and the East African province of Angola. In addition to bolstering general economic and cultural transfusion between the two regions, Dondo’s firm has been instrumental in encouraging a significant Brazilian audience presence at the Miss Angola contest. His work with Midras Group also supports a strong Angolan market for Brazilian daytime television.

Valdomiro Dondo began investing in Angola when its economy opened in 1992, while the country struggled under a decades-long civil war. Rather than focusing solely on the region’s explicit business interests in the form of diamonds and oil, Dondo set out to establish critical inroads for Angolan infrastructure, including the region’s first urban transportation program. In addition to major installations in the healthcare, technology, and retail sectors of the country, Dondo helped found Angola’s stock exchange. He also instituted language programs to help Angolan businessmen communicate with their largest investors, the Chinese.

Education on several vital issues has proved an essential ingredient in Valdomiro Dondo’s ongoing mission to improve Angola’s healthcare and human services. Entrenched superstitions surrounding such issues as hygiene, medicine, and gender roles have made it difficult for human aid services to establish the type of systems needed to help equalize rights and provide care for Angolan natives. Consequently, the charitable organizations working in the region emphasize instruction and information, in addition to the provision of relevant resources. Dondo’s beneficiaries in this sector include projects supporting dental health, advanced prenatal care, and vaccinations against malaria and other infectious diseases endemic to the area.

Estoril Sol Residence

Luxury Complex in the sea front of the city of Estoril in Portugal

The Minister of Administraзгo Pъblica, Emprego e Seguranзa Social, Antуnio Domingos Pitra Costa Neto, й dono de cinco apartamentos na Torre Baнa, no 3.є, 5.є, 7.є, 9.є e 14.є andares, estando os primeiros quatro em nome da sua filha Katila Pitra da Costa, estudante.

Pitra Neto deverб ser o prуximo presidente da Assembleia Nacional, depois das eleiзхes de 31 de Agosto 2012, conforme cogitaзхes emanadas da presidкncia de Josй Eduardo dos Santos.

Tanto no 9.є como no 14.є andar, o ministro Pitra Neto tem como vizinhos o casal "Kopelipa". Fбtima Geovetty, a esposa do ministro de Estado e chefe da Casa Militar, general Manuel Hйlder Vieira Dias – Kopelipa, adquiriu dois apartamentos.

O fiel escudeiro do general Kopelipa nos seus negуcios privados, Domingos Manuel Inglкs, fica a meio, no 12.є andar.

Na torre ao lado, Cascais, o principal gestor de negуcios um tanto obscuros do general, o portuguкs Ismкnio Coelho Macedo, desfruta da grande vista para o mar, com um apartamento no 4.є andar. Outro comprador extraordinбrio й o ex-ministro das Finanзas, Josй Pedro de Morais, com quatro apartamentos, tambйm na Torre Baнa, no 1.є, 2.є, 4.є e 5.є pisos.

Por sua vez, o brasileiro Valdomiro Minoru Dondo, tambйm portador de nacionalidade angolana, tem um apartamento no 11.є andar da Torre Estoril. Valdomiro Minoru Dondo tem cruzado negуcios com o general "Kopelipa", Josй Pedro de Morais, Pitra Neto, a famнlia presidencial e outros influentes membros do Regime. A sua formidбvel capacidade para o trбfico de influкncias conferiu-lhe o interessante tнtulo de estrangeiro mais rico de Angola. Por sua vez, outro brasileiro, associado a Minoru Dondo e a dirigentes angolanos, Gerson Antуnio de Sousa Nascimento й dono de um duplex, na Torre Estoril, no 6.є e 7.є andares.

O sуcio e representante legal de alguns negуcios de Welwitchia – Tchizй? dos Santos, Walter Virgнnio Rodrigues, demonstrou que os negуcios lhe tкm corrido de feiзгo e comprou um apartmento no 8.є andar da Torre Estoril.

Como celebraзгo do contrato multimilionбrio realizado entre o Ministйrio da Comunicaзгo Social e a empresa Westside Investments para a gestгo privada do Canal 2 da Televisгo Pъblica de Angola (TPA), a sуcia maioritбria, -Tchizй? dos Santos, agraciou-o com um bуnus de US $500 mil, enquanto a filha do presidente atribuiu-se, a si prуpria, com fundos do erбrio pъblico, um prйmio de um milhгo e meio de dуlares. Outro angolano que faz parte do selecto grupo de proprietбrios do Estoril Sol Residence й o antigo director da Endiama, Noй Baltazar.

Apesar dos preзos, os angolanos, regra geral, compram vбrios apartamentos, de forma ostensiva. Algumas das aquisiзхes levantaram suspeitas junto das autoridades judiciais portuguesas que, para o efeito, abriram inquйritos. Um dos inquiridos, por suspeita de branqueamento de capitais, foi o presidente do Banco Espнrito Santo Angola (BESA), Бlvaro Sobrinho.

A 2 de Setembro de 2010, Бlvaro Sobrinho adquiriu seis apartamentos no referido complexo, tendo, inicialmente, pago o valor de 9,5 milhхes de Euros, segundo investigaзхes do Diбrio de Notнcias.

His brothers Sнlvio and Emanuel Madaleno are also the owners of 3 more apartments in the Complex of Estoril Sol.

Kimberley’s Illicit Process

By Khadija Sharife and John Grobler

ANTWERP—Somewhere between Africa’s diamond mines and the dazzling diamond bazaars of Dubai and Antwerp, a Belgian company called Omega Diamonds has constructed a financial triangular trade, where at least $3.5 billion worth of diamond profits simply vanished between 2001 and 2008. And, if Belgian investigators are to be believed, there was little anyone could do about it. Not only did Dubai authorities deliberately turn a blind eye to questionable corporate practices of tax evasion and systematic under-invoicing—“tax optimization" being the preferred term—but the Dubai Multi-Commodities Center (DMCC) leadership appears to have actively blocked investigation by other governments. Instead of being busted and black-balled from the industry, Omega Diamonds, owned by two of the largest industry players, was handed a get-out-of-jail-free card.

While Brussels would claim a major victory on march 14, 2013, after levying a fine of $195 million on Omega Diamonds—the biggest-ever imposed on a Belgian enterprise—the company and at least two of its principals would escape any other sanction. Ironically, a few days earlier, Omega’s former attorney Koen Geens was appointed as Belgium’s minister of finance, putting him in charge of tax investigators—the very office that was prosecuting his former clients.

But a year earlier, Omega’s main shareholder, Ehud “the Argentine” Laniado, sold all his property in Belgium, and according to the industry intelligence newsletter Rough & Polished. took up residence in the tax haven of monaco, beyond the reach of the Brussels tax inspectors. His partner, Sylvain Goldberg, appeared to have moved his operations to Switzerland and Israel—the former a major tax haven, the other, not exactly known for cooperating with foreign tax authorities. Both men remain members in good standing of Antwerp’s venerable Diamond Bourse, whose officials declined to comment on the Omega settlement.

Undoubtedly, Omega was able to beat the system because of its particularly complex web of illicit activities. In short, Omega’s illegal diamond trade linked countries in central Africa to Omega subsidiaries in Dubai and, ultimately, Antwerp. Employing corrupt African autocrats and money-hungry businessmen, Omega would purchase diamonds of questionable origin for little to no money in Angola, the Democratic Republic of Congo, and Zimbabwe. They would then ship the diamonds to Dubai, where they would be given certificates of mixed origin—legal under the Kimberley Process definition—and subsequently over-value the worth of those diamonds. From Dubai, the diamonds would be sent to Antwerp, where they would be sold on the biggest diamond market for more than their actual worth. The money gained from those sales would finance the personal bank accounts of Omega and many of the corrupt characters they employed in their tri-continental scheme.

A three-month investigation into the efficiency of the international agreement designed initially to combat blood diamonds, known as the Kimberley Process Certification Scheme (KPCS). reveals that one of the most effective tactics enabling the continued looting of Africa’s mineral resources is the practice of under-invoicing the value of diamonds through subsidiary companies, based in jurisdictions providing legal and financial secrecy, like Dubai. This maneuver alone has managed to subvert and cleanse several billion dollars worth of African diamonds of questionable origin. And although Omega agreed to pay the fine that Belgian tax investigators had imposed as part of an out-of-court settlement, it has denied all guilt.

These jurisdictions are often Kimberley Process-certified, enabling tax havens to act as transit countries for diamonds, serving the purpose of removing the origin of diamonds through certificates of mixed origin. But the root cause of the problem does not lie in the ineffectiveness of the Kimberley Process as a monitoring mechanism for actual conflict diamonds. It lies in the Kimberley Process’s commendable goal of removing the stain or reputation of “conflict” from diamonds, through a process of certification. Subverting this process requires narrowly defining the concept that now frames rebels as the sole source of conflict in Africa, which still produces at least 65 percent of the world’s production of raw, uncut diamonds. So the cleansed Kimberley Process diamonds, produced in African countries that have not been subjected to violence but which may be ruled by venal autocrats, have augmented the personal wealth of these nations’ rulers. Certified as 99 percent conflict-free, they may then be used to produce vast profits for a handful of individuals and families. This mechanism is only just coming into focus thanks to a series of court proceedings in Europe.

By 2007, when the first investigations leading to these proceedings were just debuting, Dubai had become a $35 billion-a-year juggernaut that, by virtue of its lax tax laws, secrecy, and its position straddling the old world of diamonds, represented by Antwerp and the new world of Mumbai and Shanghai. Players like Goldberg and Laniado had already spotted opportunities that a tax haven and diamond hub like Dubai offered. To understand how the Kimberley Process helped Dubai grow into what Britain’s Scotland Yard believes is the world’s largest entrepot for diamond and gold smuggling, it’s only necessary to understand what the reigning Dubai Diamond Council had hoped to achieve—and the myriad of unintended consequences that resulted.

Antwerp was the world’s leading diamond trading center and home to the World Diamond Council. As early as 2000, the World Diamond Council was working to protect its position in an industry where much of the world’s diamonds passed via Amsterdam’s Pelikaanstraat at the heart of their Diamantkwartier. Getting everyone to play by the same rules was critical to protecting Antwerp as home to the 500-year-old diamond cutting and trading business, while fending off threats posed by upstarts such as Tel Aviv’s Ran Gamat and, to a lesser extent, Dubai and Mumbai.

Dubai’s rise to preeminence may be traced in a barely straight line to 1992, when the beleaguered government in Luanda, the center of barely-legal diamond mining, was facing a loss of control over most of the Angolan hinterlands to UNITA. The government, led by UNITA’s rival MPLA, hired a group of former South African soldiers who styled themselves as Executive Outcomes (EO) to, at first advise, and later assume operational command of their military campaign against UNITA. Heavy arms, gunships, and specialized tracking technology—all expensive—would be needed to bring an end to the murderous campaign of Jonas Savimbi, the leader of UNITA. To fill that increasingly pressing need, the Luanda regime turned to a coterie of Russian-Israeli arms and diamond dealers, namely Sylvain Goldberg, Pierre Falcone, Arkadi Gaydamak, and Lev Leviev. And eventually, to Dubai. But not before the Kimberley Process sought to throw a monkey wrench into their business.

The Kimberley Process Certification Scheme (KPCS) was designed in 2003 to “keep diamonds tainted with violence out of the international trade,” and was supposed to be limited to the activities of rebel groups in diamond-producing nations of Africa—largely Angola and Zimbabwe. But the $800 billion Marange diamond field in Zimbabwe, looted through a web of politicians, the army, and opaque companies, was beyond the reaches of the entire Kimberley Process. Instead of bringing to its knees the trade in Zimbabwe’s “blood diamonds,” named for the brutality and looting by President Robert Mugabe’s political and military thugs, their operations continued to be financed by these very diamonds.

Various forms of violence, from physical to economic and social, fall outside of the Kimberley definition, including acts perpetrated by those who control the state and their corporate partners. As one cable, originating at the American Embassy in Belgium and disclosed by Wikileaks, states, “Belgium very recently has begun to take steps to monitor the flow of Zimbabwe-sourced diamonds through Antwerp’s Diamond Office … but those involved in the Zimbabwean illicit trade were savvy enough to mingle diamonds with those from other countries such as the DR-Congo, and then send them to other diamond trading centers in …Dubai where they could receive legitimately-issued Kimberley certificates that indicated the source was ‘mixed,’ and then be sent on to Antwerp.”

“What can we do in the face of this?” asked Chindori Chininga, chair of the Zimbabwean Parliamentary Portfolio Committee on Mines. “What is the value of the KP certificate if it comes from places that are also tax havens?” referring to Dubai’s ability to issue mixed origin certificates, eliminating the sources entirely. Chininga, considered a moderate Zimbabwe politician and member of the ruling ZANU party, cautioned that fingering those responsible for establishing or profiting from this corrupt system won’t work if the corruptors are never held accountable. “We must ask who the system is really working for,” said Chininga, who served as Zimbabwe’s minister of mines from 2000 to 2004. Several days after an interview with the authors, Chininga, who headed an investigation into the economic activities of diamond companies, was killed in a car accident ahead of forthcoming elections. At his funeral, some family members claimed he was murdered.

Intelligence dossiers authored by Zimbabwe’s notorious Central Intelligence Organization (CIO) would later reveal that six ZANU moderates including Chininga were “to be stopped,” and that elections were being rigged with the help of two African presidents, one of them Joseph Kabila from the Democratic Republic of Congo. Finally, according to these documents, money and diamonds were passing from African presidents and businessmen from Zimbabwe through to Dubai, Angola, and China. According to a South African Supreme Court document, including a judgment delivered in September 2011, the system works very well for companies like Omega. This document outlines how the company had effectively operated a massive transfer-pricing scheme through Dubai:

“Omega imported diamonds from Angola and Congo through an associated company in Dubai into Belgium. Omega ordered the shipment of diamonds purchased in Angola and Congo in accordance with the legally required Kimberley certificates, for delivery … in Dubai. The diamonds were packed in small parcels. Upon arrival in Dubai the small parcels were retained but repacked into larger parcels, containing diamonds from both Angola and Congo, without physically mixing the stones. Thereafter the new shipment of diamonds was provided with a new Kimberley Certificate indicating that the shipment emanated from the United Arab Emirates and marked ‘diamonds of mixed origin.’ The new shipment was issued with a new invoice … addressed to Omega wherein the value of the diamonds was increased.”

According to the seized invoices, the increase in value, from Dubai to Antwerp, was estimated at 20 percent to 31 percent. For each shipment, a new price list and a mixed origin Kimberley Process certificate were attached. Omega had systematically under-valued diamonds from Africa via their Dubai-based trading company, Tulip FZE, run by Vivian Hawkins-Green, sister-in-law to Laniado. The company then increased the value when exporting from Dubai to their Antwerp-based entities. This was done by taking advantage of the Kimberley practice of allowing non-producing diamond trading countries like the United Arab Emirates to mix diamond parcels as needed and then issue their own certificates of mixed origins, enabling Dubai to omit the real origins of diamonds—in this case, Zimbabwe, whose diamonds were initially banned from international traffic by the Kimberley Process. By becoming a member of the Kimberley Process, tax havens like Switzerland and Dubai legitimately obtain the right to obfuscate the origins of African diamonds. The entire system rests largely on the integrity of African diamond producing and exporting governments, diamond dealers, and conduit countries like the United Arab Emirates. The goal is to prevent blood diamonds, synonymous with Angola’s former rebel movement, UNITA, or Zimbabwe, from entering the international diamond trading chain.

The dubious strategy of under-invoicing was used by Omega, which had exported an average of at least $1.2 billion of diamonds every year between 2001 and 2008—$10 million per month from the Democratic Republic of Congo and $100 million per month from Angola. David Renous, a former Congo-based diamond buyer for Omega, claimed that a substantial number of these diamonds were under-valued and declared neither
in Angola nor the DRC.

Renous told Belgian and American investigators that this systematic under-declaration was done with the cooperation of key Angolan elites, including longtime President Josй Eduardo dos Santos. and was part of an elaborate scheme to compensate at least one arms trader, Arkadi Gaydamak, for rearming Josй Eduardo dos Santos’s party, between 1992 and 1998, and in defiance of UN sanctions on Angola’s protagonists. The arms, all of Russian design and East European origin, were supplied in violation of UN arms sanctions. But the arms dealers and other facilitators needed to be paid. In a conflict-ridden, cash-poor country like Angola, hard currency, especially in large quantities, is quite difficult to obtain. Along came diamonds and their merchants.

Gaydamak’s payoff was to become a silent partner in Omega’s monopoly with the Angolan government. Israeli diamond magnate Lev Leviev, active in Angolan diamonds since 1998, would be the principal financier. The Tulip FZE, Renous claimed, “generated profits. The profits could either be reinjected into the system to grow the capital, or used as desired. [Gaydamak] laundered funds legally. Nobody knew about it.” The system, Renous told investigators, not only allowed Gaydamak to launder his arms wealth outside of Angola through diamonds—an easy-to-access hyper-mobile resource, but also allowed mass profiteering from the value of diamonds. These were sold at rock bottom prices to Gaydamak’s own subsidiaries abroad.

But the alleged money-laundering, under-invoicing, and tax avoidance in Africa, all illicitly taking place under the umbrella of Kimberley Process-certification, were not the problems investigated by the Belgian court. The fraud lay in the fact that Omega and tulip then sought to avoid taxes in Belgium. In fact, Omega never officially kept more than two percent of the profits, in a valiant effort to sidestep taxes payable on such profits. Three of Omega’s connected entities including evaluation company MDC, as well as trading companies DexDiam and MBD, would trade the diamonds—on paper— and send cash onward to various bank accounts largely based in tax havens, such as Luxembourg, Dubai, and Switzerland. Other players in the operation are alleged to have included several Dubai-based diamond merchants, since all the profits would ultimately stay in Dubai. And all the companies, Renous claimed, were under the control of Laniado. Dubai is one of the top three diamond trading hubs, rivaling such historic centers as Antwerp.

There is little doubt why the Belgian investigators closed the file on a four-year-long investigation that stretched from Antwerp to Africa and the Middle East. Tax havens like the Kimberley Process-certified Dubai ensured the paper trail would lead to multiple dead ends. Prosecutors could not prove Omega benefitted from over-invoiced sales from Dubai to Antwerp. As the U.S. Embassy cable from Brussels, released through Wikileaks, quoted an investigator stating, “It’s like our fax line was directly connected to their shredder [in Dubai]." The eerie silence from the UAE in response to official requests for information was answer enough.

Dubai is one of the top three diamond trading hubs, rivaling such historic centers as Antwerp, and the world’s leading cutting and polishing hub, Mumbai. Dubai’s Almas towers, the tallest commercial building in the Middle East, is said to house more than 1,000 diamonds dealers, as well as 300 international and regional companies. In 2003, KPCS was inaugurated in the UAE by the ministry of economy, naming the Dubai Multi Commodities Center Authority (DMCC) the sole point of entry and exit for diamonds in the country. The Financial Secrecy Index (FSI), assessing the UAE’s opacity, ranks it at 80 percent, or “the top end of the secrecy scale." All of which has made Dubai a prime global transit point for diamonds of all provenance, described by Nick Shaxson, author of Treasure Islands, as “one of the filthiest spots on the planet.” And that has nothing to do with hygiene.

“Because of the Kimberley Process certificates, the diamond dealers did not want to ship the diamonds directly from their African buying offices to the market,” says one leading Belgian government diamond investigator, who requested we withhold his name for fear of political reprisals. “The shipments were diverted to the UAE (Dubai). The certificate and invoice was then changed to a desired price and then shipped to a trading center. This way the evaluation office in the trading center received a shipment of rough diamonds with a UAE Kimberley Process certificate ‘origin: mixed or unknown,’ and with a value close to the market price. The full purchase amount, as mentioned on the invoice, is transferred and diverted to different accounts all over the world, private accounts or accounts of individuals. In the bookkeeping, all transfers are attributed to the UAE supplier. It may be clear that the UAE as a transit point was only created to produce ‘new’ documents in order to mask the origin of the diamonds and to create a possibility to divert the payments.”

In another American embassy cable released by Wikileaks, former CEO of the Dubai Diamond Exchange (DDE), Noora Jamsheer, claimed that the Kimberley Process system in Dubai was corrupted, and that she was offered commissions to turn a blind eye. In 2007, she resigned because she was “unwilling to make compromises and overlook suspicious shipments of diamonds.” According to the cable, concerning one suspicious shipment, “In September 2006,… Ahmed bin Sulayem, DDE Chief Operating Officer, authorized the release of this shipment.” The Kimberley Process certificate from Ghana was not properly authenticated at the time of its release. As the court cable continued, “Jamsheer believes that Dubai and the UAE are being very short-sighted by not stringently abiding by the KP protocols. She thinks that the desire to make Dubai a hub of the diamond trade is the motivation for a willingness to gloss over some suspicious transactions.”

SETTING UP OURSELVES

In an attempt to gauge how quickly and easily layers of secrecy could be accessed for companies intent on under-invoicing commodities, we contacted Vandort Consulting and Intuit, two leading firms facilitating DMCC company formation. We explained that our primary purpose was to engage in “tax optimization” strategies for our diamonds, meaning to under-invoice by using different price lists, and to Kimberley Process-certify our diamonds in countries other than the countries of origin. We also requested as much non-disclosure and opacity as possible— nominees, anonymity, banking secrecy, and other layers of secrecy.

In seeking to enlist their help as clients, we told them, “We deal in Zimbabwean, Angolan diamonds. We often obtain KPC in Tanzania, South Africa, and Namibia for lower reputational risks, before exporting directly to our trading center. However, our partners have informed us that tax optimization banking would be better suited for a Dubai-based entity [as recipient of our rough diamonds]. Also, that DMCC can offer us use of mixed origin certification.”

Vandort provided a price list: establishment of a new company or subsidiary ($8,200), a flexi-desk ($4,200) or serviced office ($9,600), professional fees ($4,000), visas ($2,100), bank account ($1,500). There were no rules as to who would occupy the office. the entire process would take four to six weeks to establish. The companies could not operate in the UAE real economy, save through locals. Renewal of the trade license requires financials of the DMCC entity, not the parent company.

We explained how worried we were that artificially reducing our profits, avoiding taxes, or using different lists would result in external penetration of our company’s activities. The most accommodating consultant at Vandort suggested, "If you are worried about privacy of your economic activities for tax optimization purposes, you could…incorporate an off-shore company in, for instance, the British Virgin islands (BVI) which can hold the shares in the DMCC company. The costs to incorporate a BVI company are $2,500 including our costs.” The company informed us that DMCC would require all corporate papers, including beneficial owners, but that there had not yet been any government inquiries. Intuit suggested a more proximate tactic for the additional secrecy layer, using the Ras Al Khaimah (RAK) free zone in Dubai, which allows anonymity of ownership and the ability to protect assets legally from claims by others. It would take just a week to incorporate.

ROOTED IN ARMS TRADE

To understand the full implications for the Kimberley Process’s credibility and the industry’s claim to be its own best policeman, only one key fact is essential. The persons who’ve benefitted most from contributing to UNITA’s destructive 10-year campaign to seize power by way of a diamond-funded war were the very ones who allegedly benefit most from the Omega deal.

UNITA and its late leader Jonas Savimbi, along with former Liberian President Charles Taylor, were among the main reasons KPCS was implemented in the first place—to cut off their movements from financial oxygen.

To place this in its full historical perspective: twenty years ago, UNITA founder Jonas Savimbi angrily rejected his narrow loss to incumbent Angolan President Josй Eduardo dos Santos in UN-supervised elections, re-igniting one of Africa’s most brutal civil wars. In a country blessed or cursed, depending on your perspective—with some of the richest alluvial diamond deposits in the world, buyers from Antwerp were enlisted as financiers of the war.

In 1994, in an effort to deprive Savimbi of his source of cash for weapons, the UN slapped sanctions on all diamond dealings with the rebel leader. Faced with a major crisis of legitimacy and a threatened worldwide boycott of the diamond trade, the world’s largest diamond producer, De Beers, and the South African government initiated the Kimberley Process. Its chief aim was to sever all rebel movements from the formal diamond trade. Between 2001 and 2003, more than 50 countries and over 90 diamond traders formally signed up for the Kimberley Process Certification Scheme—including the government of Dubai, then just a tiny player with little more than $5 million in annual turn-over.

By 1997, the luanda regime found itself trapped. though their military campaign had pushed UNITA out of every major Angolan town, the government’s ability to pay for their mercenaries and expensive military hardware was increasingly constricted. Documents brought to light by the “Falcongate” investigation in Paris implicated the late french President Franзois Mitterrand’s son Jean-Christophe and a clique of top African officials in gun-running and money-laundering. Through this probe, it emerged that Gaydamak—vying with goldberg and leviev for control of Angola’s prolific diamond production—hit on a method that not only circumvented un arms sanctions, but also contributed greatly to undermining the very foundations of the Kimberley Process.

The meteoric rise of Isabel dos Santos. daughter of Angola’s president, to the position of Africa’s first woman billionaire can be traced to this system. First floated by Gaydamak in the mid-1990s, her goal was to create a diamond-buying monopoly, much like De Beers’ scheme in Namibia, Botswana, and South Africa. Her company, TAIS, was set up in 1997 and incorporated in Switzerland for the sole purpose of diamond trading. Two years later, as mercenaries helped the Angolan armed forces establish control of Angola’s prolific Lunda Norte diamond fields, President Josй Eduardo dos Santos decreed that henceforth only ASCorp Ltd—an Omega subsidiary based in Angola—would be permitted to buy and export Angolan diamonds. Total control, with zero accountability, coupled with an official monopoly produces its own set of opportunities—as events in Angola would so clearly illustrate.

By early 2004, these partners took full advantage of the higher legal hurdle set by the newly-created Kimberley Process by dropping the price they would pay officially for Angolan rough diamonds to below $200 a carat, thereby fattening the margin they in turn would make when selling to Antwerp and Tel Aviv. In 2007, the World Bank criticized the practice “based on concerns about special and privileged treatments.” In effect, the Luanda regime actively promoted a scheme that would rob their own country of several billion dollars of revenue lost to Omega—the intermediary that made it all happen.

Omega’s diamond-laundering scheme, a daisy-chain of briefcase companies registered in tax havens, all controlled by either Goldberg or Laniado’s clan, would launder money through blind investment trusts in jurisdictions ranging from Luxembourg to Cyprus. But Omega is just one company in this sordid tale. There are thousands of such companies working the murky world of Africa’s diamond fields. Actual losses to African countries from widespread under-invoicing and other form of illicit activities, according to the UN Economic Commission for Africa (UNECA), could be as high as $200 billion each year.

For their part, since 2011, Omega and the Angolan regime, notably President Josй Eduardo dos Santos, his military, and corporate allies, circumvented potential obstacles by operating out of another tax haven. In Geneva, they were able to continue business-as-usual through acquisition of shares in companies like De Grisogono, founded by the king of black diamonds, Fawaz Gruosi—publicly uninvolved in prior ASCorp dealings.

Not all governments are equal. The difference between diamond-producing countries and non-producing tax havens is vast. The latter provide the legal and financial-secrecy infrastructure enabling illicit activities, while the former struggle to generate revenue for citizens’ needs. But efforts to interdict the trade in rebel-produced diamonds fail to take into account the role of diamond-producing governments. Whether authoritarian, undemocratic, or corrupted, they may be far more pernicious than rebel movements. For unlike rebel groups, these regimes are legitimately accepted as global players—exploiting national resources in the name of citizens, but abusing or diverting national wealth for the profit of their rulers or criminal elements with ties to the leadership.

Alas, most of these activities still take place in a technically legal way within the bounds of the Kimberley Process, using the process to provide a veneer of legality to deeply criminal undertakings. Designed to shut out the violent activities of one specific group—rebel organizations, as a means of protecting revenues of the world’s largest diamond players—it has become a process that merely lubricates this spiral of illicit operations.

Instead, the geography needs to be broadened to include other forms of violence and violations—including economic violence from under-invoicing and tax avoidance; and political and civil rights violence, when harsh authoritarian or one-party state regimes are financed through revenues, facilitating directly and indirectly, cultural, social, and collective violence.

The Kimberley Process definition has enabled a 99 percent clean diamond industry to exist largely because the real violence of the industry is whitewashed, ignored, or excluded entirely from the framework—the criminal portion of which continues to exist entirely on the periphery. In the end, if the Kimberley definition remains limited to rebels, rather than the far broader array of often unsavory players who have forced their way into the industry, violating the letter and spirit of the system, there may be no fundamental way to save the diamond industry. The Kimberley Process as it is currently defined is a system that produces the wrong kind of results.

It would be difficult, if not politically impossible, to reform the Kimberley Process in its current form, particularly as it took the better part of two years to originally negotiate with all the diamond industry players. Still, a few tweaks could help curb the illicit off shore-based trade. The definition of conflict diamonds must be broadened to include economic and political conflicts—rather than simply violent conflicts—underwritten by illicit profits. No country that does not actually produce diamonds should be allowed to issue Kimberley Process certificates, and producing countries governed by authoritarian regimes, or dominated by big corporate players, who refuse to disclose pricing policies to investigating authorities should be suspended from the process. Better policing of the diamond police themselves—the key demand of clean diamond campaigners like Global Witness and Fatal Transactions, which unmet, led to their withdrawal from the negotiations process— appears to be the single most important aspect that could be quickly addressed. Finally, tax havens—including Dubai, Luxembourg, and Switzerland—should be barred from playing any role whatsoever in the diamond pipeline, save as end consumer destinations of diamonds themselves.

To accomplish these changes, of course, would take another injection of good faith from all the original signatories of the Kimberley Process—which, given the abuses and the loopholes that have clearly emerged, should be attainable. And while the stakes are high, if these revisions are not quickly implemented, the Process itself will soon become little more than another failed and empty gesture.

Tulip FZE’s Vivien Hawkins, sister-in-law to Laniado, responded to repeated interview requests stating, “We choose not to be interviewed and accordingly do not want to comment on subjudice matters and reserve our rights to invoke appropriate legal remedies against any public comments on subjudice matters.” Since then, court actions have terminated and a settlement has been reached. Still, Omega Diamonds, including Serge Majer (M.D.C) and Aslan Piha (Margaux) and its listed auditors, WF & Co, failed to respond to repeated interview requests.

Deutsche Bank Luxembourg responded, “Please be informed that banks in Luxembourg are bound by a duty of professional secrecy pursuant to the law dated 5 April 1993 on the financial sector. Based on this duty of professional secrecy, please [accept our] apologies that we are not entitled to answer your request and provide you with any information.”

Neither Angola’s Ministry of Finance, nor Angola’s state diamond companies including endiama and Sodiam, replied to multiple interview requests.

Representatives of the Kimberley Process, based in the DRC, also failed to respond at the time of print. Lev Leviev responded with threats of a lawsuit seeking “substantial damages” for unspecified issues. Attempts to contact Arkadi Gaydamak were unsuccessful. Jamsheer declined to be interviewed.

In Dubai, the Kimberley Process office and its listed head Mariam al-Hashemi were contacted. But the request was forwarded to the DMCC’s public relations office. Jade Mamarbachi, director of the public relations consultants Brunswick group, responded only by inquiring about the nature of the story, including “who else [we] were interviewing.”

Following several email exchanges, interview requests with the DMCC were denied. We replied “Dubai is both a major diamond trading hub and a tax haven,” central to the illicit activity. Mamarbarchi stated in a subsequent e-mail, “I understand, and they know that. I have gone through it with them. This is their stance.”

Corruption MPLA Soviet style Regime is a pervasive phenomenon

C orruption in the MPLA soviet style Regime in Angola is a pervasive phenomenon, hindering economic growth and government-sponsored liberalization programs.

1970s and 1980s

The Soviet press, despite the close relationship between Angola and the USSR, accused the ruling MPLA party of clientelism, corruption, and nepotism, accusing the government of illicitly accumulation US$1 billion. Ogonek said that "corruption has flourished on a scale which is unprecedented even in Africa. the ruling party in Angola. being pro-communist by nature, was ready to sacrifice everything and everybody." [1] 1990s

In April 1999 Gustavo Costa, a journalist for Expresso, wrote an article entitled Corruption Makes Victims, accusing Josй Leita-o, the chief presidential advisor, of embezzling government revenue. Police arrested Costa and charged him with defamation and injury. The Angolan Supreme Court found him guilty, sentencing him to eight-months imprisonment, suspended for two years, and fined him $2,000.[2] Rafael Marques, a journalist and human rights activist, wrote "The Lipstick of Dictatorship," an article criticizing corruption in the Angolan government and President Josй Eduardo dos Santos, on July 3.

The National Criminal Investigation Division (DNIC) questioned him on October 13 for several hours before releasing him. Later that day Morais gave an interview with Radio Ecclйsia and repeated his criticism of the dos Santos government. Twenty armed members of the Rapid Intervention Police arrested him along with Aguiar dos Santos, the publisher of Agora, and Antonio Josй Freitas, Agora staff reporter, on charges of defamation on October 16, 1999. Marques said dos Santos bore responsibility for the "destruction of the country. for the promotion of incompetence, embezzlement and corruption as political and social values."[3][4]

In May 1999 the World Bank threatened to cut off aid to Angola if the government did not take serious steps to counter corruption, beginning with an audit of the petroleum and diamonds industries, Angola’s primary sources of income.[5] 2000s

In 2002 the International Monetary Fund found the Angolan MPLA Regime could not account for more than US$900 million in 2006 due to "extensive corruption". Bestos de Almeida, spokesman for the Angolan Finance Ministry, denied any financial inconsistency existed. [6] Transparency International’s (TI) Corruption Perception Index (CPI) for 2003 found the governments of Angola and Zimbabwe the most corrupt in Southern Africa. On a scale of 0 to 10 with 0 the most corrupt and 10 the most transparent, TI rated Angola 1.8 and Zimbabwe 2.3, some of the highest corruption ratings in the world.
[7]

In 2004, Human Rights Watch found the government could not account for US$4 billion spent between 1997 and 2002.[8] Transparency International ranked Angola 142 out of 163 countries in the Corruption Perception Index just after Venezuela and before the Republic of the Congo with a 2.2 rating.[9] The The Heritage Foundation gave a 47.1% "free" rating in its Index of Economic Freedom in 2008. [10]

Negocios are corrupt business deals in Angola. [11] References

Since 1961 Angola has been at war. First against the Portuguese colonial administration, then since 1975 against the unelected communist dictatorship. When the 50,000 Cuban mercenaries left Angola by 1991, Angola enjoyed over a year of rare peace. Until the UN supervised elections of September 1992. The widespread MPLA fraud surrounding that shameful excuse of an election was followed by the worst outbreak of massacres committed by the MPLA troops ever seen in Angola. In just 3 days MPLA mobs murdered over 10,000 Bakongo and Ovimbundu Natives. The war exploded again with a ferocity never before seen in the region. More people died in the 2 years following "the election" than in the previous 30 years of war which it was meant to end!

Instead of punishing the Marxist MPLA soviet style regime for the electoral fraud and cold-blooded massacres of their opponents, Western governments inexplicably imposed total economic sanctions on the victims – those who supported UNITA. This blockade has prevented even food aid and medicines from being delivered to the millions of people living in Free Angola. So while Western governments continued to sell weapons of mass destruction (including napalm fuel-air bombs) to the MPLA Marxists aparatus in Luanda, they enforced severe sanctions against humanitarian aid reaching the victims of these attacks.

Observers already point to several deficiencies in the election campaigns, such as intimidation of the opposition, tight control over the media, MPLA’s use of oil and diamond resources to buy off political supporters, etc.

The state remains heavily centralised in the office of the presidency, who in several instances has overruled government ministries. Dos Santos governs through an extensive patronage network of friends, MPLA allies and relatives, popularly known as the Futungo. Members of this patronage network. have been provided with attractive positions in the political administration of Angola. This ruling elite enjoys virtually unchecked access to state funds and is widely accused of depriving Angolans of benefits from the lucrative oil deals.

The resource-rich patronage system has resulted in extreme inequalities in Angola, with the United Nations estimating that 70% of the population live on less than US$ 1 a day. This has raised concerns over Angola’s long-term stability. Economic reforms have been limited and the International Monetary Fund (IMF) has raised concerns that economic growth derives solely from high oil prices and not from sectors outside the oil industry.

Public spending is generally high, but low in social sectors (far below its regional neighbours), making public spending highly unsustainable. Each year, large amounts of oil revenues disappear from the state budget through clandestine channels to the ruling elite, and international observers have estimated that more than US$ 1 billion in oil revenues is lost annually.

Public services in Angola are highly inefficient and sometimes non-existent at sub-provincial levels, which are completely dependent on transfers from the central government. Public servants generally compensate for their low salaries by demanding bribes in return for public services, thus spreading corruption to virtually all sectors and levels of society. This pattern is aggravated by the fact that the 18 provincial governments are ruled by powerful provincial MPLA governors loyal to the president.

These individuals administer their provinces as small kingdoms with little interest in broad social and economic development. The ineffective and corruption-plagued public services, especially at the local level, coupled with the non-responsiveness of the Angolan government, has resulted in a loss of political legitimacy for the government, leading several observers to question the sustainability of the fragile democratic process in Angola.

References

^ Light, Margot (1993). Troubled Friendships: Moscow’s Third World Ventures, 77.

^ James, W. Martin (2004). Historical Dictionary of Angola, 41.

DE BEERS A DIAMOND IS FOR EVER

And so it is the MPLA Regime in Angola

In 2010 a further eight kimberlites were added to the De Beers Angolan portfolio bringing the total number to 158 discoveries in the past five years. The Lunda NE concession has yielded the most prospective portfolio at both an early and advanced stage of exploration, with 114 kimberlite discoveries. In 2010 the work programme focused on the deposit assessment phase which was successfully completed on the Mulepe-1 deposit of three adjacent pipes with a combined size of around 20 hectares. 100 carats of diamonds were recovered from these pipes for revenue determination purposes, and Mulepe-1 has now moved to the desktop phase which should be completed in Q2, 2011.

The way and manner in which the MPLA Regime exploits the Lunda State
The following is a list of Diamond Mining sites in the Lunda Region

CATOCA DIAMOND MINING SITE
The Catoca Mine is the world’s 4th largest kimberlite and is currently being operated by SMC (Sociedade Miniera de Catoca), which is in turn owned by Endiama (32.8%), Russia’s Alrosa (32.8%), Brazil’s Odebrecht Mining (16.4%) and the Diamond Finance CY BV Group (18%). The mine produced just over 2.6 Mct in 2001. The kimberlite yields quality diamonds, of which 35% is gem quality, fetching prices of around $75 – $100/carat. Reserves are estimated at 60 million carats. SMC intends increasing production to as much as 5 Mct per year.

This mine site is used by the MPLA Regime to pay its debt to Russia and China, there is strong presence of Israeli firms and personnel at this site also specially in the provision of technology equipment and staff.

LUУ DIAMOND MINING SITE
DiamondWorks, through its wholly owned subsidiary, Branch Energy, has numerous interests in Angola, including alluvial and kimberlite operations. DiamondWorks operated the Luo and Yetwene kimberlite mines. The Camatchia and Camagico diamondiferous kimberlite pipes are also located within DiamondWorks’ license areas. The Luo mine began production in 1997 and has produced almost 200 000ct, with diamonds fetching between $120 and 350/carat. The largest diamond recovered to date has been a 232.6 carat stone. The Yetwene mine began production in June 1998. Exploration activities on this property have been suspended due to the security situation.

DiamondWorks have alluvial concessions in and around the kimberlite operations, including the Luarica property (North of Luo) and the Alto Kwanza property in the Bie province of central Angola. The Alto Kwanza concession is Diamondworks’ largest, with an area of 18 000km2.

In this mine is from where the MPLA Regime operates his financial centre, and provides military and security logistic to beat, intimidate and assassinate the Lunda Tchokwe Native Population.

CAMAFUCA DIAMOND MINING SITE
Southern Era is currently investigating the Camafuca – Camazambo kimberlite pipe in the Calonda area of the Lunde Norte province. Camafuca is estimated to be the world’s largest undeveloped diamondiferous pipe with a surface area of 160 hectares. The pipe is approximately 3.3 kilometres in length and 500 metres in width, and lies 40 kilometres north of the Luo concession on the Chicapa River. Camufuca was the first kimberlite pipe to be discovered in Angola. Recent sampling of the Camafuca pipe yielded just over 1000 carats from a bulk sample of 3 500 m3treated. This represents a significant increase from previous historical estimates. Grades ranged from $126 – $140/carat, with 32% of the diamonds being greater than 1 carat in size and 21% greater than 2 carats.

A feasibility study to evaluate the technical and economic viability of the project is essentially complete and was presented to the Camafuca partners in April, 2000. Plans are to develop the higher grade portions of the pipe first – an exercise that is estimated to cost $14 million. The partners have accepted the feasability study and now plan to move ahead with the development of Phase 1 that intends developing the southeastern part of the kimberlite that contains 6.1 million cubic metres of material at an average grade of 0.18 carats per cubic metre. Mining of Camafuca has been complicated by a major river that dissects the kimberlite – initial mining will utilise dredging methods.

Ownership of the project is outlined as follows: SouthernEra Angola LDA 32%, followed by Endiama 20%, SML 15% and the Welox Limited 33%. Welox Ltd is part of the Leviev Group of companies. In mid 2002, the Angolan Government formally approved the operating agreement and formation of the operating company, to be called Sociedade Mineira do Angola, Lda (SMC).

This mine is the biggest diamond site in the Lunda State it is situated in the locality of Calonda, which provides direct income and revenue to the fortune of the Jose Eduardo dos Santos family. The MPLA Regime never speaks of it in “government”. it is never mentioned, and there exists a total obscurity on the matter.

CAMITONGO SASWAHA DIAMOND MINING SITE
This mine is managed directly by the manager of the Catoca Project, the income of this mine goes to the Regime MPLA elite and cronies, among them people from Sao Tome, Cabo Verde, Guine and Portugal.

PROJECTO LUANGUE DIAMOND MINING SITE
This mine is under the direct control of the MPLA leaders, and its revenue is shared by the top brass of the MPLA Regime, specially the ones committed to the Regime 100%, the Regimes hard liners.

CUANGO ALUVIAL DIAMOND MINING SITE
This mining site is the crown of the Generals of the Armed Forces of the MPLA Regime. In this mining site it is practised slavery acts found in the XVI century world, it is also where anyone and anything is and can be killed no questions asked nor any enquiries will ever exist, people are constantly going missing and disappear in this mining site.

ALTO CHICAPA DIAMOND MINING SITE
This mining site was given to the criolos (individuals) that helped the MPLA Regime gain power in its struggle and war against the Portuguese, it is also know as the centre of enrichment of the dominant families in Angola.

BAIXA DO MINUNGO DIAMOND MINING SITE
The Dictator Josй Eduardo dos Santos, gave the exploration of this mining site to his wife, Ana Paula dos Santos.

LUNGUENA DIAMOND MINING SITE
This mining site is located in the River Lueji a tribute river of the larger River Luangue, this is the site which was given to the MPLA Regime elite in particular the top brass of the SINFO, SIE and the secret services under the Control of the MPLA Regime. This site was set up as the revenue and reward for the loyalty and special services given to the MPLA Regime.

CAZOMBO COPER AND ALUMINIUM MINES
The Regime top brass who have been given the rights to exploit this sites are
General Joгo de Matos and General Led senior officers in the MPLA Armed Forces.

MPLA Generals Colonizing the Lunda, steal their wealth
further evidence of corruption at the epicentre of the MPLA regime Dictator

The corrupt general Kopelipa is also formally represented in the diamond industry, as a shareholder of Lumanhe. On February 13, 2004, a group of six generals had to give, equally, shares in mining company Lumanhe in favour of the current minister of state and head of the Military House of the President. This transfer occurred at a moment of frank rising power of General Kopelipa and its increasing control over the Armed Forces (FAA) and the generals now have seven each from 14:28% of the capital.

The corrupt Generals Armando da Cruz Neto, General Hendrick Vaal Carlos da Silva and General Adrian Mackenzie Makevela remain active at official functions, respectively, as governor of Benguela, the Inspector General Staff of FAA, and head of the Directorate of Primary Education and Preparation of the State Troops General Staff of the Angolan Armed Forces (FAA). The other three generals dedicate themselves exclusively to the business and are the former chief of General Staff of FAA, Chief of Staff and Chief of Army Commands, including Joao de Matos, and the brothers Luis and Antonio Coquette.

Five days after the entry of General Kopelipa corrupt in society, February 18, 2004, Hendrick Vaal General Carlos da Silva, signed as a representative of Lumanhe an agreement with Endiama and ITM Mining for the establishment of the Mining Society Chitotolo. The state, through Endiama, transferred, in this way, 15% of the share capital of the generals Chitotolo. The Lumanhe also owns 21% of the Cuango Mining Society (SMC), in partnership with Endiama (41%) and ITM Mining (38%).

The SMC is responsible for systematic violations of human rights in the village of Cafunfo in Cuango basin, where it has a large mining concession. Killings, torture, destruction of mines, and arbitrary police actions are part of the routine of the Mining Society Cuango against the villagers and miners. SMC enjoys the impunity of the generals who profit from the deal. A new report on human rights in the region is expected shortly.

A European government is also involved with the shady dealings of corrupt generals. This is the Portuguese government. In June 30, 2009, the consortium ITM Mining / Lumanhe terminated their contract operations in Calonda Mining Society, where he maintained a 50% stake, while the Mining Society of Lucapa, which holds the concession for diamond mining, guaranteed the other half actions. The Parpъblica SGPS, a holding company owned 100% by the Portuguese State, controls 81.13% stake in Sociedade Portuguesa de Empreendimentos (SPE), which in turn holds 49% stake in Sociedade Mineira do Lucapa. To the Angolan state has in the Endiama company the majority of the shares.

Jose Eduardo dos Santos a man that had only 2 shirts and a pair of suits. Has it is well remembered in the memory of those who meet and lived with him. Now he has his photo in all bank notes and Identification Cards of each Angolan.

Jose Eduardo dos Santos a man that had only 2 shirts and a pair of suits. Has it is well remembered in the memory of those who meet and lived with him. Now he has his photo in all bank notes and Identification Cards of each Angolan.

37 Million US Dollars in Mr. Jose Eduardo dos Santos bank account

The Bank "Banque Internationale du Luxemburg", in a document signed by its directors A. Roelants, J. Rieter and J. Bodoni declare that the beneficiary and owner of the Panamanian registered Company “Camparal Inc.” with the bank account numbers: 275748 and 275903 belongs to Mr Josй Eduardo dos Santos of Luanda, Angola. Furthermore, the French police confirms that COMPARAL of Josй Eduardo dos Santos represented in Paris by Mr Elнsio de Figueiredo. And in the bank account of COMPARAL (of Mr Eduardo dos Santos) the balance is USD$ 37,112,567.46

The company TUTORAL (registered in the name of Elнsio de Figueiredo) has USD$ 7,331,199.53

Mr. Pierre Joseph Falcone owner of the Bank Accounts 01-88-126279-03 and Acc.45885 of the Bank Leumi Le-Israel Geveva, Acc CO-325794 of the Bank UBS Geneva and of the Bank account 1.038.915 of the Bank Ferrier Lullin & Cie in Geneva has deposited USD $59,954,664.00

This moneys came out from the State Company SONANGOL of its Account CO-101457 Escrow Agreement 3.06.97 of the Bank UBS Geneva, where it was deposited USD$ 774,193,545.00 and distributed in several accounts.

Rigged: The Scramble for Africa’s Oil, Gas and Minerals

8 February 2012

The intensifying competition for commercial access to the world’s remaining deposits of oil, gas and minerals brings with it a serious risk of exacerbating corruption and violent conflict. Our new report shows that in Angola and Nigeria there is a risk that complex deals struck between governments and corporations for access to natural resources could be used corruptly to benefit vested interests in these countries, rather than the citizens. The report also points to major concerns over opaque sales of mining assets in the Democratic Republic of Congo to offshore companies.

Our research reveals two major problems in the government allocation of oil contracts:

Governments are not making clear the grounds for why a particular company is given a contract. In certain cases, they appear to allow certain companies special or preferential access to oil licences, leading to doubts about the integrity of the process.
Governments are awarding the licences to companies whose beneficial owners remain undisclosed. In certain cases, there are grounds for suspicion that some of the companies may be owned or controlled by government or their private sector proxies.

If citizens do not know why particular companies have been awarded natural resource licenses, it can lead to suspicions of wrongdoing, especially in countries like Nigeria, Angola and the DRC with track records of natural resource related corruption. Transparency is crucial for citizen’s ability to trust that there has been no conflict of interest and to ensure that Angola, Nigeria and the DRC use their natural resource revenues for development and poverty reduction.

Bribery, Money Laundry and Corruption
Criminal state of affairs, and wide spread Endemic Corruption MPLA Regime
Daylight theft and pillage of the state assets

This Report was elaborated in 2010

This report focuses among other in the commercial activities of of the Minister of State and Chief of the Military House of the Presidency of the Republic of Angola, General Manuel Hйlder Vieira Dias Jъnior “Kopelipa”.

It is to this individual is the responsibility of the regime sectors of defence and security of state of Angola. With this individual the Chief of Communications of the Presidency of the Republic, General Leopoldino Fragoso do Nascimento “Dino”, and the president of the Administration Board and Director-General of the State Oil Company Sonangol, Manuel Vicente, form the so called triumvirate, which today completely dominates the political economy of Angola, without any distinction between public and private funds

Manuel Vicente joins also the accumulated powers of the Generals and those of the State Oil Sonangol, the fact that he is one of the most influential members of the Political Bureau of the MPLA party, has the protйgй of the President of the Republic and the responsible for the fiscal inspection of the private businesses of the MPLA Party.

The State Oil Company Sonangol is the biggest company of Angola, and the largest contributing to the coffers of the State, several analysts have considered Sonangol as the principal instrument of maintaining the Corrupt Regime of Josй Eduardo dos Santos in the domains of the financial, political and diplomatic circles internationally, like wise is the single source of illicit enrichment of the leaders of the MPLA Regime.

In certain cases, they show solidarity with other junior members in the administration who are accomplices in allowing the theft of public money, by showing gratitude and sharing in the heist, these are normally members of the executive, and public senior officials who where involved and assisted in the theft, pillage of the public funds.

Strategic sectors such as the Oil sector, telecommunications, baking, social communication, diamonds, all make part of the empire build by this regime figures.

The companies which relate to what we have just mentioned above are: Movicel, Biocom, Banco Espнrito Santo Angola, Nazaki Oil & Gбs, Media Nova, World Wide Capital and Lumanhe.

Movicel
At present (2010) there are only two mobile phone service operators in angola one is Unitel and the other is Movicel.

Unitel
Operates since 2001, it is a result from the association by equal shares of (25%), between Sonangol, through its subsidiary MSTelcom (ex-Mercury), and Portugal Telecom, GENI and Vidatel.

Movicel was created by the government in 2003, as a subsidiary of the state company Angola-Telecom.

Through the Resolution N.° 67/09 of 26 August 2009, the Council of Ministers decreed the meditate privatization and without public tender the privatization of the company Movicel, they allocated the company to a consortium of angolan companies by the value of 200 millions de dollars.

For such effect, the MPLA Regime, invoked the difficulty on the mobilization of other investors for the privatization of the companies.

The MPLA Regime also argued of the urgency in generation funds to the coffers of government in "face of world financial crisis" ;

That decision, according to the government resolution, had into account the identification on the "structure of the national investment partners, that secures the financial resources vitals to the immediate application of the investment plans of Movicel and the financial backup awaited by the national treasury".

Mean wile 59% of the capital of the company Movicel was transferred to two companies linked to high ranking officers under the State Minister and Chief of the Military House, General Manuel Hйlder Vieira Dias Jъnior “Kopelipa”, the company Portmill and the company Modus Comunicare, as we will describe.

On the 10 of June 2009, General Kopelipa, and General Dino and Manuel Vicente, formally separated from the company Portmill Investments and Telecommunications from which they where both proprietors, with control of 99,96% of the company shares equally divided between themselves.

They gave their shares by the intermediary of a portuguese citizen called Ismкnio Coelho Macedo, to a group of high ranking officials of the Unit of the Presidential Guard (UGP), as per the grid shown under.

In the case of the company Portmill, the Lieutenant-Coronel Leonardo Lidinikeni, official of the Presidential Escort has 99,96% of the shares of the company.

In the company Modus Comunicare, the Lieutenant-Coronel Tadeu Agostinho dos Santos Hikatala, responsible for the presidential escort, is the share holder of 99,92% of the shares of the company. The United of Presidential Guard (UGP) is subordinated to the Military House (Casa Militar).

The private administrator of the Businesses’ of General Kopelipa, Mr. Ismкnio Coelho Macedo, made the operation of purchase, selling and restructuration of a small company of communications, publicity and marketing called Modus Comunicare – Comunicaзгo e Imagem Lda. which had already had expression in the market, and placed in its ownership list high ranking officials of the Presidential Palace.

The company was transformed into an anonymous society, dedicated to telecommunications on the 14 August 2009.

That date indicates that the process of recognition of such transaction, its transformation into an anonymous society and alteration of its business scope, only was concluded two weeks after the government of President Josй Eduardo dos Santos, atributed 19% of the shares of the company Movicel to this new company.

On the 29 July 2009, the Council of Ministers approved the privatization of 80% of the capital of the company Movicel in favour of the angolan companies Portmill Investimentos and Telecomunicaзхes (40%), Modus Comunicare (19%), Ipang – Indъstria de Papel e Derivados (10%), Lambda (6%) and Novatel (5%).

By its turn the state companies Angola Telecom and the Empresa Nacional de Correios e Telйgrafos de Angola have the following shares 18% and 2% of the social capital of the company Movicel.

We now present the list of beneficiary share holders on the companies:

Portmill, Investments and Telecommunications (40%)

As national director of Telecommunications Mr Aristides Cardoso Frederico Safeca, integrated the Commission for the Negotiations of Movicel, in accordance with the government edict No. 67/07 issued by the ex-Ministry of Finances Mr Josй Pedro de Morais (December 2002 to October 2008), dated of 19 January 2007.

That commission was headed by the then economic assessor of the President Josй Eduardo dos Santos, Archer Mangueira.

Since 2 October 2006, Aristides Safeca has the functions of President of the Administration Council and Director of the Belgian Company Parisa, S.A.

The same Aristides Safeca, in association with his Brothers Alcides Safeca, Secretary of State for Budget (Secretario de Estado do Orзamento – Ministry of Finances) and Amнlcar Safeca, Director of UNITEL, are majority partners in the company Trans Omnia,

in which the associate themselves with G eneral Fernando Vasquez Araъjo, Chief of the Main Department of Armament and Technical of the Army General Staff of the FAA. The company Trans Omnia has been privileged in multimillion contracts to the supply of food to the Angolan Armed Forces FAA.

Aristides Safeca accumulates the public functions with private sector functions, which is a norm in the MPLA Regime

The Vice-Minister for Telecommunications is also the President of the Administration Board of the foreign Company Parisa (Based in Belgium), making multiple business with the Angolan State for self enrichment and of those family members and associates.

The attribution of a quota to Novatel, in the privatization of Movicel constitutes another proof of public funds being diverted in determent of the State.

Novatel was created on the 29 April 2009, after the presentation of the recommendations of the Commission for the Negotiation of Movicel and 3 months before the formal announcement of the beneficiary companies by the Council of Ministers.

Fбbrica em Benguela avaliada em 294 milhхes de dуlares Segunda maior cimenteira quer liderar mercado interno

A Heidelberg, o segundo maior grupo cimenteiro mundial, arranca com a construзгo da fбbrica em Benguela durante o ano de 2013. A empresa vai se associar com a Tecnimуvel (Angola), Grupo Galileu (Portugal) e com a Caixa Social das Forзas Armadas Angolanas para criar a SLN – Fбbrica de Cimento e Clinker de Benguela.

O capital da nova fбbrica estб distribuнdo em 55% com os alemгes da Heidelberg, 34% com a Tecnimуvel, 11% com o Grupo Galileu e 10% com a Caixa Social das FAA.

O contrato de investimento foi assinado, em Dezembro de 2009, ainda por Aguinaldo Jaime (que liderava a Agкncia Nacional de Investimento Privado – ANIP) mas sу agora as condiзхes estгo criadas para o avanзo definitivo do projecto. Mais: o Novo Jornal sabe
que uma alta figura do grupo Heidelberg aterra, dia 8, na Catumbela (provнncia de Benguela), para liderar os acertos finais.

O investimento estб avaliado em 294 milhхes de US dуlares. A parte angolana entra com cerca de 25 milhхes de US dуlares de capitais prуprios e 71 milhхes de dуlares em maquinaria e equipamentos e outros bens fixos e corpуreos. Do exterior virгo cerca de 26 milhхes de US dуlares e outros 169 milhхes USD para importaзгo de mбquinas e equipamentos. O financiamento da fбbrica foi estabelecido em
moldes semelhantes.

O projecto arranca com capitais prуprios de 59 milhхes de dуlares, sendo que 49% pertencem aos investidores angolanos (25 milhхes de dуlares). Os restantes 51%, ou 30 milhхes US dуlares, pertencerгo ao investidor externo. Os capitais alheios, avaliados em 235 milhхes de US dуlares, serгo negociados junto da banca. 30% no mercado financeiro nacional e os restantes 70% no mercado internacional.

As autoridades nacionais, no acordo de investimento (que o Novo Jornal consultou em parte), comprometemse a conceder uma бrea de mil metros quadrados para o projecto, a investir nas ligaзхes ferroviбrias da regiгo de Benguela para facilitar a ligaзгo ao Porto do Lobito e a fornecer бgua e energia para garantir a operaзгo.

Tambйm serгo concedidas as isenзхes fiscais estabelecidas na lei Nє 17/03 de 25 de Julho, para alйm de estarem garantidas as questхes burocrбticas envolvidas em processos deste gйnero.

No acordo de investimento ficaram tambйm garantidas as questхes ambientais, mediante a apresentaзгo de um estudo de impacto de ambiental, como prevк a lei. Esta й, com certeza, uma das questхes mais sensнveis do investimento. A provнncia de Benguela estб inserida numa regiгo com forte apetкncia turнstica e num ecosistema relativamente frбgil – com zonas de habitaзгo e reproduзгo de
animais e alguma apreensгo pelo suposto avanзo do deserto do Namibe.

A recente estiagem deixou em sobressalto a regiгo sul de Angola.

MPLA has now the control of the private media in Angola

21 February 2012

Protests demanding reform and led by the youth and reported on national media challenged the despotic dictator Josй Eduardo dos Santos, who completed 32 years in absolute power.

Source: Committee for the protection of Journalists (Comitк de proteзгo de Jornalistas)

The Parliament, dominated by the MPLA party of Jose Eduardo dos Santos, analyzed legislation to "combat crimes" in the domain of technologies of information and social communication. The Law Project, since last year (2011), intends to harden the sentences for defamation and to criminalize the electronic diffusion of "recordings, images and videos" from anybody without the express consent of those in such recordings, images or videos.

In declarations to the Nations Radio Station, the Communist Dictator Jose Eduardo dos Santos, em clara alusгo a jornalistas cidadгos, atacou o uso da Internet para organizar "manifestaзхes nгo autorizadas com o intuito de insultar, denegrir, provocar tumulto e confusгo". (Um usuбrio do YouTube, kimangakialo, postou mais de 150 vнdeos de protestos).

In the same speech made in April 2011, Jose Eduardo dos Santos afirmou que os jornalistas gozavam de total liberdade para criticar sua lideranзa. Porйm, pesquisas do CPJ indicam que as forзas de seguranзa agrediram, prenderam e obstruнram o trabalho de jornalistas independentes que cobriam protestos e eventos oficiais. Personalidades e funcionбrios pъblicos usaram as forзas de seguranзa e os tribunais para acertar as contas com os repуrteres que investigavam denъncias de abuso de poder, corrupзгo ou mб conduta.

Two journalists, Armando Josй Chicoca and William Tonet, where condemned to prison, due to their critical coverage of the MPLA Regime; both appealed to their sentences and where released on the end of 2011.

Josй Manuel Gimbi enfrentou intimidaзгo por parte das forзas de seguranзa enquanto realizava reportagens do enclave militarizado e rico em petrуleo de Cabinda. Ataques ao serviзo de navegaзгo (DoS), targeting sites hosted in the exterior such as the popular Angolan Independent news sites Club-K and Angola24horas, where taken from the internet in October 2011, closed down by the MPLA Regime.

Law of "crimes" on the internet, restricts news and of social network sites.

Incarceration or treat of incarceration, and aggression to journalists to make them to refrain or be afraid in reporting in cases of corruption, involving members of the MPLA Regime.

Attacks and Persecution of Journalists in Angola 2012 by the MPLA Regime Security Apparatus

7 of March 2012 On the 7 of March 2012 the Journalist Francisco Mukkuta also known as "Coque" from the "Radio Station Despertar" was followed by elements of the MPLA Security Apparatus on a 4X4 Land Cruiser, of grey colour and without any number plaque which is issued by Frescangol, after conducting and interview on the Radio at 18:30 with two young Human Rights activist Mбrio Domingos and Kimbanba who have been earlier kidnapped and beating by the MPLA Security Forces apparatus in the vicinity of the Water Tank of the shanty town Cazenga, Luanda then taken to the area of the Sanitary Installations bordering the Cazenga, Cacuanco and Viana areas.

The Land Cruiser followed the Journalist from the door of the Radio Station to the car park next to his house.

Hand written message on a pamphlet with death treat to the Journalist Francisco Mukkuta also known as "Coque" from the "Radio Station Despertar". The message in hand writing reads:
"Koke is better if you move neighbourhood, take care thief.
Koke you are not afraid, better look out"

The note was delivered on the 21 March 2012 to the Journalist Francisco Mukkuta

25 Attacks on journalists in 2011 by the MPLA Regime Security Apparatus

In 2011 it saw an increase of attacks to journalists in Angola perpetrated by the MPLA Regime. Several cases of physical aggression, censorship, arrests and treats have severely increased in 2011 in comparison to 2010. Many of the Journalists involved, who where targeted where those journalists who covered the many youth protests against the MPLA Regime following the inspiration of the Arab Spring protests in north Africa in 2011.

List of attacks to Journalist in Angola by the MPLA Regime per year and the amount of fatal or attacked journalists.

2007 – 4
2008 – 4
2009 – 7
2010 – 7
2011 – 25

2 Two the number of independent Angolan Newspapers

With the exception of only two independent private newspapers the rest of the newspapers in Angola are in the hands of MPLA Party Officials, Civil Servants or are under the control of shareholder ownership by companies aligned with the MPLA Regime, including family members of the MPLA Regime ruling elite.

2 List of the two independent Angolan Newspapers

Note:
Folha 8 a weekly newsletter had its offices raided by the MPLA Regime Security Forces on the 12 March 2012, all the Computers where removed and taken form Folha 8 offices.

It is to be known that the Editor of Folha 8 publicly revealed a few months ago that he had written documents on the state of Foreign Bank accounts in the Name of the Dictator Jose Eduardo dos Santos. Is this a way for the MPLA Regime find out what those documents are and who made them available?

Luanda, Angola, 10 March 2012

All photos where taken on the 10 March 2012, the anniversary of the first Demonstration of 7 march 2011 in Luanda.
Those in the picture are among others the secretary of the Democratic Bloc Political Party and Civil Activists, on of them is a well known rapper.

7 Seven is the number of the Angolan Newspapers controlled by the MPLA Regime:

O Paнs
Expansгo
Exame
Angolense
A Capital
Semanбrio Angolense
Novo Jornal

8 years of prison

In the law of Internet in Angola, it is proposed a severe punishment "to those without consent, supply, transmit, facilitate, distribute recordings, films and photos of other peoples by means of a system of information".

At present the MPLA Regime as passed 4 Laws that criminalize news gathering activities.

1886 The Legal Law inherited from colonial era, determines 6 months of imprisonment for defamation of public officers.
2002 A Lei do Segredo de Estado impхe uma pena de dois anos de prisгo por posse de documentos oficiais considerados ‘sensнveis’. 2006 A Lei de Imprensa permite que tribunais suspendam meios de comunicaзгo por um ano.
2010 A Lei de Crimes Contra a Seguranзa do Estado estabelece uma pena de dois anos de prisгo por "insultos atravйs de palavras, imagens, textos ou бudio" contra o presidente ou instituiзхes oficiais.

2 the number of independent radio stations in Angola

Apart from controlling the public radio stations, the MPLA Party officials also control all Radio Stations in Angola apart from only 2 Independent and private Radio Stations.

2 Two independent Radio Stations:

Radio Ecclйsia
Radio Despertar

8 Eight Radio stations controlled by the MPLA Regime:

Radio Nacional de Angola
Television Pъblica de Angola
FM Radio LAC
FM Radio Comercial de Cabinda
FM Radio 2000
FM Radio Morena
Radio Mais
TV Zimbo

10 Journalists Killed since 1992

10 Journalists where killed by the MPLA Regime because of their work in the last two decades in Angola. Many more deaths of journalist occurred during the civil war committed by the MPLA Regime apparatus, which no one has ever been brought to justice for it.

Details of killing of Journalists in Angola by the MPLA Regime since 1992:

7 journalists assassinated
2 journalists killed by supposedly crossed fire
1 journalist killed during a reporting mission
0 Zero the number of detentions by the Police or by the Regime in reference to the assassinations of the Journalists in Angola

THE MPLA IS BUYING THE NEWSPAPERS IN PORTUGAL

Tobis – The MPLA Regime bought this Film Archive company which holds the Film from the decolonization era. The buying company was Filmdrehtsich Unipessoal, they paid 4 million euros for the Lumiar Studios. The archive – which includes the Colonial war time – was taken out from Tobis before it had become classified as national patrimony.

Cofina – The company Newshold controls 15,08% of Cofina, this company is controlled by the MPLA Regime is the source of the financing, it has almost 22% of the editorial and controls the following press titles in portugal: Correio da Manhг, Record, Sбbado and Jornal de Negуcios. This information clarifies why in the recent years, and more noticeable in the recent 6 months jornalists and editorial staff have been removed and fired for publishing articles which are not favourable of the MPLA Regime actions.

Newshold – This company has now achieved 1,7% in the portuguese media group SIC, Expresso, Visгo and Caras, among other titles. The MPLA Regime is trying to purchase 23% of shares that the Company Ongoing has in the company, which if they are allowed to purchase it, they will have the control of 25% of the Newshold media group.

The Russian / Chinese Mafia

The Russian and Chinese Mafia is lead and composed by Sam Pa [(Xu Jinghua) president the China International Fund (CIF) (?) and of China-Sonangol, Wang Xiangfei [Non Executive Director of China International Trust and Investment Company (CITIC Group)], Jin Liqun ( President of the Counsel of Supervision of China Investment), Wu Yang (one of the Directors of Group 88 Queensway), all conected to the Ministry of Security of the Communist Chinese State, and Lev Avnerovich Leviev (Russian Businessman Billionaire (Bukharian)-Israel), Arcadi Aleksandrovich Gaydamak (Russian Businessman Billionaire).

Lev Avnerovich Leviev sold his participation of 18% in the Diamond Mines of Catoca to China Sonangol International Holding Ltd for US$400 Million USD, having acquired that participation in the decade of the 1990 for only US$20 Million Dollars.

Xu Jinghua comes to Luanda monthly to get bags of Diamonds valued at of more than US$66,2 Million Dollars – All this information given to us by Superior Officers of the Angolan Counter Intelligence Unit.

Xu Jinghua [(Sam Pa), old soviet time student colleague of Josй Eduardo dos Santos in one of the Military Collages of the KGB. Xu Jinghua during the civil war he always appeared next to the Russians as a consultant, and the funny thing is that this same individual was also the agent of the counterintelligence of china in Angola. As is was told to us by one of the most close collaborators of General Helder Viera Dias “Kopelipa,” who asked for anonymity.

Xu Jinghua, Manuel Domingos Vicente and Josй Filomeno de Sousa dos Santos have always been involved in the management of China Sonangol International Holding Ltd, in both ways visible and invisibly.

Before the creation of China-Sonangol, Xu Jinghua served as intermediary of crude oil between the Angolan regime and the communist Chinese regime.

The General Manuel Helder Vieira Dias Jъnior (Kopelipa) occupied and was in charge of the protocol aspects, maximum security and Manuel Domingos Vicente was in charge of the administrative and logistic matters … while that, Josй Filomeno de Sousa dos Santos learned with his “adoptive uncle” Xu Jinghua, in Hong Kong, the secrets of the transnational administration …

Josй Filomeno de Sousa dos Santos was thus prepared to administer Billions and Billions of US Dollars and to abandon the administration bosy of China-Sonangol, some time in la second part of 2012, leaving behind Manuel Domingos Vicente, who staid as the Executive Director of China-Sonangol.

Due to his health conditions of Domingos, it is Francisco Lemos Josй Maria, supposedly direct cousin of Ana Paula Cristуvгo Lemos dos Santos, who has travelled to Hong Kong regularly in the name of the President of the Republic of Angola.

Question: Who is the real owner of China Sonangol International Holding Ltd Group and of Endiama China International Holding Limited owned by the Group 88 Queensway, localized in Hong Kong?

And more so. lets find out, the destination of Angola Gross domestic product (GDP), estimated at more than US$115.9 Billions Dollars (2011 estimate), oil & gas, raw materials, mining and derivates, farm land, etc.

China International Fund (CIF)

China International Fund (CIF) is a Chinese-owned officially private company based in Hong Kong that describes its major businesses as including "large-scale national reconstruction projects and infrastructure construction in developing countries". The China International Fund CIF and its associated companies in Hong Kong and Singapore invested upwards of $US 20 billion mainly in unstable African dictatorships.

They have made agreements with the Angolan and Guinean governments to explore for various resources in those countries. These agreements will result in billions of dollars of money being invested in the two countries.

The Company is under the suspicion of being a state-owned company, because “key personnel have ties to Chinese state-owned enterprises and government agencies.”

In a conversation between American Ambassador Dan Mozena and Chinese Ambassador Bolum Zhang, Zhang said, "the China International Fund CIF made many promises to Angola, and that while the company has a large presence in Angola, its weak management and lack of leadership have stalled many of the projects. Zhang said that as the China International Fund CIF is a "private company," the Chinese embassy does not actively participate or monitor its relationship with Angola. He added that China International Fund CIF continues to benefit from the Hong Kong-based owner’s "close relationship" with President Dos Santos."

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